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## Near East/South Asia Report

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27 November 1985

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

HURRIYET COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN ACTIVITIES IN U.S.

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 30 Sep 85 pp 1,4

[Text] The HURRIYET correspondent reports from Los Angeles:

California's Armenian governor George Deukmejian, who has virtually turned the state into an "Armenia," has now managed to introduce Armenian terrorism into the universities where such criminal activities are now glorified in classrooms.

The California State University at Fresno has begun offering courses on Armenian acts of violence.

The chairman of the Armenian Studies Department at this university is Professor Dikran Kouymjian who teaches to his students the goals of Armenian terrorist organizations such as the ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide and the Armenian Revolutionary Army. During these classes Kouymjian talks about Armenian rights and tries to justify the murder of Turkish diplomats by Armenian terrorist organizations. Those students who sign up for these courses are given high grades for the winter quarter and enjoy other privileges as outstanding students.

History Distorted

Meanwhile Armenian Congressman Charles Pashayan said in a statement that the U.S. Congress acknowledged the Armenian genocide in 1896 and 1920 by endorsing two resolutions on that issue. Pashayan urged the present Congress "to follow the example of these previous bills."

Pashayan, a Republican congressman from California, noted that Congresswoman Nancy Johnson and Congressman Tony Coelho have also expressed their views on this issue and that it has been confirmed that the U.S. Congress acknowledged in 1896 and 1920 that an Armenian genocide was committed in the Ottoman Empire. Pashayan said: "These events have been recorded in detail in the archives of Congress and are indisputable facts. We therefore urge the present Congress to endorse Resolution 192 in view of the said precedents."

Armenian Report Released

Meanwhile, it is reported that the Armenian report prepared for the Human Rights and Political Committee of the European Parliament by Belgian

parliamentarian Jacques Vandemculbruch has been published in Armenian papers in Los Angeles. This report will be officially submitted to the European Parliament's Strasbourg meeting next month.

The report, entitled "The Political Solution of the Armenian Problem," features the history of the Armenian problem in its introductory section. It states that until the 19th century several non-Moslem ethnic groups and minorities in the Ottoman Empire lived in an environment of full tolerance and that, however, at the end of 19th century the Armenians were instigated by the Russians and other great powers to rise against the Ottoman government.

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CSO: 4605/11



ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

TURKISH JOURNALIST ADVOCATES ARMENIAN-TURKISH DIALOG

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 27 Sep 85 pp 1,4

[Text] As we reported in our yesterday's edition, the Austrian television held a panel debate on the Armenian question with the participation of representatives from both [the Armenian and Turkish] sides as well as a German historian and the Austrian moderator. During the panel debate which took place two days ago and lasted 3 hours opposing views were expressed. On this occasion, MLLLIYE'I carries an article by Mumtaz Soysal entitled: "Is This the First One?" The article says:

Austria's leading newspaper, COURIER, reports in its television news section that at 9:45 pm on Wednesday a panel debate with no time limit will take place on television pitting, for the first time ever, Turks against Armenians. The report adds that the participants in the program will include two Armenians, two Turks, a third-country historian and the Austrian moderator.

After turning into enemies two communities which had coexisted peacefully for eight centuries, the West now wants to gain credit for their rapprochement by initiating a dialog between Turks and Armenians and by attempting to recreate the friendship that was broken at its own instigation.

The panel debate purportedly represents the first dialog between the two communities.

Such an allegation indicates above all ignorance about the unbreakable bond between the two communities. Indeed, one can find no other example in the history of the world of such a harmonious relationship between two communities so different in faith, religion, language and ethnic origin--a relationship so harmonious that it lasted for a full 800 years without any quarrels or conflicts and two communities so tightly intertwined in customs, traditions and cultures that they have become inseparable.

Today, when people speak about a first dialog they are admitting their ignorance of these facts. Thus, before anything is said, the author of that phrase knows nothing about the coexistence of Turks and Armenian and the historic commonality of the two communities' traditions and cultures.

Basically, it is important to know how that unbreakable bond, the centuries-old coexistence and the harmonious relationship came about and why they broke down

at the turn of the 20th century after having survived with mutually beneficial results from the 11th through the 19th century. There is even more. If the contention that the bonds of friendship between the two communities have been broken forever is true, then how is it possible that Turks and Armenians still live with the same harmony and still maintain the same close and sincere friendship and mutual respect in the streets of Istanbul, from the wine taverns of Kumkapi to the stores of Carsikapi?

On this occasion, one may talk about Islam's tolerance and broad-mindedness, which some circles have recently begun confusing with the laws and principles of secularism deflecting its spirit from its lofty goals and ignoring the advantages which made the aforementioned constructive and beneficial friendship possible for both sides. Since the Seljuks, the Turks have always treated the assorted ethnic groups in Anatolia with tolerance and broad-mindedness and granted them every right despite their numerical superiority. Sometimes, in the case of large ethnic groups, the Turks left them free to keep their customs and traditions and to pursue their ancestral faiths and beliefs. The Ottoman government was founded on the same principle and spirit. This is confirmed by the fact that when Mehmet the Conqueror conquered Constantinople, his first move was to invite the Armenian spiritual leader Movagim from Bursa to Constantinople and to ordain him as patriarch, equal in stature to the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Byzantium.

However, perhaps the most interesting point is that, rather than remaining confined to a specific territorial domain, the Armenians preferred to live dispersed throughout Anatolia and other parts of the Empire side by side with the Turks plying their trades and crafts. It is as a result of this dispersion that an unbreakable friendship was forged between Turks and Armenians. At times this has led to confusion about the origins of certain customs and traditions. Thus, today Armenians and Turks share many traits in areas ranging from language to cuisine, from architecture to music and theater.

Consequently, if one is to talk about the Armenian question the most constructive method would be to initiate a dialog between Turks and Armenians. But Turkey must not let the credit for initiating such a dialog go to others by organizing certain activities on its own.

However, such a dialog must take place with the participation of historians, men of culture, intellectuals, writers, painters, artists and scholars.

Otherwise, one cannot expect the Turkish government to reopen the path which began with the participation of Boghos Nubar Pasha in the Treaty of Sevres and which ended by the Treaty of Lausanne. In other words, it would be pointless to sit at the negotiating table and to debate with persons who lack such qualifications and who hold no stature whatsoever.

We would lose nothing by resuming a dialog with the Armenians with whom we have always and often been in communication. While the Austrians want to gain credit for being the first on this issue, a similar attempt was made by the Canadian television last May.

However, if we use this dialog to resurrect issues that should be considered closed and to reopen wounds by recalling events that belong to the past neither of the two communities will win anything; on the contrary they will both suffer severely.

The biggest loser, however, will be humanity itself.

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CSO: 4605/12

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

'ARMENIAN TERRORISTS' SAID TO BE TRAINED IN SYRIAN CAMPS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 28 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] Frankfurt--The second channel of West German television has aired an interesting documentary on international terrorism prepared jointly by Japanese, Canadian and British television journalists. The program exposes the role of certain countries in the encouragement and escalation of terrorism and sharply deplores the French government for its supportive stance toward Armenian terrorism.

Several Soviet KGB operatives who have recently defected to the West spoke on the program with their faces concealed and accused the Soviet Union of instigating and encouraging terrorist activities in Turkey. According to the documentary, besides the Soviet Union, France and Libya are also partly responsible for the rise of terrorism, and lately Syria has begun to play a major role in the planning of terrorist acts.

Speaking in the West German documentary, a former KGB official whose face was concealed made certain disclosures. He said that until 12 September 1980 an average of 20 persons were killed daily in Turkey and that the Soviet Union played an undeniable role in that regard.

The former KGB official also said:

"The Soviets do not want Turkey to stand firmly on its feet because it is an important NATO ally and because a strong Turkey is not in Moscow's interests.

"Consequently, until very recently the Soviet Union was involved in a broad campaign of instigating various ethnic groups and training guerrillas and operatives. Special centers and camps were set up in the Soviet Union to train these operatives who were given weapons and money and dispatched to Turkey. From the very outset, Moscow's goal has been to weaken and to destabilize Turkey."

The documentary also claims that as a result of the events in Lebanon Armenian terrorists began to be trained in Syrian camps. According to the documentary, Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad ordered the establishment of four major centers to facilitate the training of terrorists by special experts. The documentary also accuses France of being too tolerant and lenient toward foreign terrorists and even helping and supporting them out of fear. The program adds, however,

that France has recently been forced to take a stronger stand against terrorism. According to terrorism experts, terrorist acts began to be encouraged in France after Mitterrand and his Socialist Party took office. However, after the Orly massacre various organizations led by the French police urged and forced the government to take effective action against international terrorism.

The documentary also features an appearance by the Italian Industry Minister who stated that many members of the Italian Red Brigades organization have found sanctuary in France and conduct their destructive activities from there. The minister added that France has refused to extradite them despite his government's repeated requests.

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CSO: 4605/9



ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ASALA 'INSTRUCTORS' REPORTEDLY SENT TO TRAIN TURKS IN LEBANON

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 28 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] Ali Okansoy, one of the defendants in the trial on the recent incidents in southeastern Anatolia, disclosed some very interesting information during his interrogation yesterday. He stated in his testimony that six ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] militants were invited to a camp in Lebanon to train members of his organization. He added, however, that the ASALA instructors were sent back before they started working because of a dispute that arised among the members of his organization.

Okansoy, who had fled overseas after 12 September, also spoke about his organization's activities in Syria and Lebanon. He said that after several ventures he arrived in the most secure Palestinian camp in Lebanon where Turkish militants were being trained under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan. He recalled that one day six ASALA instructors arrived at the camp to teach the Turkish militants the use of explosives and other warfare methods. However, Okansoy added, the members of his organization did not want to be trained by them, and as a result of the ensuing dispute Abdullah Ocalan sent the ASALA instructors back even though he was the one who had invited them.

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EGYPT

OPPOSITION LEADER INTERVIEWED ON CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 14 Sep 85 pp 20-23

[Interview with opposition figure Lutfi al-Khuli: "An Arab Conference in Cairo Will Not Save Egypt from the Treaty with Israel"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Can Egypt free itself from the Camp David agreement and the normalization of relations with Israel, or has this treaty become an inescapable destiny?

Is it true that if the Egyptian regime ventured to nullify the "peace treaty" with Israel, the Jewish state would be impelled to declare war on Egypt and a serious crisis would arise with the United States? Is this what keeps President Husni Mubarak from taking this step, or are there other reasons?

In view of this, will relations between Egypt and the Arab states continue to turn in a vicious circle because its name is tied to Camp David?

Lutfi al-Khuli, the prominent Egyptian nationalist writer and opposition figure, who has close ties to Arabs and Palestinians and is considered an important bridge between Egypt and the Arab world, presents a number of proposals to deliver Egypt from Camp David, and in particular urges that an Arab conference be held in Cairo to achieve that goal.

In this exclusive interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL, Lutfi al-Khuli speaks about the possibilities and scenarios for change in Egypt, the dangers faced by the present regime, the possibility that Sadatists will stage a coup against Mubarak, Egyptian-American and Egyptian-Soviet relations, and numerous other subjects.

Lutfi al-Khuli discusses these issues from a number of viewpoints: as a leading figure in the opposition (he is one of the founders of the National Grouping Party and is in charge of Arab affairs within the party); as a writer involved in issues of the Arab world who believes that Egypt will return to play a role in it (he is editor-in-chief of the magazine AL-TALI'AH, which recently resumed publication, and he is also responsible for the "National Dialogue" page of AL-AHRAM, which appears twice a week with contributions by prominent Arab political figures and intellectuals); and as a fighter who

refused al-Sadat's line and his policy, for which the late president punished him by banning him from writing, stripping him of his duties at AL-AHRAM and closing AL-TALI'AH.

The interview with Lutfi al-Khuli started with the following question:

[Question] What price has Egypt paid for signing the peace treaty with Israel, domestically and on the Arab and international planes? Has Egypt derived any benefit from this treaty, or did it simply create a historic dilemma for the largest of the Arab states?

[Answer] The main problem that we face at the present time, as Egyptians and Arabs, is that the largest of the Arab states has signed a separate agreement with Israel under the American umbrella. This separate agreement has had a bad effect on Egypt's Arab ties and struck a blow to its Arab interests, be they economic, commercial, strategic or security-related. It has also turned Egypt--one of the founders of the non-aligned block--into a country aligned with the United States in a relationship that can best be described as one of dependency. This situation forces us to pose a basic question: In what way has signing the Camp David agreement served Egypt's interests? Has this agreement secured any benefit for us? The answer is no, this agreement has provided absolutely no benefit for Egypt.

[Question] Can you give some examples?

[Answer] The agreement did not bring about a peace between Egypt and Israel that would allow the Egyptian government to reduce military spending. In fact, military spending has increased, and goes up each year by an average of 5 to 10 percent. It was assumed that the agreement, especially due to the American support, would solve some of Egypt's economic problems. What happened is that these problems became more serious, to the point that Egypt now consumes close to 2 million Egyptian pounds every day for food, of which 1 million is in loans. That has never happened before in Egypt's history. What has been achieved with the American assistance that has poured into Egypt after the signing of the Camp David agreement, compared to Soviet assistance, for example? American assistance to Egypt has been greater than Soviet assistance, but it is an entirely different kind. Soviet assistance led to the building of the High Dam, the shipyard, and the building of a thousand factories, whereas the Americans have not carried out a single important project in Egypt in the past 10 years--the Golden Age in relations between Cairo and Washington. It rather seems to us that U.S. interests dictate that Egypt should remain economically weak and in continual need of the United States, with a much lower status than that of Israel. The agreement returned Sinai to us? Not exactly, since Taba is still under Israeli control. Of course, the area covered by Taba is very small, but the Israeli government uses it as a bargaining chip in talks with Cairo, and wants a price for its return. This price is a wide-based normalization of relations between the two countries. Thus we can say that the Camp David agreement failed as far as Egypt is concerned in that there is a real crisis in official Egyptian-Israeli relations and popular support is increasing for the rejection of the agreement with Israel. This agreement has failed, of course, as regards the

region as a whole, since it could not open the door to a true, comprehensive and just peace.

[Question] But do President Mubarak and top government officials not understand the situation? Why does President Mubarak not realize the lesson to be learned from this failed gambit? How is Mubarak different from al-Sadat in his adherence to Camp David?

[Answer] For al-Sadat and the powers that he represented, the Camp David agreement was an option that fit in perfectly with the policy of close ties with the United States--indeed it was the logical conclusion to be drawn from it--as well as the economic open-door policy, which was aimed at purging the public sector, and the policy of ending the Nasirist experiment in all its manifestations. For Mubarak, the Camp David agreement was a kind of legacy that should be dealt with and adhered to on the basis of two factors:

First, this legacy has its legitimacy at the domestic and international levels, and Egypt must honor its word and carry out its international obligations.

Second, the balance of power in the Arab world would not allow this legacy to be attacked or abandoned.

But Mubarak also faces another situation, in that he cannot ignore the rejection of the Camp David agreement by popular Egyptian forces and the opposition to it from the middle class and "enlightened capitalism" in Egypt, because it has damaged their interests and closed Arab markets in their faces. He also cannot ignore the failure of this agreement to achieve peace in the region. We find that the current Egyptian regime teeters between two positions: At times it holds to a hard-line position with Israel due to some particular public pressure, and at times it moves toward Israel due to pressure from the United States, even though Israel does not really adhere to the spirit of the Camp David agreement.

There is another difference between al-Sadat and Mubarak. During the period of al-Sadat, it was the Camp David agreement that decided and motivated political activity and political decisions in Egypt. It was the point of departure for Egypt's perception of its relations with the Arab world, foreign countries and even with itself. For example, al-Sadat considered the Egyptian opposition to be traitorous and thought that it should be defeated and even purged because it opposed the Camp David agreement. Under Mubarak, something else has happened, which is that Egypt's situation, in terms of politics, popular mood, or social relations, is not completely subordinated to the Camp David agreement, but rather tries to affect it. Mubarak deals with the Egyptian opposition as a patriotic force, even if they differ with him and his policies. He finds in their opposition to Camp David no reason to clash, but rather feels that this is their right.

There is also another difference. Al-Sadat tried to conclude an alliance with the United States and Israel on the basis of Camp David. He considered Egypt a part of the American strategic framework, and in his last days, even thought seriously of joining NATO. In contrast, we see that Mubarak has refused to be



a part of the strategic framework of the United States or any other country. Indeed, he is trying to rebuild the bridges with the Soviet Union and socialist countries and to reclaim Egypt's position in the context of the non-aligned movement.

In dealing with the Arabs, al-Sadat considered every Arab country that opposed Camp David to be an enemy that should be attacked and whose officials should be accused of political ignorance and backwardness. Mubarak believes that it is the right of any Arab country to reject Camp David and oppose this agreement, without this precluding some cooperation between Egypt and the other Arab countries.

[Question] But these differences between Mubarak and al-Sadat are not enough, in the view of most Arab countries, for relations with Egypt to return to the way they were.

[Answer] That is true. Of course those differences between Mubarak and al-Sadat are not enough for it to be said that a real change has occurred in Egypt's adherence to Camp David. But it is mistaken to take no notice of these changes, even if they are not enough. That would mean that we are not aware of the movement of events and currents, and consequently cannot push them and develop them to achieve the basic final objective. You could say that the Camp David agreement, which was planned to replace the Arab-Israeli conflict and freeze this conflict in favor of Israel and the United States, has now been changed by the course of events and its rejection in Egypt and the Arab countries into a real problem that is more serious than the Arab-Israeli conflict. One cannot deal with the Camp David agreement as if it were an inescapable destiny, nor as if it were simply a piece of paper that needs only to be ripped up for things to return as they were, and for Egypt and the Arab states to reclaim their power.

[Question] Is it true, as has been said by top Egyptian government officials, including President Mubarak himself, that if Egypt tried to nullify the Camp David agreement, Israel would be impelled to declare war against it? Is it true that this would cause a major crisis with the United States?

[Answer] Ripping up the Camp David agreement would be tantamount to declaring war on Israel, and Israel will respond the same way. The Egyptian government knows that, and so does the Egyptian opposition. Ripping up the agreement would of course cause a major crisis between Egypt and the United States that would threaten the cessation of military assistance to Egypt. That is true. But this situation must not turn the Camp David agreement into a fate or a shackle from which one cannot get free. The Egyptian opposition is convinced of this, while other political and mass groups have the destruction of the Camp David agreement as their ultimate goal. But we must act prudently and realistically. However unjust and restrictive an agreement may be, you cannot rip it up, in today's world, without having reasons that are convincing to the world at large. Otherwise, the credibility of your country will be shaken, and that will have repercussions on all kinds of commercial, economic, financial and political agreements that you might conclude with other countries or international groups.



Of course, it should be recognized that there are numerous reasons that Egypt could cite to justify the nullification of the Camp David agreement, of which the most prominent are:

1. Israel's continued illegal possession of Taba and its refusal to return it to Egyptian sovereignty. This is an issue on which Egypt cannot remain silent forever. In this case, it would be possible to set a deadline for the return of Taba to Egyptian sovereignty, and if this does not happen, that would be a reason to nullify the agreement. Keeping Taba constitutes a violation of the agreement, which provides for a return to Egypt's historic borders.

2. Israel's policy of aggression against other Arab states exploits the cover of the Camp David agreement. It should be recognized here that the Egyptian government lost an important chance during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It would have been possible for the Egyptian government to nullify Camp David or freeze it at least, by reason of the invasion of Lebanon, rather than be content with simply withdrawing the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv. This is an important opportunity that Egypt lost. The invasion of Lebanon is completely contrary to the Camp David agreement, the purpose of which--according to the text of the agreement--is to bring about peace in the region.

3. Israel's policy on the Palestinians and Palestinian territory is completely inconsistent with the provisions of the Camp David agreement relating to the Palestinian issue. This policy could serve as a primary justification for the nullification of the Camp David agreement.

[Question] Why did Mubarak let these opportunities go by? Is it because he does not want to be rid of Camp David after all, or are there other considerations?

[Answer] Mubarak would be the best person to answer that question, but based on the information that I have and my analysis of the situation, I think that Mubarak has not taken steps to nullify Camp David up to now, even though he has been given more than one opportunity to do so, because he believes that he would not be able to find a unified Arab position--political, military and economic--that would support Egypt in the face of the serious consequences that would result from the nullification of this agreement, either in Israel's response, or that of the United States.

[Question] Do you believe that Mubarak really wants to get rid of the Camp David agreement?

[Answer] Mubarak is a product of the patriotic Egyptian military establishment, which does not believe in Camp David. There are many powers within the Egyptian government that regard the Camp David agreement as a burden. This is an important gain. But I should explain an essential point, which is that it is necessary to have Egyptian-Arab cooperation in order to block the Camp David agreement and bring about the factors that will make Arab will triumph and bring down the agreement. This cooperation must occur at the political, economic, military and security levels. We must break out of the

vicious circle that revolves around the following dilemma: Should Egypt first nullify the Camp David agreement, or get Arab assurances first?

[Question] How does one break out of this vicious circle?

[Answer] There are two important factors to consider here. The first is that the different segments of the Egyptian population are in favor of nullifying Camp David. The second is that there are prominent forces in the present Egyptian government that consider this agreement to be a restrictive burden. It is necessary to take advantage of these two factors. But how to get out of the vicious circle? Arab-Egyptian talks must be held on this issue. Those who demand that Camp David be nullified before Egypt returns to the Arab ranks must talk with those who demand Arab assurances before Camp David is nullified. It would be difficult to carry out this dialogue in an official Arab context (i.e. the Arab League or Arab conferences at whatever level). This dialogue should also not be held between Egypt and a number of Arab states that for various reasons have common interests with Cairo, like Iraq and Jordan, for example, so that it would not lead to the establishment of a new alliance in the region.

[Question] So how would this Arab-Egyptian dialogue be carried out? What form would it take?

[Answer] I think it could be done in Cairo. An announcement could be made for an Arab conference in which Arab political and party figures from different countries would participate, to be held in Cairo or any other Arab capital, to study seriously the issue of delivering Egypt from the Camp David agreement and make unambiguous and tangible resolutions on the issue. I can tell you that the National Grouping Party, of which I am a member, is prepared to undertake the announcement of such a conference and make the arrangements for it.

[Question] But the question remains: Does President Mubarak want to be freed from Camp David? Does he want this agreement destroyed?

[Answer] Any patriotic Egyptian government must see that this agreement is oppressive, unjust and detrimental to Egyptian national security. It is harmful to her interests, and furthermore, no such government could continue with it. Mubarak is, after all, a product of the Egyptian national military establishment. But it must be stressed that what is needed is not just the nullification of the Camp David agreement, but also and especially the building of an alternate Arab policy to deal with the period after Camp David.

[Question] This idea that is now current in Egypt of forming a "national front" comprising parties and political powers of different orientations--do you think that it is serious and could it open doors to real change in Egypt?

[Answer] The idea that is now being proposed is not new. It has been proposed by the Egyptian opposition--especially the National Progressive Grouping Party since the period of Mubarak began. At that time, the idea of a national front was intended as a way of forming a common basis for national progress, with the participation of different forces operative in Egypt, to

lead to the formation of a national unity government. But the Sadatist forces defeated the idea at that time. Recently, the writer 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, who has good ties with both Mubarak and the opposition, revived the idea of forming a national front to deal with the Islamic forces that believe in violence. Al-Sharqawi's idea is that this national front would be composed of the ruling National Democratic Party, the Wafd Party, members of the Muslim Brotherhood that are allied with the Wafd, the National Grouping Party and the Socialist Labor Party. Up to now, the idea has not been converted into practical action. One of the main reasons may be that the opposition parties do not want this front to be simply a new force that supports the government. They want it to be an arena for cooperation among different Egyptian political forces, based on a program of common and clear effort, in order to confront the great challenges facing our country. The fact that al-Sharqawi, who is known to have good relations with the government, went ahead and proposed the idea of the national front, perhaps indicates that Mubarak has started to realize that one political or societal group alone can no longer take on the challenges and solve the major problems that face us.

[Question] Is the Egyptian opposition comfortable with the nature of its relations with Mubarak, or does it feel uneasy with him or his government?

[Answer] I think that the Egyptian opposition feels extremely uncomfortable in its dealings with Mubarak. With al-Sadat, it was clear how they dealt with each other--it was confrontational. But there is no confrontational relationship between the opposition and Mubarak, indeed the opposition deals with him in a democratic climate, in the context of a delicate balance of power. The opposition understands quite well that any confrontation between them and Mubarak would benefit the Sadatist forces, which are still active in Egypt. These forces support the continuation of the commitment to the Camp David agreement, the close relationship with the United States, and the economic open-door policy. I believe, without any exaggeration, that it is the Sadatist forces that are the primary opponents of Mubarak. They do not consider Mubarak one of them, and they are continually maneuvering to keep him from diverging from the plan laid by al-Sadat. For example, Mubarak once received a report prepared by these Sadatist forces that said that 90 percent of Egyptians oppose any contact by Cairo with the PLO.

So the opposition realizes quite well that any confrontation with Mubarak would benefit the Sadatist forces, but they also realize that they cannot support Mubarak completely because he has not yet undertaken the changes that the opposition seeks, either in domestic or foreign policy.

This does not mean that the idea of the national front is stillborn. No, the future belongs to this idea. The national front could block Camp David and destroy this agreement, because we should not forget that the primary responsibility for destroying this agreement lies with the Egyptians, as long as the Arabs help them and do not stand by and watch.

[Question] Is Mubarak in serious danger from the Sadatist forces, especially if he really tries to distance himself from Camp David?



[Answer] I think that the Sadatist forces--and they still have men in important positions--really will try to block or outflank any movement by the government in a nationalist direction, indeed they may turn against Mubarak if they find a replacement acceptable to the people.

In this regard, I would also like to add that the Egyptian government cannot maintain the current position. It must carry out real and fundamental changes that are appropriate to the scope of the challenges and problems.

[Question] The changes in government that occurred last week, in which Kamal Hasan 'Ali resigned and Dr 'Ali Lutfi was entrusted with forming the new government--does this mean that you do not think that they are enough?

[Answer] This change in government is not a political change, and certainly does not constitute a fundamental change. The new government represents continuity in the same basic plan in various areas.

[Question] How does Mubarak handle his relations with the United States and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] About 3 months ago the Soviet envoy Primakov, a member of the Academy and one of the most distinguished Soviet experts on the Middle East, visited Cairo to give a series of lectures on his country's policies in the region at the Center for Diplomatic Studies in Cairo. During this visit Barimakov met Mubarak and other Egyptian officials. Mubarak assured him that he wants to establish good and normal relations with the Soviet Union, provided that this not be at the expense of Egypt's relations with the United States. He also explained that he rejects any restrictions that the United States might place on his relations with Moscow. I met with Primakov during this visit and he said to me that the Soviet Union is anxious to restore relations with Egypt and does not underestimate Egypt's strategic importance in the region. I got the sense that the Soviet Union, despite its strong opposition to the Camp David agreement, is not trying to cut off Egypt, which has put so much effort into the Camp David agreement, but rather is eager to work with Egypt, and if possible, help it to withdraw from Camp David.

[Question] In your opinion, will the coming summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev, which will be held in Geneva on 19-29 November, lead to any kind of agreement on the Middle East?

[Answer] We should note, first of all, that the Reagan administration rejects the inclusion of the Soviets in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and would like to keep them at a distance from the Middle East. But we should further note that, a few months ago, this American administration started to conduct negotiations with the Soviets on the Middle East. A short while ago, the American secretary of state, George Shultz, announced that the Middle East crisis and developments in the Gulf war will be topics of discussion in the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. Even if this does not constitute a reversal in American policy, it at least represents progress. Why? There are two possibilities:

1. Either the Soviets have exerted some pressure on the Americans to accept discussion of Middle East topics with them, or

2. The Americans have discovered, as a result of the failure of their policy and that of Israel in the last few years, and as a result of the pressure of recent events, that it is impossible to arrive at solutions or settlements to the crises of the region that will really safeguard American interests without the participation of the Soviet Union.

Or perhaps a combination of the two.

Until now, the Arabs have had no role to play in the Geneva conference. Their real role is to crystalize a specific, unified position and make it clear to the Americans and Soviets before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

If that does not happen, then it does not matter whether Reagan and Gorbachev agree or disagree (which is more likely) on the Middle East--the Arabs will gain nothing from this summit.

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EGYPT

## CONTRAST IN ARAB VALUES CONDEMNED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 24 Aug 85 p 5

[Commentary by Sa'd-al Din Ibrahim: "The Arabs Between the Yacht and the Donkey"]

[Text] In the last few weeks, two small stories appeared in the inside pages of some Arab newspapers that deserve to reflection. One concerns a prominent wealthy Arab who had a problem docking his yacht at a French coast resort town. The town did not have a harbor large enough for a yacht of that size.

The other concerns a poor Arab youth who was preoccupied trying to come up with a new method of carrying out a suicidal attack on the Israeli occupying forces in southern Lebanon.

Each of them found a "solution" for his problem, but what a great difference between the two solutions. More important is which one of the two has in his hands the tools to shape the Arab future.

### The Problem of the Arab Yacht

The first story as I read it in one of the Arab magazines is about a wealthy Arab who owns one of the largest yachts in the world. He is so proud of it, more than any of his other yachts, that he named it after his dear daughter. It is his favorite yacht when he wants to go on a cruise surrounded by friends of both sexes. This summer he decided to end his cruise in one of the beautiful French coastal resorts, Antibes. After communicating with the municipality of that town, the crew of the yacht told him that it would not be possible to dock the yacht in the town's small harbor. The harbor was not prepared to accommodate such a huge yacht.

This became an annoying problem for the wealthy Arab who has not been accustomed in recent years to being denied any wish, or to having any obstacle stand in his way. The wealthy Arab and his consultants began thinking and using their imagination to overcome this problem which was threatening to spoil his cruise plan. As a result of this thinking, a creative solution was found. The enlargement of the harbor. The

municipality of the town apologized because it did not have the funds. Immediately, the wealthy Arab offered to bear all expenses. The municipality sent its thanks along with the estimated expenses of a few million francs and the estimated time needed of a few months to complete the project. The wealthy Arab was disturbed not because of the millions that were needed but by the "few months" needed to complete the project, because this meant the summer would come to an end and he wanted to dock his yacht this summer, not next summer. Communications and negotiations were opened once again between the two sides which resulted in the possibility of completing the project in a matter of a few weeks, but with triple the initial estimated expenses. The wealthy Arab gave a sigh of relief and agreed immediately and paid all the expenses. The municipality was very pleased, because this gift from the "Arab Heaven" will mean more money circulating in the town's economy and more jobs for the unemployed, as well as the city's dream of having a bigger harbor soon becoming a reality.

### The Arab Donkey

The second story--as I read it in Arab and foreign papers--is about a youth no more than 16 years of age from one of the poor villages in southern Lebanon. A few months ago he joined the resistance against the Israeli occupation. The Arab youth had witnessed the soldiers of the occupation taking over his village, destroying the homes and killing the men. That inflamed the rage of anger in his heart. He had heard about what Sana' Mahidi and other young Arab men and women had done and the spirit of martyrdom entered into him. He joined one of the resistance cells in southern Lebanon and was trained to use weapons and explosives. He wanted to do what Sana' Mehidli's had done, driving a car loaded with explosives into a gathering center for soldiers and vehicles of the Zionist enemy, but the problem for our young poor Arab villager is that he did not know how to drive and his family did not own a car. Even if the resistance supplied him with a car, he would need a few weeks to learn how to drive, and he did not want to wait that long.

The Arab youth exhausted his imagination to overcome this problem. Finally, he found the solution in his village environment and its traditional means of transportation, the donkey. Yes, donkey. He loaded the heavy explosives in a sack. He got on the donkey with the deadly load and his finger on the little trigger mechanism. When he reached the checkpoint where there was a number of the Israeli occupying forces and some of their collaborators, soldiers from the Army of Southern Lebanon, they did not suspect him or his donkey. At the right moment he pressed the button on the detonator. The young man was killed within seconds and so was his donkey. But also killed and wounded with them were around 20 Israeli and collaborator soldiers.

### We Are Not in Need of More Contradictions

The Arab world is full of contradictions, some of which are due to nature and some due to people. Some are a result of geological coincidence and some are a result of the imposition of ideology. The Arab countries that

are overpopulated are not the ones overflowing with money. The ability of some Arabs to produce revolutions contradicts the ability of the others to waste wealth. The sources of the hidden Arab powers contradict their obvious weakness. These are some of the thousands of contradictions that I and many other know.

The contradiction between the yacht and the donkey has another side which raises hope in spite of the tragicomic content it carries. After moments of reflection on this contradiction, there came to mind the verse from the Holy Qur'an that says, "From life may come death and from death may come life". How true this verse is when we look at our wealthy Arab, who exhausted his imagination for the sake of the pleasures of life, and our Arab youth who exhausted his imagination for the sake of death and sacrificing life. One, in spite of his long life which is full of adventures, deals and pleasures, is not able to produce on Arab land anything but weakness, humiliation and death. The other, in spite of the youth of the life that is ahead of him, chose to sacrifice it, so that by his death dignity, honor and life will be born on the Arab land.

The foolish wealth in our Arab World carries the element of destruction from within. The number of wealthy fools in our Arab world has increased during the oil boom. With them increased the Arab tragedies, defeats, famines, and scandals. It is no coincidence that the Arab world is witnessing a destructive war in the Gulf region whose like has not been seen in the past 200 years, except in the years of the oil boom.

Our wealthy Arab, the owner of the yacht, makes billions from his dealings, and spends millions on his pleasures. His name was mentioned by the news media that published his story. As I recall the man never built a school, university, hospital, or a mosque on Arab soil, never donated a fraction of his millions to the homeless in Lebanon or to the starving in the Sudan. All of this reminded me of a few verses by an angry, bewildered Arab poet trying to find a way out of the circle of oil, contradictions and destruction, to enter the circle of dignity, glory and life. Our poet says:

How can I start this poem, I wonder..?  
Oil has complicated, benumbed and distorted us  
This defeated rabbit in all wars  
How can I start this poem, I wonder..?  
While oil buys a thousand resorts in Marbella\*  
And buys half of Paris  
And buys a thousand prostitutes  
But doesn't buy a sword to liberate the South [Lebanon]

I stopped at the last verse, at the sword that liberates the south, and I remembered the story of the Arab youth in southern Lebanon. He did not

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\*Marbella is a beautiful resort coastal town in Southern Spain (like the French Antibes that our wealthy Arab wanted to visit).

wait for a sword to be bought by the oil rich, yacht owners. It did not deter his will, this perplexity of our poet who was looking for a way out of the poem of destruction and humiliation. Our young Arab in southern Lebanon left the wealthy Arab in his foolishness and left the Arab poet in his mourning. He led his donkey to where both sacrificed themselves, so they may be a part of the poem of glory and life.

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EGYPT

FAMOUS NOVELIST OFFERS THOUGHTS ON LITERATURE, POLITICS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 14 Oct 85 pp 47-49

[Interview with Najib Mahfuz by Abu Zayyan al-Sa'di: "The Great Arab Novelist Najib Mahfuz to AL-DUSTUR: I Think about the Reader, Not About the Critics, Because They Are Like Opposition Parties"]

[Text] I am an admirer of Najib Mahfuz's literary production, and I have read almost all his narrative works. Although I studied at the Faculty of Literature at Cairo University in the mid-sixties, circumstances did not enable me to meet him and talk to him. He was sitting in an isolated corner of the Qasr al-Nil casino, surrounded by Cairo literary figures and intellectuals. I approached warily, offered greetings and said, "I am an Arab writer from Tunisia. I came to greet Najib Mahfuz and talk with him." He stood up smiling, with a welcome, and invited me to sit down next to him, and the conversation among the people seated then proceeded to deal with diverse subjects, political, literary and journalistic, which he listened to with attention and concentration, then stating his view briefly and frankly at the same time. I told him, "I would like to hold a literary conversation with you for our magazine's readers." He apologized that he was on holiday for Lesser Bayram, that his time was short and that that might not permit him to do so. I told him as I raised my voice, "I looked for you in Alexandria and did not find you. I looked for you at some of your places in Cairo and again did not find you. I want this opportunity I have been given to be with you now not to be lost to me. You know that your Arab readers everywhere are very anxious to know your views about life and literature." He was silent awhile, then said, "Let us meet tomorrow, then, at the Cleopatra casino, out of appreciation for my dear readers and the magazine you represent." He was waiting for me at the scheduled time. The place was beautiful, shaded by high pine trees, and the calm evening Nile water flowed by elegantly. At the beginning we made general conversation, then I submitted my questions. He said, "I prefer that the conversation be spontaneous," and I said, so be it.

The conversation between us ranged from his experience writing novels to his evaluation of Egyptian and Arab creative work, then to the discussion of his political positions on 'Abd-al-Nasir's revolution and al-Sadat's policies.



At the end, he bade me farewell warmly and had me convey his warm greetings to all his brothers and beloved ones in every Arab country. I have faithfully recorded all the segments of the conversation which took place between me and Najib Mahfuz, and found no difficulty in doing so, because he was clear and frank.

[Question] You may be one of the few writers in the East or West whose creative powers the days and years, the changes in environment and the struggles of the generations have not managed to limit. You suddenly at all times present people with things that are new and striking at the same time. Is writing an enjoyment and pastime, or is it a craft and an industry?

[Answer] Writing is a kind of love. It is basically a pastime, but as time goes on and interacts with the writer's life, it becomes a profession on which he depends for his living. It becomes a profession and job; that is, a person who can maintain art as a pastime to the end of his life is a rich man -- for instance Mahmud Taymur, who was rich, and whose art at the beginning was a pastime and also ultimately ended up as a pastime.

[Question] When you start writing, do you think, if only for an instant, of your writers and critics, or do you carry on with your work, with nothing to preoccupy you from it?

[Answer] In the periods of preparation, which it is hard to define, because with age they are broken up into scattered moments, one thinks only of the human experience he is going to express. When the preparation turns into work and execution, however, other considerations must enter in. I believe that I am one of those who think about the reader because I consider that I am addressing some person. Therefore when I found the technique which is called "stream of consciousness" useful to me in my experience, when I started to write the novel *The Thief and the Dogs*, I considered the reader present. The change in me was not a true stream of consciousness because the true stream of consciousness as the people who write it, such as James Joyce and William Faulkner, write it, does not imagine the presence of a reader and therefore they surrender themselves to their stream of consciousness, with all its fluctuations, even if it is not possible totally to understand it. I always feel that I am responsible to the reader in order to bring experience to the greatest possible degree of clarity. That can be difficult, and the clarity may not be complete, but it is the most extreme clarity I can manage. I think about the reader on this basis.

[Question] What about the critics?

[Answer] No, I do not think about critics, because they are like opposition parties. They are always arguing. If I thought of satisfying anyone, I would anger others besides him, and so on.

[Question] Who historically are the critics from whom you have benefited? In other words, what lessons do you believe have penetrated to the core of your narrative experience?

[Answer] A fair answer to this question is not possible. Note that you are talking to someone who will be 74 next December. I started writing more than

50 years ago. There has been much criticism and there have been many critics, as you see, and as a consequence of that it is difficult for me to answer. I am certain that of course there are names which must be mentioned, but you must not consider that I am offering you a fair, comprehensive all-inclusive list. The names of critics who occur to me now, such as Taha Husayn, Mahmud Amin al-'Alim, Raja' al-Naqqash, Shukri 'Ayyad, Ghali Shukri, 'Ali al-Ra'i, Louis 'Awad and Mahmud al-Rabi'i will suffice for me now.

[Question] Many orientalist have written about you.

[Answer] Yes, they have written good things. I repeat, my answer is not scientific or fair.

[Question] Many of your critics observe that your prolific narrative output can be categorized by stages -- pharaonic, social realist, comic, spiritual and political.

Were these stages subjected to planning in advance or was it a matter of whims of the mind, a mixture of thought about the self, society and history? Or how do you view the matter?

[Answer] It was writing with the development of the times, with no planning in advance. These expressions are theories of the critics. I have learned of these expressions only through them.

[Question] When you were busy writing one of your novels, did you rely on written observations about people, situations and opinions?

[Answer] No, I did not feel that I had finished one stage and was entering another, as the critics say. Writing is ongoing, like anyone going along the road; you are the one who observes that he has been progressing in a dilatory or hasty manner, or in discomfort, if there has been a trace of disability in him.

[Question] Does ongoing here mean that you write at any time, under all circumstances, or that you think and reflect and then start to write?

[Answer] Writing becomes a daily activity only after the subject has matured. Years have gone by without my writing anything.

[Question] A number of critics have said that a good creative work, especially a narrative work, is the product of a unique experience in life filled with hardship and strange types of observation in various environments, here and there. However, what we do know, and you are a creative novelist, without argument, you spend your life calmly, so far as we know, far removed from convulsions or other types of conflict; how do you view the matter?

[Answer] It is difficult to say that a novel is the result of one thing or another. You can fashion a novel out of any human experience, such as a tranquil experience in any calm environment, lacking in any adventure, or a violent experience in the heart of war or a hunting excursion in the

jungles, as with Ernest Hemingway, or the experience of a human living in high-class areas visiting aristocratic families, as with Marcel Proust. This in my opinion means that we can produce a successful novel from any human experience, on condition that we reflect deeply about its dimensions and learn about its real essence. There are different kinds of experiences which move the reader more than anything else. There is no doubt that the life of a person who has traveled the world and been exposed to dangers, especially battles, gains richness, stimulation and movement which he can present to the reader better than someone who spends his life in a library. However, the novel will not inevitably be a greater one.

[Question] Is there any reason why you have not visited the Arab countries?

[Answer] It is not a matter of the Arab countries; rather, I do not like to travel. I traveled only once, to Yemen, almost by force.

[Question] You are like the master al-'Aqqad, who traveled to the Sudan once, just after Rommel's armies approached the Egyptian borders.

[Answer] Yes, exactly, I am like al-'Aqqad.

[Question] Your narrative works are full of politics and political contradictions, right, left and center, which indicates serious, profound knowledge of the Egyptian and Arab political situation. Who are you?

[Answer] There is a reason for the interest in politics, because if you look at my biography you will find that I was a child when the 1919 revolution occurred. I witnessed the July revolution and was present during the second world war, the establishment of empires, the elimination of empires, and political struggle inside and outside Egypt. Of course, the most important thing that existed in our life was politics. Although I did not belong to any parties, I believe without a doubt in the principles of freedom, democracy and social justice. I believe in these values completely.

[Question] That is, you never were a member of the Wafd?

[Answer] I was a Wafdist, when the whole country was Wafdist.

[Question] Were you also a Nasirist?

[Answer] I was a Nasirist at some time.

[Question] During Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's era you had a broad, wide-ranging circulation. The government honored you with the highest forms of honors. however, your position regarding 'Abd-al-Nasir's era was critical, not lacking in violence. How can you explain this?

[Answer] First of all I would like to tell you that my criticism of 'Abd-al-Nasir's era occurred during 'Abd-al-Nasir's era. I wrote *Miramar*, *Gossip on the Nile*, *The Thief and the Dogs* and *The Road*, but it was self-criticism, the criticism of a person who belonged, not the criticism of a rejectionist. This position did not change after 'Abd-al-Nasir's death.

[Question] However, we have been informed that you have a stand on cultural normalization with Israel.

[Answer] You are asking me about 'Abd-al-Nasir. I believe in 'Abd-al-Nasir's revolution, except for the dictatorship. I criticized it during his life in novels that were printed and short stories that were published in the newspaper AL-AHRAM itself. After that, I happened only to state this view in the form of short articles. My position on 'Abd-al-Nasir has not changed; I appreciate his positive aspects and criticize his negative ones.

[Question] Don't you consider that 'Abd-al-Nasir's departure created a great vacuum in the Arab political arena?

[Answer] 5 June 1967 eliminated everything that had existed previously. It left no room for any vacuums, or for the filling of any vacuums.

[Question] Today in Egypt, and in the other Arab countries as well, there is a generation, indeed there are generations, of novelists, some of whom have drawn inspiration from the Arab heritage and others of whom have tried to wed the modern European narrative form to the genuine expository form in our heritage.

What is your opinion about these new generations of novelists?

[Answer] I do not claim to be fully informed about that, because we do not have an Arab common market and you, personally, when you go around the bookstores of Cairo, are undoubtedly amazed by the absence of works by any Arab literary figure, with rare exceptions. The important thing is that the person I have read under special circumstances guides me as a writer, and the person who returns from a journey guides me also as a writer and I buy him; I have found most magnificent things in that new literary figure.

[Question] For example?

[Answer] The Syrian Hanna Minah, the Iraqi 'Abd-al-Rahman Munif, the Palestinian Ghassan Kanafani.

[Question] What about Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco?

[Answer] I have heard about Mahmoud Mossadi and Taher Ouattar and have asked my friends to provide me with their works, because I have been told that their literary work is good, no less so than those I just mentioned. In particular, I read Dr 'Ali al-Ra'i, a critic I respect greatly, stating that there has been a resurgence of the novel in the Arab countries which has surpassed all previous generations. I have faith in his objectivity and the integrity of his judgment. As for Jamal al-Ghitani, Majid Tubiya, Yusuf al-Qa'id and San'allah Ibrahim, novelists of Egypt, I like their output, in terms of form and content.

[Question] Have you heard of any other Tunisian literary figure besides Mahmoud Mossadi?

[Answer] I have read a novel titled 'A'ishah. Is that Tunisian?



[Question] Yes, it is Tunisian, and its author is Bechir Ben Salama, the Tunisian minister of culture and editor in chief of a magazine titled AL-FIKR.

[Answer] A friend gave me this novel, I read it and I liked it.

[Question] Your novels have been translated into a number of foreign languages. Are you thinking of an international prize, such as the Nobel Prize, for instance, or do you have any other ideas?

[Answer] No, not at all, we here in Egypt nominate only the master Tawfiq al-Hakim, who is more deserving. I would not nominate myself.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] We just nominate one person.

[Question] What happens now, though, is that a number of literary figures such as Adonis and Yusuf Idris nominate themselves, since they present themselves to boards, literary societies and universities for acceptance and nomination.

[Answer] I do not do that, of course.

[Question] You are now publishing a new novel in AL-AHRAM titled 'The Day the Leader Was Killed'. What are you trying to say in this novel?

[Answer] It is about the crisis of young people which became intensified and reached its peak in al-Sadat's era.

[Question] What is new in it? Is it a beginning of a new stage?

[Answer] I told you that I do not know about stages.

[Question] Are you a person who likes Taha Husayn and al-'Aqqad?

[Answer] I was an apprentice under both of them, and I graduated from their schools.

[Question] Some modern historians have said that the age of the giants has passed. What is your opinion?

[Answer] Yes, that is true, but the distinctive features of the generations that have followed these giants have not become defined and crystallized. Time itself has not accepted them, because these giants were encyclopedic and we are now in the era of specialization. The beginnings of the renaissance of culture and civilization made it possible to write about numerous fields, but now specialization dominates the situation.

[Question] Arab and non-Arab writers today are interested in the literature of Latin America, indeed we have found people among our writers who have been influenced by this literature and rate it above other literatures of our era. Do you have an opinion about this literature?



[Answer] For some time, as I have been following this Latin American literature with interest, I have found creative and magnificent things in it. As regards Gabriel Marquez, winner of the international Nobel Prize, who as you know enjoys broad circulation in our literary and journalistic circles, I have found that his output varies. While his novel One Hundred Years of Solitude is truly up to international standards, his other novel, The Autumn of the Patriarch, is not up to these standards. He made it revolve about a political subject and rather than go most clearly to his point, he inundated the novel in shades of obscurity and ambiguity whose source lies under the influence of William Faulkner, who was distinguished by a special style of free and other forms of association.

[Question] On the basis of your lengthy literary experience, can a literary person in the Arab nation depend on his pen for a living?

[Answer] The situation I have reached now is not an appropriate criterion on the subject. I have written many literary works, and many of them have been produced as movies, which guarantee that I can depend on them for my daily livelihood. However, it is certain that Arab literary figures in general cannot live on their pen. If our cultural institutions thought of supporting full-time activity, if only on a limited scale, that would bring benefits which would bestow all good things on our Arab literature.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the rendering of your novels and stories into movies?

[Answer] I cannot but be satisfied. The majority of our Arab masses are illiterate or semi-literate, and cinematic activity by its nature is for the masses, as you know. Therefore, all I ask of the people who produce my novels and stories is that they retain the essence of my works and not take them outside the limits I have drawn.

[Question] Is there a statement you would direct to your Arab readers everywhere?

[Answer] Of course I send them my warm greetings, wishing them prosperity and hoping that they will help us find a solution for overcoming the cultural alienation that divides the Arabs. You are familiar with the political disputes among the Arabs. I would put these to the side. I consider that if the Arabs concentrate on two things, cultural and economic integration, that will eliminate all their disputes in the end; the Arabs do not exist, except in terms of culture and economics.

11887

CS0: 4504/36

EGYPT

# NEW MANDATORY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT AGE DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Muhammad Sharaf and Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "Will the Ban on Employment after Age 60 Benefit or Harm the Production Process?"]

[Text] The decree of the higher policy committee under the chairmanship of Dr 'Ali Lutfi, the prime minister, has been expressed categorically.

The decree prohibits the appointment of people who have reached age 60 to government, general organization and local government unit jobs, as well as paving the way for young generations to assume leadership positions.

In addition, the committee has decreed that contracting to continue working after this age under any designation, whether as a consultant or expert, is to be prohibited, and that no contract of this type is to be renewed, in order that opportunities may be given to the intermediate groups.

This decree came into being after the government's administrative agencies had become so swollen with an immense number of advisors and experts that it became commonplace for anyone going out on retirement to come back to his original position, although under another title.

Although some advisors and experts are paid only the difference between pension and base salary, they have been receiving large sums for being present.

There are other dimensions to this issue.

What, for example, is the position of the current labor law following age 60? How is deception carried out in this regard, even though the constitution requires that people who have been transferred to retirement not be allowed to work? By what exception have these retired persons come into their original positions? Does the presence of advisors and experts actually benefit the production process, or does it harm it?

## 1. How Do They Engage in Deception with Respect to the Law?

Although the law has specified 60 as the age for transfer to retirement, "permission" for the competent authorities to benefit from the expertise of

people transferred to retirement has been the back door these persons have slipped through in order to return to the jobs they had occupied. Indeed, they have continued to hold onto their original authorities, causing young experts to lose the opportunity to assume responsibility for them.

Dr Hasan Bilal, director of the media department in the Ministry of Health, says that the decree on transfer to retirement is set by the Egyptian constitution and requires that employees not do any executive work after they reach retirement age. However, the "competent authorities" may benefit from the expertise of people transferred to retirement if they have rare expertise or highly specialized scientific capabilities, to work as consultants or experts without administrative or executive authority, and their opinions will constitute advice to the competent authorities only.

It is well known that the logic behind that is to offer the young generations opportunity. However, it has happened that people transferred to retirement have remained in their positions after retirement age while retaining administrative and executive authorities, causing people in the young generations to lose the opportunity to assume responsibility.

Since the higher policy committee decree regarding the ban on work by any name in the case of people who have gone beyond age 60 has come into being, that is an affirmation of the constitution and the law, especially now that government departments have been generous in giving administrative and executive jurisdiction to consultants and experts transferred to retirement.

Muhammad Shukri Habib, secretary general in the Ministry of Social Affairs, says "The ministry will transfer everyone who has reached retirement age to pension in carrying out the higher policy committee decree refusing to extend the employment of any individual reaching age 60.

"Nonetheless, there remains the problem of al-Azhar and Teachers' College graduates, since the current law allows them to continue to work to age 65, in view of the length of their studies. We do not know what the law's position regarding these graduates is."

In the Ministry of Supply, Fu'ad Basyuni, the first deputy minister, says that not a large number of consultants are working after 60. Nonetheless, the ministry will give the young generations a chance to participate in bearing responsibility, now that they have gone a long time waiting actually to contribute to the work.

## 2. The Labor Law Does Not Specify the Age for Transfer to Retirement!

Many people working in government and public sector companies stay on their jobs after age 60 under the title of "expert" or "consultant," and the labor law's position is one of impotence in the face of this phenomenon, which usually comes about following agreement between the person transferred to retirement and the job entity.

As an official source in the Ministry of Manpower says, the labor law does not set a specific age for transfer to retirement. Rather, it is the social insurance law which has set 60 as the age for this transfer.

The social insurance law applies only to people working in the public and private sectors. The government sector is subject to the General Pension Authority.

This means that the labor law has not set an upper limit for retirement. The government sector specifies transfer to retirement at age 60 except in the case of government technical workers who work up to age 65 according to the bills.

There also are the graduates of al-Azhar. The law has set 65 as the age for their departure to retirement, on grounds that they enroll in studies at al-Azhar at age 10 and graduate at age 30 or after. Therefore, they are compensated by continuing to work to age 65.

Will a new law be issued based on higher policy committee instructions that exceptions are not to be made with regard to staying on the job after 60?

That is what is needed now!

### 3. Do We Have a Second Job Leadership Rank?

The higher policy committee decree prohibiting the appointment of people who have gone beyond 60 years of age as experts or consultants has met with much approval among workers, especially young people and intermediate groups in government departments, the private sector and local government units.

The question the workers are raising now is, is there a second rank which can be relied on to bear responsibility and job leadership?

Has there been training for these young people so that they can be relied upon?

In response to these questions Midhat Kazim, deputy minister of education, says "No one denies that this decree is to the benefit of all workers, but there is a question which needs an answer. Do all the ministries and government organizations now have a second rank of technical personnel who can be relied upon to bear responsibility after the people who have gone beyond 60 years of age have left work? I consider that there are many bodies which might lack long experience in the work area.

"Therefore I consider that the burden of intensifying training courses for middle management and administrative leaders by carrying out administrative programs lies on the Central Organization and Administration Agency."

### Positive Effects

Thurayya 'Abdallah, deputy minister of education, comments on this decree by saying "Prohibiting the appointment of people who are retired will have positive effects, since there has been much contradiction and duplication of opinions among consultants and leaders on the job.

"It is well known that people going out on retirement have been appointed as consultants or experts. They have always wanted to establish their identity



and importance in decisionmaking, and sometimes have opposed any new idea on grounds that they became well versed in the type and method of work in the past. Consequently, that has affected the course of work, and sometimes officials have abandoned their views because of the consultant's insistence on his own view, although the consultant's task is to express opinions and advice only.

"Also, these experts and consultants have constituted a financial burden on the job entities."

#### 4. The Decree Offers an Opportunity To Find Bold Solutions to Our Problems

Economics experts consider that there is no use in retired persons' staying on at their jobs, since this does not benefit the job entities as much as it obstructs the opportunities for advancement open to young people and the bearing of leadership responsibility.

Dr Faruq Yusuf, professor in the faculty of economics and political science, says "The continuation of people who have reached age 60 on the job has negative effects which are embodied in keeping other persons from being trained, attaining the same grade and attaining the same expertise.

"In addition, the presence of these consultants and experts on the job shows that workers' productivity is low, since they increase the number of jobs though there is no need for that.

"In another area, though there are some experts whom we need, the situation does not operate on the basis that the job needs these experts. Rather, it has been the rule to attempt to placate influential persons. Therefore the presence of consultants has been at the expense of capable young people."

Dr Ahmad al-Sifati, professor of economics at Cairo University, considers that the continuation of experts and consultants in their original jobs means the continuation of the traditional solutions to problems whose failure has been proved. It also means the continuation of influence over decisionmakers and also a negative effect on young leaders through the failure to give them opportunities.

Therefore, the higher policy committee decree gives the new generation of young leaders an opportunity to find non-traditional solutions to the problems the society is suffering from, and that provides an opportunity for constant rejuvenation on the job.

Dr Mustafa Ahmad, expert at the National Planning Institute, divides labor into two types, technical and administrative.

For this reason, when people with technical expertise reach 60, their influence on the productive process must be studied in terms of the cost of their staying on and the yield gained from them, so that that will not influence the economic units, although that does not mean benefitting from the efforts of the new generation.



As regards administrative workers, it is possible to benefit from them, because expertise is acquired from the job itself.

In general, it is necessary to work to create young generations of people at the worksites who will be characterized by boldness in decisionmaking. This will give an impetus to the development process.

The matter therefore requires specifying the groups which can be dispensed with and those from whose presence benefit can be derived, provided that that be codified so that exceptions not occur and we do not go back to our original situation.

#### A Positive Decree

Dr Huda Muhammad Salih, expert in the National Planning Institute, considers that the policy committee decree is positive to a great extent, especially now that the number of experts and advisors has increased, because it gives young generations the opportunity to set forth on the job.

She requests that a commitment to this decree be guaranteed, so that no exceptions occur which will turn into rules later on, as happened with previous decrees in this regard.

#### 5. How Can One Benefit from Experts and Consultants?

While the higher policy committee decree prohibiting the appointment of retired persons is basically aimed at opening doors to people in young generations and intermediate leaders to assume work responsibility, we do not deny that some experts and consultants have great expertise. Can one benefit from this expertise, and how?

Zaynab Tawfiq, the deputy minister in the Central Organization and Statistics Agency, has made a study on ways for benefitting from these consultants so that their presence will not affect work or deprive young leaders of opportunities.

She says "There is no doubt that people who have gone into retirement have expertise which can be benefitted from, while the law prohibits their appointment now because they have reached the legal age.

"Therefore I recommend that the final 2 years before transfer to pension have a special nature so that they will constitute a preparation for the transfer of all their areas of competence in the form of expertise and studies to second rank personnel who will bear the responsibility after them.

"The higher policy committee decree will result in eliminating the phenomenon of depriving the second rank of chances to occupy leadership positions, and there is no doubt that the views and recommendations of people with new blood will be totally suited to the circumstances and changes in society. Consequently, the higher policy committee decree will have positive effects and results on the course of work within government and public sector units and local government units, since we always are in need of bold new ideas, aside from other things.

"If, for example, we look at some people in major positions who have stayed in their positions following retirement, we will find that these people no longer have anything new to add to the job.

"In addition, there is another danger to retired persons' staying in their original jobs. This is that these consultants generally withhold their expertise from the second rank, so that the work entities need their advice. Therefore, they do not give the second rank a chance to establish its presence. There is no doubt that withholding information or expertise will have grievous consequences for the work entities.

"Therefore, I consider that the work system and method must be well known to everyone, so that work is not affected by any person's absence, just as with banks, which are careful to give each employee in their jurisdiction a list of the everyday elements of the job."

She asserts that the central agency has been holding training programs for work leaders and middle management for a long period and that there now are employees trained in leadership. As a result of this, there is stability in work and it is not affected by the elimination of consultants and experts.

#### Wages: The Difference between Salary and Pension

Although experts' or consultants' wages are the difference between salary and pension, which normally is no more than 100 pounds, statistics show that consultants get many times more than this amount, because of their constant continuous appearance at various committees, where they receive from 20 to 50 pounds per session.

They also get various bonuses, depriving lesser workers of a large portion of the stipulated bonuses.

11887

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EGYPT

INCREASED NILE FLOW WILL EASE WATER SHORTAGES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Fawzi 'Abd-al-Halim: "The Specter of Drought Is Receding, and the Nile Is Having the Last Word!"]

[Text] Contrary to expectations, the Nile's water yield this year is enough to meet our water needs, not just for this year but for at least another year. In addition, it augurs well for inundations in coming years.

We always make predictions and prophecies, but the Nile always has the last word.

The prediction had been that this year's flood would be an average one, and that we would be on the brink of famine.

The basic fear was that this year's flood would be like the one before, when we didn't have enough Nile water to drink, or irrigate the thirsty land, or run our industrial machinery.

But the Nile's last word brought good news. The specter of drought has disappeared from sight, and the lean years are nearing an end.

Since the Nile is such a good friend to us, why aren't we good friends to it?

But friendship with the Nile, as the minister of irrigation sees it, has another meaning.

Irrigation Minister Engr 'Isam Rada says, "Observations of the Nile from its upper sources have confirmed that the Nile's overall natural flow from these sources would be more than 90 billion cubic meters this year, thus exceeding the average Nile flow of 84 billion cubic meters.

"Ongoing predictions made by the Irrigation Ministry indicate that the net total flow of water expected at the High Dam would be 66 billion cubic meters.

"According to these predictions, the water level at the High Dam will rise continually until it reaches a peak of 166 meters by the end of November, and will then begin dropping gradually to a level of 160.15 meters at the High Dam by the end of July, leaving an estimated volume of 62 billion cubic meters after we draw off our water needs and right before the start of next year's flood, God willing."

What do these figures mean?

The irrigation minister says, "Quite simply, these figures mean that the specter of famine is dispelled for at least 2 years, and that Egypt's share of water needed for agriculture, industry and drinking is assured for these 2 years, even before next year's flood begins. This will without a doubt help dispel the specter of famine for even longer. These figures also mean the end of the crisis which we have all experienced over the past 6 years, when the Nile water flow was continually dropping while our water needs were continually rising. It is no secret that this year was the most critical year of all, for if the Nile's flow had happened to be the same as last year, which was a distinct possibility according to the theory of probability, the water available to us would have fallen short of our needs, and we would have been unable to draw our share of Nile water. Last year the flood was 57 billion cubic meters, of which we used 23 billion cubic meters from the High Dam lake, whereas we actually need 59 billion cubic meters a year. An even more likely possibility was that this year's flow would be merely average, i.e. about 84 billion cubic meters. But something happened on 3 September; the inundation suddenly increased, bringing the water level higher than expected, and thus making this year's flood above average. This means that after drawing all our water needs for this year, we will still have 62 billion cubic meters at the High Dam for use in 1987. This has not happened since the series of drought years began in 1979. If it had not been for the High Dam, we would have suffered, during those years, a famine worse than the one we hear of in Africa today. For example, in 1979 the water's flow was 48.3 billion cubic meters; in 1980, 50 billion cubic meters; and in 1981, 45 billion cubic meters. The line graph for the water flow continued like this until this year, when it went higher than expected. Therefore, the fact that we could draw 75 billion cubic meters from the High Dam Lake over the past 6 years saved us from the evils of famine."

Since the Nile has proven its friendship to us over the past few days, why don't we prove that we are a friend to it?

#### The Real Meaning of Friendship With the Nile

The irrigation minister says, "Friendship with the Nile is actually something essential and irrevocable which, as we see it, consists of protecting it from impending harm from pollution, encroachment of its banks, and so forth. In this context, the measures being taken by the state are becoming more intense day by day. For example, Irrigation Ministry agencies have surveyed the close to 3,000 sources of pollution, which consist of factories, tour boats, sewage outlets in some towns and villages, and some public sector

installations. Various state agencies such as the Health Ministry, the waterways police, and the sewage authorities have cooperated by issuing warnings to owners of such installations. We are giving priority to factories which dump untreated water directly into the Nile, as well as to the commercial and tourist river fleet.

"The Irrigation Ministry has allocated 30 million Egyptian pounds to deal with the more serious factory violations in polluting the Nile's waters, and 5 million pounds for sewage treatment units for river transport units and for units to remove oils, lubricants and other residues which are extremely harmful to the Nile."

The irrigation minister adds, "We have begun a comprehensive survey of those towns and villages which do not have any sewage treatment operations. We have also begun overcoming the obstacles to financing such operations in order to protect the Nile by keeping sewage out of its waters.

"In another context, we have decided that the Irrigation Ministry should be the sole authority entitled to give permits to operate or establish any works, projects or installations along the Nile, in order to prevent river pollution in the future.


"There have also been contacts between us and the Agriculture Ministry in order to curb the use of chemical pesticides for agricultural or other purposes, which leads to water pollution in the waterways.

"Irrigation development and water usage guidance projects cover three areas: the first being Kafr al-Shaykh Governorate, representing the north Delta, the second being al-Mansuriyah at al-Gizah, representing the sandy areas, and the third being al-Minya, representing the traditional crop areas. The practical experiments which have been conducted for 6 years in these areas in order to formulate more efficient ways of using water have been completed, and their results indicate that the implementation of these works and activities on the national level would save 10 to 15 percent of the water now being used for agriculture each year. For this reason, a national irrigation development project has been drawn up, beginning with an area of 125,000 feddans in al-Minya, and will be implemented over the coming 3 years.

"This is the friendship with the Nile which we are working to achieve."



# RATES OF NILE WATER USAGE THROUGHOUT EGYPT



All figures show yearly usage

1. North-west Coast: 135,000 feddans, watered by rain water
2. Siwah Oasis: 125 million cubic meters, to irrigate 25,000 feddans
3. al-Bahriyah Oasis: 250 million cubic meters, to irrigate 50,000 feddans
4. al-Farafirah: 700 million cubic meters, to irrigate 140,000 feddans
5. al-Dakhlah Oasis: 500 million cubic meters, to irrigate 100,000 feddans
6. al-Kharjah Oasis: 250 million cubic meters, to irrigate 150,000 feddans
7. South al-Kharjah: 675 million cubic meters, to irrigate 135,000 feddans

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LIBYA

UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO BOLSTER DECLINING ECONOMY

London ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW Oct 85 pp 58-61

[Text]

**IR** The downturn in the world oil market is having a profound effect on the Libyan economy. Oil exports, which account for 99 per cent of Libya's foreign exchange earnings, and 53 per cent of its GDP, have contracted sharply in the last four years, not as a result of oil reserve depletion, but because of the slump in global demand for crude oil. Figures released by the oil secretariat in June this year put the level of exports at 890,000 barrels a day (b/d), less than half their 1980 total.

Currency reserves have dwindled as they have been drawn upon to finance foreign trade. This has led to mounting constraints on capital investment. The annual development budget for 1985 is approximately 19 per cent lower than that for 1984, falling from LD (Libyan dinars) 2110m to LD1700m. Accordingly, economic activity is slowing down, as it has since 1981, and, on current estimates, the rate of growth for this year, projected at 9.4 per cent in the current development plan, is unlikely to exceed 3 per cent.

Due to Libya's excessive dependence on oil surpluses, the deterioration in the terms of trade has been even more marked than in the case of some other oil-producing states. Whilst oil revenues have

declined from \$22 billion in 1980 to an estimated \$10bn this year, the trade balance has steadily worsened, cutting the trade surplus from \$11.5bn in 1980 to \$2.5bn in 1984. And next year, according to Wharton's *Middle East Economic Outlook*, Libya will realise a current account deficit of 0.6 per cent.

Not surprisingly, the Libyan authorities have encountered some difficulty in re-adjusting their economic planning. Their current five year transformation plan, 1981-85, (the second of its type) which set the annual growth rate at 9.5 per cent, was formulated against the backdrop of the second oil price boom in 1979. The plan allocated a total of LD18.5bn for the development budget, far above the investment budgeted in the 1976-80 transformation plan, but thought to be feasible due to the increase in revenues which followed the 1979 Opec price rise.

The transformation plan was formally adopted by the annual meeting of the Libyan legislature, the General People's Congress, in January 1981. The agricultural sector, with a budget of LD3100m, received the largest single allocation, but there was clear emphasis on the development of heavy industry, which was allocated LD2730m. Within six months however, the decline in oil exports had begun to undermine the plan and by the autumn of 1981 Libyan oil exports had plummeted to about 650,000 b/d from the 1980 average of 1.7m b/d.

Two factors exacerbated the problems of economic development. Firstly, the Libyan share of the oil market shrank due to the relatively high price of Libyan crude in relation to the prices charged by other exporters. In fact Libya's initial resistance to lower prices was one of the reasons for the withdrawal of two oil companies, Exxon and Mobil, from operations in Libya. It was not until there was a discount of \$1.50 off the official price of \$37.50 per barrel, which was set in December 1981, that the authorities were able to restore oil company confidence.

Secondly, the US government's trade sanctions, which applied both to imports of Libyan crude and to exports of American technology, increased Libya's difficulties still more. These sanctions, introduced unilaterally on March 10, 1982, precipitated a short-term economic crisis, as the US had been their largest customer, accounting for 35 per cent of production. Oil exports crashed from 1.2m b/d to a low point of 600,000 b/d, prompting a price cut of \$10 per barrel on the previous year's official price. This was deemed necessary in order to raise export demand.

Shortages of foreign exchange began to emerge as a problem in the autumn of 1981, when oil sales first plummeted in conditions of a market glut. For a week, the Central Bank of Libya stopped all foreign currency payments until the revenue situation improved. Following the introduction of the US trade boycott, however, the cash-flow deteriorated to such an extent that Libya was unable to meet external payments. In March and April, after the embargo was announced, the Libyan authorities imposed a complete ban on the import of consumer goods, including cars.

Trade debts soon started to accumulate. By October 1982 they had escalated to an estimated \$2000-\$3000m. The usual four-month bureaucratic delay in payment to foreign contractors became extended to about nine months, or in some areas, notably construction, even more. Foreign currency reserves, which had risen to \$13bn in early 1981, fell to \$3.7bn in late 1982, and although the cash flow improved slightly in 1984, trade debts have remained a constant feature of economic life.

In the absence of a significant recovery in the oil market, further stringent controls on expenditure have been introduced. The General People's Congress in 1984 took the unprecedented decision of instructing the Central Bank to balance expenditure against revenues on a monthly basis. Congress also voted to remove subsidies from the service industries, which were established on financially autonomous lines. In January this year Congress set up Consumer Guidance Committees, specifically to monitor and reduce local domestic consumption.

With a population of only 3.4m Libya is quite well-placed to withstand the present depressed conditions of the oil market. In 1984, GDP per head was £5713, higher than that of many industrial states. Therefore, on present trends, the leadership has some scope to curb domestic consumption without inducing discontent. In fact, one unforeseen benefit of the current unfavourable financial

conditions could be a more efficient distribution of resources.

Whilst the short-term outlook for Libya is depressing, the longer-term prospects are much brighter. New oil discoveries, including major finds of 2.8bn barrels at Sarir and Masalah in December last year, have extended Libya's life-span as an oil exporter. According to projections for 1984, Libya has reserves sufficient for 52 years at the current rate of extraction. The slide in revenues, whilst damaging in the short-term, does have limits, and Libya could gain when there is an up-turn in the market; however, the post-oil prospects very much depend on Libya's response to present conditions.

The leadership is responding to the downturn in oil exports with efforts to increase productivity and output in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Falling revenues, and forecasts of stagnation in the oil market, have underlined the importance of economic diversification. Whilst budget allocations have been decreased, causing delays and cancellations in several areas, resources are being concentrated on a number of priority projects that are specifically designed to reduce dependence on the oil sector.

These priority projects include the so-called "industrial fortresses" — heavy industrial complexes. Although they were planned prior to current economic conditions, these projects have not been abandoned because of their capacity to diversify the economy away from dependence on crude oil exports. Since 1982 no new industrial projects have been commissioned, except for work relating to the fortresses, which receive the largest share of actual investment in development budgets.

There are two types of fortress; those, such as the petro-chemical complexes

located at Abu Khamash, Ras Lanuf and Mersa Bregah, which are planned for diversification within the hydrocarbons sector; and those, such as the iron and steel works at Misratah, the aluminium smelter at Zuwarah, and the cement plants at Labdah, Zlitan and Darnah, designed for diversification away from the hydrocarbons sector.

Within the hydrocarbons sector particularly, diversification is proceeding well. Since the announcement, in June this year of the completion of an extension to the Az Zawiyah refinery, which was begun in 1974, the Libyan authorities are claiming to have achieved self-sufficiency in their capacity for refining. The Az Zawiyah complex now has a refining capacity of more than 120,000 b/d, and output will be increased with the completion of the refineries under construction at Ras Lanuf and Misratah. Last year, exports from the heavy industrial sector, primarily urea sales, earned Libya LD51m in foreign exchange.

Before the deterioration of the oil market, there were few constraints on capital investment. In fact the Libyan economy proved incapable of absorbing investment allocations. In successive development plans the actual rate of growth was invariably lower than the projected rate of growth. Since about 1968 the rate of plan fulfilment has fallen markedly, and the proportion of the 1981-85 plan left unfulfilled is likely to be even higher.

Of all the economic sectors agriculture has the lowest absorptive capacity. The 1976-80 transformation plan allocated around \$5065.5m to agriculture, with a projected annual growth rate of 15.8 per cent. The real growth rate was only 3.6 per cent. By the end of the plan period, agriculture's share of the GNP had fallen from 4.8 per cent to 3.5 per cent. In the present plan, the projected growth rate is 7.4 per cent, but the sector's percentage of GNP has already dropped below 2 per cent.

Throughout Libya's development the biggest constraint on growth has arisen from an inadequate supply of indigenous manpower. Within all sectors of the economy, including the service sector, Libya has proved unable to meet the

demand for labour. Consequently the economy depends to an enormous degree on foreign labour, both skilled and non-skilled: over a third of the current labour force, or some 520,000 workers, is migrant labour.

Furthermore, in agriculture, labour shortages are compounded by another constraint on development: inadequate water supplies. The extensive mechanisation of agriculture, notably the use of tractors and water pumps on the coastal belt, has been responsible for a drastic decrease in groundwater levels. This has in turn curtailed development, particularly in the Jefara Plain, where the water shortage has reached crisis point.

In order to sustain growth outside the oil sector, the Libyan authorities are at present seeking a solution to the problems imposed by both labour and water shortages. Qaddafi has launched a series of initiatives, including a lengthened working day, designed to reduce the country's dependence on foreign labour, which has become a major debit on the country's trade balance. The current expulsions of groups of foreign workers

(see p34) must be seen in this light.

Meanwhile, efforts to resolve the country's problem of water shortages focus on the "great man-made river" project, which at \$9bn overwhelms other schemes in both scale and expense. It is planned that the river, in reality a pipeline, will transport 2 million cubic metres of water per annum, from artesian wells in the desert, south to the coastal areas where agricultural production is concentrated. Along the way, the line will feed irrigation systems, thus allowing land reclamation to proceed.

The first stage of the project, begun on August 31, 1984, is a 400km pipeline carrying water from Tezerbo and Sarir to Ajdabiyah on the coast. Following its completion in 1989, a second stage for transporting water from wells in the Fezzan to Tripoli will commence, followed by a third stage which will extend the system from Ajdabiyah to Tripoli and Ajdabiyah to Tobruk. As it is largely financed from a tax on consumer goods, the scheme is the only one to have escaped

the stringent financial controls placed on development.

If the authorities do make headway in resolving the difficulties posed by manpower and water shortages, it does not necessarily imply that the impediments have been removed from self-sustained growth. The Libyan economy remains fundamentally dependent on inputs of foreign expertise and technology. With a continuous flow of these inputs, Libya can achieve a degree of self-sufficiency in industrial and agricultural production, but is unlikely to emerge, economically, as an autonomously developing country. The country lacks the internal resources to change its current image within the world division of trade which, whether the oil market picks up or not, is that of an oil producer of declining power. □

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CSO: 4500/17



TUNISIA

SUCCESSION STRUGGLE DISCUSSED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 1 Oct 85 pp 5-6

[Article: "Tunisia: Succession Poser"]

[Text]

Libya's Col. Moammar Gadaffi has emerged as an unwitting ally of prime minister Mohammed Mzali in the intensifying Bourguiba succession struggle.

By expelling some 25,000 Tunisian migrant workers in the summer, Gadaffi gave Mzali an excellent card to play, both at home and abroad. He responded first by summoning home the remaining 65,000 Tunisian workers in Libya, declaring that they were being exploited intolerably by the Gadaffi regime. He claimed that many had also been forcibly trained to commit acts of sabotage against Tunisian installations. Then Libyan diplomats were expelled from Tunisia along with other suspect Libyan civilians.

Mzali capitalised on the affair domestically by advancing his offensive against the trade union movement, in particular the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT). Salary negotiations between the UGTT and the government since the beginning of the year have been acrimonious. UGTT leader Habib Achour was threatening widespread strikes unless concessions were made on wages. Mzali used the Libyan crisis to force the union to back-track. When this ploy did not work Mzali denounced the UGTT workers' "privileges" at a time when 90,000 Tunisians were returning home from Libya to unemployment.

He has introduced a draft law for the setting up of a special national solidarity fund to be supplied with funds from a 1% withholding tax on salaries. At the same time, he has ended the automatic withholding of 1% of worker salaries which used to go into UGTT coffers, making it the strongest union in Africa. In yet another anti-UGTT move, Mzali

has put an end to government funding for certain UGTT officials. In total, the UGTT will be deprived of close to \$10m. The UGTT journal *Chaab*, was suspended for a six-month period.

Mzali's supporters have been busy trying to convince Tunisia's allies that with the "*Combattant Suprême*" in fragile health, the PM is the best bet for future stability and maintaining the country within the western alliance and close to moderates in the Arab camp. But many foreign capitals are still sceptical about Mzali's chances for consolidating his hold on power in the post-Bourguiba period, and therefore have kept all options open.

One result of the breakdown in relations with Tripoli has been the reinforcement of Tunisia's military ties with the West, particularly France and the United States. During Bourguiba's trip to Washington last spring the Reagan administration made no secret of its intention to bolster Tunisian defences. Admiral James Watkins, commander-in-chief of the US navy, met the Tunisian president last month to reconfirm American backing. The French, wary of growing US influence in its Maghreb zone of interest, has intensified its own diplomatic activities through its new ambassador to Tunisia, Eric Rouleau, a former *Le Monde* journalist. The French military attaché, Col. Yann de Lignières, also pledged to Bourguiba the unconditional support of President François Mitterrand's regime in case of aggression against Tunisia.

The problems with Libya have also rallied additional Arab support to the Tunisian cause. The most important has been the consolidation of the budding alliance with neighbouring Algeria, whose own rela-

tions with Libya are far from excellent<sup>1</sup>. President **Chadli Benjedid** made a much-publicised trip to Tunis as did Algerian army commander, Gen. **Mustapha Ben Loucif**. The Algerians agreed to step up their purchase of Tunisian industrial goods and encourage joint-venture schemes between the two countries. **Saudi Arabia** and **Kuwait** have promised to increase their financial assistance. **Iraq** has said that it too is willing to increase its purchases from Tunisia. But Tunis fears the effect of Ba'athist propaganda on internal political debates if it gets too close to Baghdad. Indeed, a Ba'athist plot was denounced in the official press during the summer.

The crisis with Libya will nevertheless cost the ailing Tunisian economy dearly. For instance, Libya was taking a quarter of all Tunisian olive oil exports and a considerable amount of industrial goods, including textiles and tinned foods and cattle. Libyan tourists also brought in precious hard currency as did the remittances from Tunisians working in their eastern neighbour's territory.

Another beneficiary of the present crisis has been Gen **El Abidine Ben Ali**, state secretary for national security. He is particularly close to the president's son, **Habib Bourguiba**, and other military leaders, including Col. **Habib Benamar**, commander of the national guard and a relative of the powerful first lady, **Wassila Bourguiba**, and Col. **Abdel Hamid Fehri**, head of the national defence council. Ben Ali, in particular, has been meeting numerous foreign military delegations and has been extending his network of relations. Having been trained in the US, he is well-considered in Washington. He is also known as a hardliner, denouncing all dissent within the country<sup>2</sup>.

Although Mzali remains the "designated" successor, Bourguiba has made several troubling statements about the succession process in recent times. He declared, for example, that minister of finance **Rachid Sfar** should be the successor of his successor. Even the reference to Mzali's eventual succession sparked off rumours in the popular quarters of Tunis that Bourguiba was contemplating scuppering the PM. In any case, Mzali did manage to win a tactical victory in political infighting by having the president's personal secretary, **Allali Laouiti**, retired after 50 years' service. He had exercised considerable behind-the-scenes influence by controlling access to the presidential office ●

#### Footnotes

1. The French also use southern Tunisia as a base for monitoring Libyan activities in **Chad**.

2. A testy border dispute between Algiers and Tripoli involves a hydrocarbon-prone zone near the oasis town of Ghadames. The Libyans claim areas now within Algerian territory. There have been unconfirmed reports of military clashes in the zone, especially air battles.

3. Ben Ali played a central role in crushing the trade union unrest at the end of the 1970s: severe repression left dozens dead and hundreds imprisoned.

BAHRAIN

OIL COMPANY LOSSES EXPECTED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Sep 85 p 60-61

[Article: "Bahrain: The Temporary Predicament"]

[Text] The Bahraini Minister of Finance and National Economy, Ibrahim 'Abdal-Karim, expects the Bahraini oil company, BAPCO, to sustain losses between \$28 and \$30 million by the end of the current year.

The Bahraini government owns 60 percent of BAPCO, the company to which Saudi Arabia supplies 70 percent of its oil needs, charging OPEC official prices. The company purchases the remaining 30 percent from the spot market at prices set for the day of the sale.

The problem the company is facing is twofold -- the price rise for oil the company is purchasing from Saudi Arabia leaves a small margin of profit from its refined products, and the sagging oil products market, in turn, affects the company's selling volume.

The government decided that the way out of this predicament is to transform BAPCO to merely a refinery of Saudi oil, without commitment to buy certain quantities of Saudi crude oil at official prices, i.e., as the Bahraini finance minister explained, the company refines the oil from Saudi Arabia in return for appropriate compensation with no obligation to import oil from it.

What will BAPCO and the Bahraini government's position be in case Saudi Arabia refuses to implement this proposal? The answer remains less clear now, especially since the Bahraini government is determined not to close the refinery, which is considered the second source of work for the Bahrainis, following government jobs, since it employs 3,750 people. For that reason, the Bahraini minister indicated that the government might be prepared to support BAPCO financially due to its importance in regard to the national economy.

On the other hand, the American oil company CALTEX, which owns 40 percent of BAPCO, considers not importing or even purchasing smaller amounts of Saudi oil an unrealistic proposal in light of current relations between BAPCO and the Saudi oil industry not to mention the special relations between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the latter's fundamental contribution to the former's

economy. Moreover, the company reminds the public of the Saudi offer to sell to BAPCO crude oil for \$4 less than the spot price in the mid-80's.

The other way out of the predicament lies in the improvement of the refined oil products market and BAPCO's return to profitability. But company officials do not anticipate radical changes in its circumstances before 1988.

12929/13035

CSO: 4404/14



BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

LOAN TO PAKISTAN--Two Bahraini and three foreign banks offered a loan of \$150 million to Pakistan. This loan, which follows another loan of \$125 million made in September 1984, is part of funds borrowed by Pakistan annually to finance developmental projects. It is used primarily to import foods and mechanical equipment. The difference in this new Pakistani loan is that Pakistan has started to practice Islamic law in internal banking operations. But its external banking sector still operates according to the international laws governing Western monetary markets. Thereby, the interest of the new loan, which will become due in 5 years, has been defined on the basis of the interest prevailing among London banks (i.e., the LIBOR) plus 7/8 percent for the first 2 years and 1 percent for the remaining 3 years. Sources in the Pakistani Finance Ministry say that this is the last loan Pakistan is seeking during the current year. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Sep 85 p 53]

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IRAQ

AL-KARKH WATER PROJECT INAUGURATED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 30 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Firyal Jasim]

[Text] Commemorating the 17th anniversary of the pioneering 17-30 July Revolution, the revolution of good and giving, the first phase of the al-Karkh water project is to be inaugurated today. The project was undertaken by the General Contracting Company for Water and Sewage Projects which is part of the Ministry of Housing and Construction.

Distinguished efforts were made by engineers and technicians in this projects one of the largest in the country, whose capacity is 200 million gallons per day.

With the inauguration of the first phase of the project, which has been operational for the past few days, the water shortage problem has been overcome in all al-Karkh districts, including al-Nur, al-'Amiriyah, al-Mansur, al-Hurriyah, al-Kafa'at, al-Khadra' Janinah, Ghazaliyah, al-'Adl, al-Dawudi, al-Kazimiyah, and al-Shu'lah districts. Water in those areas was nil, but after operation started, it rose to 11 meters.

The project includes four tanks: the northern, located in al-Shu'lah district, has a storage capacity of 215,000 cubic meters of pure water; the southern, with a capacity of 150,000 cubic meters, is located in the al-Sayyidiyah district; the third tank, located in Abu-Gharib, consists of a concrete tank, a pumping station and a power generator, and has a storage capacity of 72,000 cubic meters of pure water.

The fourth, known as al-Taji tank and located in al-Taji district, consists similarly of a concrete tank, a pumping station and a power station, but has a capacity of 28,000 cubic meters.

Some 175,000 meters of concrete, 16,000 concrete supports, 40,000 tons of reinforced iron, and 250,000 square meters of bricks have been used in the project. The pipe networks are 204 kilometers long with diameters ranging from 1,600 to 350 millimeters.

In the meantime, the General Establishment for Water and Sewage today lays the cornerstone for the Hayy--al-Muwaffaqiyah joint water project.

This project, which will be completed in 36 months, is designed to have a capacity of 1,000 cubic meters per hour. A population of 26,900 in 64 villages near al-Muwaffaqiyah and al-Hayy regions will benefit from the project.

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ISRAEL

## FOREIGN DEBT INCREASES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Avi Temkin: "Foreign Debt Up \$229m"]

[Text]

Israel's foreign debt totalled \$23,394 million at the end of June, \$229m. more than at the end of the previous quarter the Bank of Israel announced yesterday.

The bank's figures showed that in the first quarter foreign liabilities had decreased by \$271m. Thus during the first half of 1985 there was a reduction in the foreign debt of some \$42m.

The overall term-structure of the debt remained unchanged in the second quarter of the year. Short term liabilities continued at some 15 per cent of the total obligations, with mid-and long-term debts representing 85 per cent.

But the sectoral structure of liabilities underwent some change, as the government paid back some of its short term debts and the banking system took short-term loans abroad.

The Bank of Israel figures showed that since the end of 1984 and until the end of June the government's short-term debts to commercial banks abroad went down from \$157m. to \$53m.

The commercial banks, on the other hand, increased their short-term debt during the first half of 1985 by some \$220m. These debts totalled some \$2.6b. at the end of June.

Government officials confirmed yesterday that Israel will receive \$1.2b. in regular American grants for fiscal year 1986 by the end of the year. Israel had already received \$750 million in emergency aid in September over and above the "regular" aid and will get a similar sum in spring 1986.

On the other hand, from the central bank figures it emerges that Israel will have to repay some \$1b. in principal and interest during the last quarter of the year and some \$3.2b. during 1986.

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ISRAEL

TRADE DEFICIT FALLS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Pinhas Landau]

[Text]

The deficit in Israel's trade balance for the first 10 months of 1985 shrank by 26 per cent compared to the same period in 1984, according to figures released by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Jerusalem yesterday. The figures showed imports exceeding exports by \$1,794 million in the January-October period, with the deficit in October amounting to \$225m.

Seasonally adjusted figures - excluding ships, aircraft and diamonds - show that the deficit in the past four months of July through October shrank by 27% compared to the first half of the year - a period which itself was marked by an 8% fall in the size of the trade deficit vis-a-vis the second half of last year.

The months of September and October, however, show the deficit at the same level as the two months preceding them. This was the result of a 2% rise in imports being offset by a 2.5% rise in exports. But the level of imports in July-October 1985 was down 5% from that in the January-June period, following a 3% drop in their level between the second half of 1984 and the first half of 1985.

Most groups of imports showed declines over the last few months - including October. The main exception was consumer durables, which soared by 40% in October compared to the average monthly level of imports in January-September. Exports, on the other hand, showed a gain of 5% in the July-October period, when compared with the first half of the year.

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CSO: 4400/35

ISRAEL

EXPORTS TO SINGAPORE UP ..

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Ilan Chaim: "Israel's Exports to Singapore Up 38 Per Cent"]

[Text]

Israel's exports to Singapore grew to \$41.5 million during the first nine months of the year, a 38% increase over the same period last year, the Ministry of Industry and Trade announced yesterday.

The ministry and the Israel-Asia Chamber of Commerce will soon hold an exporters conference on ways to boost trade with Singapore, which is considered a window for trade with the entire Southeast Asia region.

Many international trade shows are held in Singapore, which also serves as a major transit, transshipment and communications centre for the region. In January, Israeli firms will participate in Singapore's aerospace exhibition and trade delegations will continue from there to South Korea and Japan.

Singapore buys electronics and other high-technology products, diamonds and chemicals from Israel. Israel's imports from Singapore include coffee, tea, spices, oil, fuels and coconuts.

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ISRAEL

PARTICIPATION IN ASIAN HIGH-TECH EXHIBITION PLANNED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Macabee Dean: "Singapore Show To Introduce Israeli High-Tech To Chinese"]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. - Israel's participation in the Asian Aerospace '86 exhibition, which opens on January 15 in Singapore, is aimed "in great measure" at attracting the attention of visitors from China, sources at the Export Institute said yesterday.

"This is one way of showing our huge amount of wares to potential buyers in the entire Far East, but mainly to the Chinese," an official at the institute said. The Israeli Exhibition will cover 500 square metres. The main companies participating are Astroautics, of Bnei Brak; Elbit Computers, of Haifa; Elisra Electronic Systems, of Bnei Brak; Fibrotex Military systems, Tel Aviv; G.K., Tel Aviv; Israel Aircraft Industries,

Lod; Rafael, Haifa; Rada Electronic industries, Herzliya, and the Israel Defence Industries, Tel Aviv.

The items to be exhibited, or information about them, will include digital air data computers, display systems for a modern glass cockpit and tank fire control systems. There will also be automatic test equipment for flight-line testing, airborne mission computers, weapon delivery and navigation systems, systems which detect pulsed radar threats, and sophisticated camouflage nets.

Also on show will be combat and commercial aircraft, including the Kfir, Westwind I and II, the Astra business jet, the Arava multipurpose civil military turbo prop, and a third general all-aspect air-to-air missile.

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ISRAEL

## HISTADRUT GENERAL CONVENTION MEETS TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 1 Nov 85 Weekend Magazine p 5

[Article by Mark Segal: "The Age of Kassar"]

[Text] THIS WEEK the Histadrut holds its 15th Convention, when it will open the celebration of its 65th anniversary. It was in 1920 that just over 1,000 *halutzim* trekked to the Haifa Technion building to inaugurate the General Federation of Labour, with the vision of establishing *Hevrat Ovdim* - a workers' commonwealth.

It was an ideological instrument of Labour Zionism, which its first secretary-general, David Ben-Gurion, proceeded to fashion into an instrument for achieving national independence. Thus the Hagana evolved from a unit at Histadrut HQ into the Yishuv's underground armed force. But it was that same Ben-Gurion who, as Israel's first prime minister, dramatically reduced the Histadrut's power by transferring many of its functions to the fledgling state apparatus. For the mainstream of Labour Zionism, pragmatism rather than dogma has been the guiding principle.

It was Max Weber who wrote of "the bureaucratization of the revolution," and that most certainly applies to the transformation that the federation has undergone, especially in recent years. The very size of the Histadrut must raise questions. The 1,600-odd delegates represent 1.54 million members, who with their families comprise 2.6 million souls, or 63 per cent of the nation.

One of the questions certainly concerns Kupat Holim Clalit, the Histadrut's sick fund, which dominates Israel's health services with its

14 hospitals, 1,274 clinics and 15 rest homes, serving an insured membership of 3.15 million (who include religious Histadrut workers' unions) or 79 per cent of the population.

The Convention will undoubtedly have to consider how to cope with the chronic financial situation of Kupat Holim. This is partly a function of the world crisis of socialized medicine, but is largely due to the decline in financial support from the government during the Likud years, when it declined from 29 to 12 per cent of the budget. The Histadrut leadership claims that this was a function of the Likud's ideological tendency to undermine the Labour Movement's mutual aid apparatus.

There has always been a contention that if not for Kupat Holim, the Histadrut would see a massive drain in membership. The Histadrut counter-argument is to point to the gradual increase in Kupat Holim's share of the federation's total revenue. Thus, the health fund's percentage in 1981 was 63.7, while in 1984 it was raised to 68.15.

The reality of tight money has brought about an ideological transformation. Moving sharply away from steadfast refusal to countenance nationalization of health insurance, a proposal will be put to the Convention by Aliza Shefi, Mapam's personable head of the Histadrut's Social Insurance division, for the creation of a national health insurance scheme, funded by the government and operated by the existing sick funds.

THE 15TH Convention will give the formal stamp to the secretary-generalship of Yisrael Kessar. He took over in mid-term from Yeroham Meshel, proceeding to receive an enhanced mandate from the Histadrut electorate at the head of his Labour-Mapam Alignment list. This symbolizes the coming-of-age in Labour Movement politics of the new generation of the Oriental communities, with the Yemenite-born Kessar taking over from the East European leaders, and well equipped to enable organized labour to cope with the complexities of a society and an economy being overtaken by the technological revolution. His tremendous personal popularity has so far enabled him to maneuver the federation ship successfully through the rough seas, with calm waters not yet in sight.

This personalization of the leadership contains high risks for the canny secretary-general as the spectre of unemployment threatens to loom larger in the coming years. His own experts are talking in terms of 10 per cent of the work force being rendered jobless.

Kessar finds himself caught in the quandary of being loyal to the first Labour prime minister in eight years, who commands obedience to policies implemented by the most neo-conservative union-basher of a finance minister Israel has ever had. Thanks to Kessar and his extremely tough Trade Union Department head, Haim Habinfeld, the unions, which speak for 90 per cent of salaried employees – something of a world record – have demonstrated unparalleled responsibility in the face of workers' declining purchasing power. No wonder Kessar could claim in his recent interview with *The Jerusalem Post* that "the Histadrut is carrying the prime burden of the government's economic measures at a time when Finance Minister Moda'i makes sure that there is no proper capital gains tax and companies and the self-employed pay a laughable share of taxes."

So far, workers have not taken to the streets, but the question is how long this industrial peace can last and whether, under mounting pressure, Kessar's popularity may not start to crack. The report that he was booed in Beersheba by demonstrating Solel Boneh workers who had just re-

ceived dismissal notices must set off alarm bells at Histadrut H.Q. On whether or not this proves to be an isolated incident hinges much more than Kessar's career or even his captaincy of the Histadrut: it is the success of the economic programme that is in the balance.

Undoubtedly, the echo of the Beersheba protesters, with their cry of "You asked us to vote for you to give you the power to save our jobs,"

will accompany Kessar and his colleagues on to the Convention platform. For they encapsulate the dilemma of all Histadrut leaders who steer a unique organization combining the role of union and employer. The Histadrut sector is unique in producing 25 per cent of the country's GNP and providing work for 22 per cent of the labour force.

The present tough times must oblige the Histadrut executive sector to make hard decisions regarding personnel retrenchment, lest its firms founder. It is here that the tension between the dual roles becomes most acute, and the burden in public terms will be borne by Yisrael Kessar.

ACCORDING to Organization Department head Gideon Ben-Yisrael, a major issue on the Convention agenda will come under the heading of "reinforcing movement solidarity," with the stronger groups urged to help out the weaker members. He says this was essential in view of the widening polarization in Israeli society as a result of the Likud years, with a shift away from Labour's stress on an equal sharing of the burden.

As the top Histadrut official on the employment front, Ben-Yisrael warns that unemployment, presently 8.5 per cent of the work force, will rise to 10 per cent by December – and that's before the dismissals of 18,000 public sector employees.

"Where will these people all go?" he asks. "Bank interest rates are crazy and more and more firms are on the verge of bankruptcy. The Likud ministers care more about another dunam on the West Bank than about the jobless in development towns. No wonder queues are getting longer outside the visa sections of the U.S. and Canadian embassies."



"Social Service Minister Moshe Katzav talks a lot about the unemployed but has done next to nothing in the field of retraining... Some people are saying that the Likud is planning economic moves so that the crisis will only be resolved after Yitzhak Shamir takes over from Peres."

Ben-Yisrael is in the unique position of having been on both sides of the table. He was previously chief government labour mediator, and prior to that an attorney specializing in labour law.

He speaks admiringly of Kessar and his plans to translate into concrete terms its motto: "to return the Histadrut to its members" and getting rid of the bureaucratic barriers that have alienated the membership from the movement. He noted Kessar's emphasis on quick attention to individual members' complaints and his drive to get younger members more involved.

A novel technique introduced by Kessar was local conventions. Ben-Yisrael is in charge of organizing these assemblies, of which 60 have already been held, and has found it an exhilarating experience.

A major problem looming on Kessar's horizon is the threat of secession by important groups of unionists, particularly salaried professionals who feel badly let down by Haberfeld, the secretary-general's sidekick. They claim that he reneged on a written commitment to let their public sector members obtain increments ensuring their wage differential. The complaint is increasingly heard that the Histadrut establishment is insensible to the demands of its more highly qualified members, willing to sacrifice their interests on the altar of egalitarian ideology.

The first move to form a break-away union was made lately at a conference of heads of professional unions, when they discussed the prospects of forming an alternative federation. Represented were engineers, architects, physicians, social scientists, high-school teachers, defence establishment research workers and university lecturers.

BUT IT IS NOT only among the professionals that danger signs are increasing. The incapacity of the

old-time union functionaries to adjust to the new generation of skilled technologists employed in sophisticated industries may well mean that this growing segment of the economy will tend to remain outside the pale of unionization. Only lately Yitzhak Giladi, veteran boss of the metal and electronic workers union, complained about difficulties in recruiting new members. More and more firms, he charged, were abiding by the personal rather than the collective contract, with multinationals like IBM blocking all union activities.

Enquiry elicited that Giladi and his *apparatchiks* have done little to attract members from the high-tech sector. It seems they have yet to emerge from the metal-workshop phase.

Technicians union head Zalman Shenkman has moved an amendment to the Histadrut constitution defining the trade-union power structure and delineating the areas of authority of union secretaries, Trade Union department chairman, and Histadrut secretary-general. This was a reaction to Kessar and Haberfeld signing the recent agreements with the government and employers without involving the trade union secretaries.

The counter-reaction of the Histadrut establishment has been to tighten union centralization still further. Outgoing Treasurer Natan Almoslino, who heads the Convention's constitutional committee, has introduced an amendment empowering the central committee to disband an errant trade union's elected executive bodies by a vote of only 51 per cent of the Histadrut Executive, and replace them with appointed officials.

This bid to turn back the clock stands in sharp contrast to Kessar's talk of "removing causes of alienation between the membership and the movement." Great expectations have been roused with talk of "Kessar's quiet revolution" involving widespread reforms in the Histadrut bureaucracy. The secretary-general may find his greatest difficulty in this area. His urging of cutting to one-third the cumbersome 42-strong central committee has aroused not unexpected opposition from veteran office-holders who feel their positions threatened.

CANVASSING opinions on Kessar's plans at the Va'ad Hapoel mas-sif, it did not take long to learn that the knives are already being sharpened as they wait in ambush for him to stumble. He has already sent shock-waves through Histadrut corporations since he shook up the Bank Hapoalim board room, installing new people such as labour-council secretaries in place of the expense account barons.

The ricochets have begun to reach the secretary-general's office, which perhaps explains his unusually strong attack on his party colleagues at Monday's meeting of Labour delegates to the Convention convened at Kibbutz Shefayim. He denounced the obstacles raised in merging the seven Histadrut trade union pension funds, with people inside the federation inciting works committees to threaten to quit these funds and shift to the private banks' schemes.

ONE OF THE charges levelled against Kessar is that he is only interested in appointing members of the Oriental communities, particularly those of Yemenite origin. To substantiate this charge there was mention of the packing of the newly-important department for religious affairs with fellow Yemenites, and Kessar's nomination of Aluf (Maj.-Gen.) David Maimon, the first Yemenite-born IDF general, as the next head of Solel Boneh and a former MK, Yemenite-born Yehuda Hashai, as director-general of Shikun Ovdim, the Histadrut housing giant. But others applaud his bid to

infuse new blood from the broader membership into the top of the pyramid.

Working against Kessar is his tendency to be a loner in a set-up where collective decision-making is a tradition. His refusal to appoint a deputy secretary-general has antagonized the inner circle of Histadrut Labour politicians. The fact is that Kessar stands head and shoulders above those surrounding him, but his apparent unwillingness to delegate power and instead strive to do everything by himself may yet cause him real difficulties.

Going for him is a huge reservoir of public affection and respect, as is evident from Hanoah Smith's recent poll of the public's esteem for various office-holders. Army generals came top with 80 per cent, Supreme Court justices second with 72 per cent and the Histadrut leadership third with 56 per cent.

Yisrael Kessar has begun to refurbish the federation's image by replacing its previous leadership's pompous speechifying with his folksy humour, by substituting the old red membership book for a trendy plastic card, and by installing pretty girl ushers at the entrance foyer of Histadrut headquarters instead of the short-tempered old-age pensioners.

The results of the 15th Convention will indicate how much substance will be attached to the rhetoric of reform and what kind of stamp the age of Kessar will leave on the General Federation. □

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CS0: 4400/30

ISRAEL

NEGEV BEDOUIN TOWNSHIPS BEING PLANNED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 25 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Liora Moriel]

[Text]

BEERSHEBA. - Over 50 Beduin, representing a number of tribes, yesterday failed to elect a delegation to represent them on the Supreme Committee on Beduin Affairs, chaired by Dr. Yosef Ginat.

Ginat, the adviser on Arab affairs to Minister without Portfolio Ezer Weizman, told the Beduin on a recent visit here that he wanted them to elect representatives for the committee (rather than that he appoint them).

After a lengthy discussion, the Beduin decided that they did not want a separate committee to deal with their problems. Rather, they said that they were an integral part of the Israel's Arab minority: "We don't want anyone to divide us by separating the Beduin in the south from the Arabs in the north," a Beduin spokesman said. "We want to be represented on the Arab Committee for Land Rights."

Meanwhile, two large Negev Beduin campsites not far from Beersheba are now being planned as townships with permanent housing and services, Shalom Danino, in charge of the southern district at the Interior Ministry, told *The Jerusalem Post* this week.

"In the past, we thought Hura would have 3,000 units and Lagya, 5,000, but now we're planning 10,000 units for each because the townships are very popular," Danino said. In fact, even as encampments the two sites have become

crowded; Hura now has a population of 5,000 and Lagya, 7,000.

"If it weren't for their internal tribal differences, which ended up at the High Court of Justice in Jerusalem, and caused delays in planning, they could have become as established as (the townships of) Kuseifa and Arouar," he said. Kuseifa and Arouar were built for the 6,000 Beduin evacuated from the Tel Malhata area two years ago when the Nevatim Air Force Base began operations.

Another matter still not settled is who will be responsible for the construction of the towns, the evacuation of the residents from their current lands and the financial compensation for the land. Danino said the matter is to be settled soon between the Israel Lands Administration and the Implementation Authority.

The Implementation Authority was set up by special law in July 1980 to evacuate the Tel Malhata Beduin and resettle them in Kuseifa and Arouar.

The government recently decided that the Implementation Authority would be the only agency to deal with the Negev Beduin and that Ginat will no longer be in charge. The Implementation Authority is headed by Agriculture Ministry Director-General Meir Ben-Meir.

Meanwhile, another Beduin township is under construction - Segev Shalom. The township is near Beersheba Prison and will eventually house 5000 Beduin from the Azazma tribe.

Danino said that settling the Be-

duin in permanent towns is the first step toward a resolution of the land ownership problem in the Negev. "After they settle in towns, we'll negotiate with each resident about his (land) rights," he said.

The first Beduin township in the Negev, Tel Sheva, was poorly planned and is now being renovated with many new built-your-own-homes schemes. The seven-year-old township of Rahat, near Kibbutz Shoval, is a success story, with a population of nearly 16,000. But there are problems: there are good schools and health facilities, but there is no industrial area. Daily, buses take residents to nearby Jewish towns for work.

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CSO: 4400/35

ISRAEL

PROBLEMS IN JORDAN VALLEY SETTLEMENTS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Nov 85 Weekend magazine p 8

[Text]

THEY LOOKED at the desert a decade ago, vibrant young men and women at the beginning of adult life, and saw a garden where children yet to be born were playing alongside homes yet to be built. They look now at the lush reality they have created, at the beautiful children and green fields, and see middle age approaching across a desert of financial ruin.

The settlers of the lower Jordan Valley, the *bik'a*, have reached a difficult turning. The years of cheerful struggle and creativity, in temperatures reaching 50°C have climaxed in agricultural success and financial bankruptcy. The settlers have finally mastered the desert only to find themselves in the thrall of bankers.

With an interest rate of 8 per cent a month, the settlers would be losing money even if they were to plant trees producing dollar bills, says Yoni Stein of Moshav Gitit. "No profit on a crop can match the cost of the capital needed to plant it."

In the face of that grim calculation, families have begun to pull up

roots nurtured over a decade of sweat. Ten of the 38 families in Moshav Netiv Hagdud left two years ago. The neighbouring kibbutz, Gilgal, is presently experiencing a similar upheaval and so are other settlements. At Gitit, two of 24 families left last year and others are doing some deep soul-searching.

"People are growing older," says Rahel Sayag, a member of the Gitit moshav committee. "They see themselves reaching middle age with nothing in the bank and unable to begin again somewhere else."

Says Stein: "We came here as kids, a year or two out of the army. We can't continue doing what we did 10 years ago."

THE SETTLEMENT of the Jordan Valley, more than a pioneering enterprise, was an expression of geopolitics, a major strategic gesture aimed at providing sinews to the Labour Alignment's Allon Plan, which called for permanent Israeli retention of the lower Jordan Valley in any peace settlement.

"The *bik'a* is the real security divide between us and Jordan," says Nissim Zvili, director-general of the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization. "Settlements give expression to this concept. If we had only the army there, it could be evacuated tomorrow."

The irony is that while the enterprise is a financial disaster – a debt of some \$20 million hangs over the 17 settlements of only 500 families – it has recently become a stunning agricultural success. The bleak desert stretching westward from the Jordan River had been almost totally shunned by Arab farmers over the centuries. Israeli agronomists working in experimental stations in the area, together with the new settlers, slowly learned what to grow in the distinctive micro-climate and soil, and how to grow it.



Their objective was to exploit the "natural hothouse" so as to reach the markets of Europe with vegetables and other produce well before producers abroad, and thereby reap high prices. It was a difficult process marked by many false starts, but a successful formula emerged about

two years ago. According to this an average farmer given normal interest rates could earn \$20,000 a year — more than his average counterpart in the centre of the country — although net income would be the same because of higher expenses.

"It took 10 years of research by top people till we found the right structure," says Zvili. Vineyards have proven a major source of income, with harvests for export coming as early as May instead of August. Early-growing vegetables and fruit orchards are mainstays.

These solutions, however, have proven themselves only for the eight moshavim and three kibbutzim on the valley floor, where the heat induces early yields. No sound economic basis has yet been found for the six moshavim in the foothills several hundred metres higher, such as Gitit.

The more difficult agricultural conditions have led to a weeding-out not only of unsuccessful crops but also of unsuccessful farmers. Settlers who have proven less skilled at agriculture are being forced to give it up by their own moshav peers, who refuse to continue providing operating budgets through the communal association (*aguda*) to members whose efforts will only increase the settlement's debt.

"If everything they grow comes up thorns, the association will suggest that they take up some other work in the moshav or outside," says Gitit's Sayag. "Only seven of our 22 families work entirely at agriculture now."

Nearby Hamra, perhaps the worst-off of the settlements, has a debt of \$4.5 million hanging over its 32 families and no prospect of economic achievements in sight.

"Some of the people here are pushing 40 and they see this place growing into an old-age home," says treasurer Yitzhak Heller. "There's nothing for the kids to come back to from the army."

A very different attitude prevails at Netiv Hagdud, a settlement on the valley floor that has survived the social and economic crisis marked by the departure of a quarter of its members two years ago. "We are building this place for our children," says Yair Mazor. "If it were not for the debt, this burden from the past, we could earn a very nice livelihood. We don't care if the temperature is 45 degrees or zero. This place is beautiful and we built it. Our wish is to grow with the settlement. It's sad that just when the region has reached the take-off point, it is retreating."

At Gitit too, despite its doubtful economic future, the settlers' attachment to the community they have created and to the wild beauty of the region is tangible.

"We were young people who wanted to begin something new," says Sayag, walking across the large lawn in the centre of the moshav. "These were just barren hills when we came. There are 67 children now. Most of the people here are very positive. It would be a pity if they left." The handsome mother of two, whose husband works in the valley as a sports instructor, is herself a full-time farmer, beginning her workday at 5.30 a.m. "I won't leave this place no matter what," she says.

THE SITUATION in the *bik'a*, says the WZO's Zvili, is far more critical than in the Golan Heights, whose farmers last week joined forces with those in the lower Jordan Valley to block roads in order to call attention to their plight. "The economic basis of the Golan is solid and their problems can be solved by wiping out maybe 10 per cent of their debt and converting the rest to long-term, low-interest loans."

But where the lower Jordan Valley is concerned, half of the region's debt will have to be written off and the other half converted to long-term loans. "There is no chance in the world that the settlements can pay back the debts they have today," says Zvili.

Noting the expenses incurred over the past decade in trying to find the right agricultural solutions for the region, he sees no fairness in imposing the burden for this experimentation on the families living there.

"The Israeli nation sent these 500 families to live there and I believe that the nation has an obligation to see to it that they can do so with honour. It's a difficult place to live, but it has agricultural advantages and the quality of the settlers is high. They need high motivation, and I believe that this, together with the agricultural prospects, will make the *bik'a* a Garden of Eden."

*Bik'a* settlers have now learned what bankers have always known; that the key to the Garden of Eden lies in the interest rate. □

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CSO: 4400/38

ISRAEL

TOURISTS ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES FROM EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Nov 85 Weekend magazine p 6

[Text]

THE SCENE could not have been more idyllic as the Fantasea sailed into the bay of Marsa Bareka at noon on Tuesday, May 7, this year. The bay, situated between Ras Mohammed and Sharm e-Sheikh at the southern tip of the eastern shore of the Sinai, is legendary among the international diving community for the richness of both its marine life and its corals.

In the Fantasea's wood-panelled wheelhouse, Captain Yehuda Reich, a veteran of the Israeli merchant marine and one of the most experienced dive-boat captains working the Red Sea, was in a good mood. The sea was perfect, the wind was down and a small cove in the bay by the name of Hasheba was empty. He would anchor, there would be a quick dive, a long, luxurious lunch, a bit of wind-surfing, and another dive. Yet another unforgettable day in the magic kingdom of Sinai, he thought to himself.

Reich was confident that there would be no problems. Three days earlier, on Saturday, May 5, he had checked into Sharm Port, paid a \$100 docking fee, cleared the passports of the crew and tourists aboard, and received permission from Colonel Nadr Naguib, chief of the Egyptian Water Police, to enter Marsa Bareka, provided they cleared the area by nightfall.

Reich had every reason to take Naguib's statement, made in front of the ship's owner Howard Rosenstein, and several other Egyptian officers, at face value: Naguib had granted the same authorization to the yacht earlier in the year, and all had gone smoothly.

BUT NOW, on Tuesday, as Reich was making his final approach, gunshots splintered the silence and bullets started whizzing around the yacht. On shore, several Egyptian soldiers could be seen running, then stopping to point and fire in the direction of the yacht, which was flying an American flag. Reich grabbed a white towel and started to wave it in the direction of the shore, at the same time giving orders for the Fantasea to be secured to a mooring in the bay. The firing stopped. Miraculously, the ship and the 15 people on board were not hit.

However, the incident did not end there. Rosenstein and the yacht's mechanic, who speaks fluent Arabic, were ordered to come ashore, using a rubber dinghy for the short journey. Meanwhile, the soldiers on shore continued to point their weapons at the yacht and at the two men making their way over in the dinghy.

Rosenstein recalls fear of a different type from anything he had ever experienced as he stepped ashore. He was greeted by seven Egyptian soldiers with no officer in command, with their cocked Kalashnikov rifles aimed at his chest. They were miles from a road, let alone a major military base. There was no radio.

"Never have I felt more helpless, more sure of pending catastrophe, than at that moment," says Rosenstein. With trembling hands he produced his permit from Sharm port and a photo of himself with Colonel Naguib. Neither made any impression on the soldiers.

Under threat, Rosenstein and the mechanic were forced to transport two armed soldiers in the dinghy to their base some two kilometres to the east, where radio contact was made with the group's officer. Rosenstein was instructed to return to the yacht, register all passengers and crew, bring in their passports and the ship's documents, and return to the camp to wait for the arrival of the officer.

He was also commanded to take some additional ammunition for the soldiers who had been left on shore to guard the yacht. All this was happening while the soldiers continued to level their weapons at Rosenstein and the mechanic.

There were hours of waiting and uncertainty for Captain Reich and his employer. The former kept making radio calls to other boats in the area to report the incident to the authorities in Sharm and the latter tried to explain to the officer, when he arrived, that they were there legally.

Eventually, Rosenstein and the mechanic were allowed to return to the yacht and told to wait. The Egyptian officer, without explanation, kept three passports with him. It was by now midnight. For the dozen divers who had come from all over the world at considerable expense to dive in these waters a legend was fast becoming a nightmare.

At dawn, after long hours of inspections and interrogations, the Fantasea was escorted to Sharm by Egyptian naval patrol boats. Reich was arrested and fined 500 Egyptian pounds in a "trial" conducted over the telephone between Colonel Hani of the Sharm police and some mysterious judge apparently sitting in Ras Sudar.

At the end of the trial the passengers and crew were allowed to depart, but Reich and the Fantasea were held "pending further clarifications." These were destined to take nine days, during which time no explanations were offered or apologies given.

On Friday, May 17, at 12.30 p.m., Reich was informed by Colonel Hani that he could up anchor and depart.

THE FANTASEA incident was not an isolated one, any more than was the outrage at Ras Burka. Rather, it was the result of a gradual, but clearly discernable, increase in hostility by the Egyptian authorities in the Sinai to tourism.

For many months now there have been reports of ships and divers being shot at, of boats being rammed and forcibly boarded by armed soldiers who pay no heed to official documents, and who are clearly acting from whim, not policy. People have been arrested at Coral Island and other tourism spots, travellers have been harassed at the check-point on the Nueiba-Santa Katarina road, and dozens of campers have complained of bad treatment.

The Fantasea has been boarded, held, questioned, countless times in the past. Howard Rosenstein has written innumerable letters to offi-

cials in Israel and Egypt, warning of the potentially explosive situation, but with very little effect.

Hassan Issa, the Egyptian consul-general in Eilat, who before the killings at Ras Burka privately admitted that he was worried about the situation, sent cables to Cairo reporting the problems and, more important, a handwritten note to the commander of the Sinai, General Gihad, saying that he had done so. Neither the note nor the cables changed the situation. Indeed, it got worse, culminating in the Ras Burka outrage.

The Israeli establishment was hardly more effective. Probably due to official sensitivity over the Taba talks, the deteriorating situation along the Sinai coast was not dealt with adequately. Protests were lame, and the halting dialogue between Israel and Egypt tended more toward overall foreign policy issues, than to the specific situation in Sinai.

Only after the Fantasea incident was any action taken, but even that was mild. The director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, brought the issue up at the diplomatic level and placed it on the agenda of the "director-general talks" between the two countries, but only "as another example of the

general issues that need to be dealt with in our relations with Egypt."

NOT ONLY has Rosenstein never received any explanation, compensation or apology from the Egyptians but, to add salt to the wound, several weeks ago, when the Fantasea put into Sharm again, the Egyptians fined Rosenstein (who was not on board) 1,000 Egyptian Pounds. This time, according to the anonymous judge at the other end of Colonel Hani's telephone line, not only Captain Reich, but the Fantasea itself was violating Egyptian law. No law was cited when the fine was imposed. If the Fantasea wanted to leave Sharm port, the fine had to be paid. No, the crew was told, there was no appeal.

The original Fantasea incident should have been a warning light for both Egypt and Israel, but it wasn't. Something must be very wrong in an environment where enlisted soldiers in the field automatically open fire on a vessel flying an American flag, obviously unarmed and obviously a holiday vessel. The yacht was boarded, impounded and fined with no explanation, and held for 10 days - despite the fact that it complied with every demand made by the Egyptians (including payment of the highest port dues in the world), and despite explicit permission from the ranking officer in the Egyptian Water Police to be where it was.

It would seem that neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Prime Minister's Office demanded to know why Israeli nationals, among others, aboard a boat operating out of Eilat were fired on, arrested and harassed. Instead, the situation was allowed to deteriorate, with almost no-one asking why, until the tragic Ras Burka deaths over Succot.

THE HOSTILITY of the Egyptian authorities in Sinai, experts say, can be traced back directly to General Gihad, the military, and thus overall, commander of the area. The rift between the general and the Egyptian tourism authorities in the area is a matter of common knowledge.

The general apparently feels that cordial tourism relations between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai are not consistent with his government's policy regarding normalization in other matters, such as the total freeze in trade and cultural ties.

He has gone out of his way, say people familiar with the situation, to make tourism as unpleasant as possible. He has introduced restrictions forbidding dive-boats to approach nearer the shore than one kilometre during the day, and two kilometres at night, applying a strict interpretation of a law disregarded until recently. It is impossible for a small craft to anchor two kilometres out in the Gulf of Suez at night, other than at one of the reefs west of Tiran island - an anchorage that recently was also declared a "closed area" for no apparent reason.

Could the tragedy have been prevented if more attention had been paid to the Fantasea incident, and dozens of similar ones, of a few months before? Was Ras Burka the unforeseeable act of a madman, as the Egyptians are claiming - or was it a function of the overall feeling of officially-endorsed hostility that has been allowed to permeate the Sinai?

In any event, it is inconceivable that the situation should be allowed to deteriorate to a point where Israelis feel that they cannot visit an area they returned in exchange for peace, and access to which is guaranteed in the Camp David Accords. That point is fast approaching - unless Israeli officialdom takes steps to prevent a wonderland from being turned into a haunt of fear. □



ISRAEL

ENERGY BARTER PLAN UNVEILED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 1 Nov 85 p: 17

[Article by Yitzhak Oked: "Shahal Unveils Plan To Barter Exports For Imported Fuel"]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. - Energy Minister Moshe Shahal yesterday unveiled an innovative barter system that his ministry is initiating, which he said should increase Israeli exports by hundreds of millions of dollars and ease the drain on the country's foreign currency reserves.

Speaking at the Insurance Forum luncheon, he stated that as far as he knew the idea has never been tried by any other country.

He explained that Israel spends over \$1.6 billion annually to purchase fuel and that this seriously drains foreign currency reserves.

Under the proposal, foreign trading companies will pay half the cost of Israel's fuel imports. The companies will receive credit in shekels at an Israeli bank for the amount they paid toward the fuel purchase

and accumulate regular commercial interest on this sum.

The trading company will have five years in which to choose locally made goods worth the value of their credit. Those goods will be exported to the destination of their choice.

If the trading company fails to use its credit toward the purchase of Israeli products within five years, it can receive cash. As a penalty it will only collect 50 per cent of the accumulated interest.

Shahal said negotiations are under way for a deal in which a company will pay \$300 million for the purchase of coal from South Africa. Negotiations are also being conducted for a similar deal involving about \$600m. worth of oil from Mexico.

CSO: 4400/29

ISRAEL

FIRST SOLAR-GENERATED STEAM PLANT FOR SMALL ENERGY USERS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Ilan Chaim]

[Text]

Kibbutz Nir Eliahu's dining hall yesterday officially began operating under its own steam, with the dedication of Israel's first solar generated steam plant for small energy users.

The \$35,000 system was built and installed on the dining hall roof by the Paz Oil Company and Pimat Ltd., an alternative energy company, with the support of the Ministries of Energy and Industry and Trade. Nir Eliahu buys the steam to run its dishwashers and other kitchen facilities, saving about 15 per cent of the cost of conventional energy.

Under the system, computer-controlled mirrors track the sun, focusing its rays on a series of steel tubes, heating the water inside up to 200 degrees Centigrade. The solar heated water flows into a flash tank, where it becomes steam.

"I don't like to use the word 'breakthrough'," Energy Ministry Director-General Natan Arad told *The Jerusalem Post*, "but this is certainly another important step forward in Israel's development of alternative energy."

Dr. Eitan Yanir, director of steam

research at Paz, said the new system is important, "because it fills the gap between the solar hot water generator used in private homes and the larger industrial users of solar generated steam and electricity."

Yanir mentioned Luz Industries of Jerusalem as the major innovator in solar generated power on an industrial scale. But Luz was also the first to develop a commercial installation for solar generated steam. This genuine breakthrough was achieved in 1981, with the inauguration of the solar steam facility at the Tapud food-processing plant at Sha'ar Hanegev.

The smaller scale plant atop Nir Eliahu's dining hall roof introduces a cheap source of steam for hospitals, hotels and even apartment blocks. Future modifications of the system will enable it also to generate electricity or to provide cooling, at an investment of some \$150 per square metre.

Paz offers the modular system - which can be expanded according to need - either for outright purchase by the user or as a source of energy which the user buys from the company.

ISRAEL

NEW MICROCHIP DEVELOPED ..

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 7 Nov 85 p. 3

[Article by Yitzhak Oked]

[Text]

HERZLIYA. - A new generation of 32-bit microprocessors designed and developed entirely in Israel was unveiled yesterday at the National Semiconductor plant here.

Observers point out that with the presentation of the new microprocessors, Israel is becoming a world centre in the design and development of these products.

National Semiconductor, an American company that controls over 80 per cent of the worldwide 32-bit microprocessor market, believes that its new second generation microprocessor, the 32332, will enable it to maintain its leading position in the 32-bit market.

Other companies are now competing with National Semiconductors. One such firm is another American company, Intel, that some two weeks ago also introduced a 32-bit microprocessor, the 80386. Like National Semiconductor, Intel has a research centre in Israel and, like the 32332, the 80386 was designed and developed in Israel.

At a press conference here yesterday, Anil Unberoi, a National Semiconductor group marketing manager who flew in for the presentation from the firm's home office in California, said that the 32332 is not only superior in performance but also will compete in price with other microprocessors on the market. The 32332 will sell for less than \$200, while Intel's 80386 is expected to sell for

about \$299. Motorola also sells a 32-bit processor for around \$275.

Among the key features of the 32332 are one which allows it to be used with eight, 16 and 32 bit computers.

The 32332 can also do more multiple jobs from a single instruction. It also has an improved data execution speed - as much as 60 per cent faster than other processors.


Dr. Giora Yaron, the manager of the research centre here, stated that the National microprocessor, not larger than a postage stamp, has about 90,000 transistors and is capable of three million functions per second - more than three times the speed of the 32032, which was National Semiconductor's first generation 32-bit microprocessor. Launched in 1983, it was also developed and designed in Israel.

Yaron said his research centre here is already deeply involved in the development stage of a third generation microprocessor - the 320532 - which is expected to be unveiled in 1987. Engineers here were not willing to talk too much about it. They only said that it would be a one-chip device capable of seven million functions per second - about seven times faster than the first generation and twice as fast as the second generation processors.

In answer to a *Jerusalem Post* question, Yaron said that the recently established National Semiconductor technological centre at Migdal

Haemek will eventually produce and manufacture the microprocessors developed at the research centre here. The company has already invested \$50m. in Israel, \$4m. of it in the new microprocessor.

National Semiconductor made the first presentation of the Israel-designed product in California a couple of days ago and, at that presentation, it kept quiet the fact that this microprocessor was designed and developed in Israel.



**Designed and developed at National Semiconductor's Herzliya research centre, the new 32332 microprocessor – the size of a postage stamp – can perform 3 million functions per second.**

(Giora Salmi)

/12828

CSO: 4400/35

ISRAEL

BACKGROUND ON WEST BANK LAND SALES GIVEN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Aug 85 p 15

[Text] Several years ago the Unit for Fraud Investigation in the central police office received intelligence information on leaks from the Israeli Real Estate Authority to real estate dealers pertaining to Arab lands in Judaea and Samaria which were offered for sale. The information pointed out that government officials, who were in the process of buying these lands for the government, were repeatedly surprised when private investors managed to beat them to a deal that they were on the verge of closing, after a lot of efforts and funds had been spent.

Investigators of the unit, headed by Deputy Commander Binyamin Ziegel, suspected that the leaks were not accidental, but rather that they were part of a very well oiled machine, complete with bribes and other benefits, intended to funnel tremendous profits to private hands. It did not take too long to find out that the unit itself was not immune to leaks.

Several of the investigators found out that private dealers had knowledge of secret parts of the investigation and of sensitive police sources. The suspicion concentrated on a senior official in the unit, who could have acted out of ideological considerations. Although an officer was put in charge of investigating the leak, the source has never been found. The violent and dangerous nature of real estate deals on the West Bank on the one hand, and the political sensitivities of the investigation, which was accompanied by actual intervention by senior sources on the other hand, ultimately brought about the suspension of the investigation.

The story regarding the investigation by Ziegel's people only serves to point out the problematic side of real estate deals on the West Bank. At first it was ideology which motivated business. Not only people from the right looked favorably on acquisition of land in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, but even Labor party officials encouraged them, as they considered them to be a renewal of Zionist pioneering. It is no accident that the Israeli Real Estate Authority uses Himnuta -- a subsidiary of the Jewish National Fund, which bought lands at the turn of the century -- in order to close deals on the West Bank.



But, as time went on, when it turned out that the differences in land values between land in Kfar-Saba and areas 5 minutes away had gone up in price tenfold, speculators showed up on the scene. When speculators are around, so are crooks. It turns out that here there are no religious, national or ethnic differences. The victims were often Arab land owners who fell prey to crooks in their own villages. These crooks managed to sell lands they did not own, sometimes to naive Israelis, who always dreamed of a house with a lawn, and who bought whatever they could lay their hands on, without checking where the land was and where they were going to build their dream house.

The government decision to enable individuals to buy land on the West Bank, a decision arrived at in late 1979, was preceded by a hot internal debate. It was also accompanied by a difficult debate with the United States. From the very first days of the Begin government, Ministers Moshe Dayan and Yig'al Horowitz proposed to enable Jews to acquire land in Judaea and Samaria. Nothing was done about it because of the fear that it would interfere with the negotiations with Sadat. In April 1979, several days after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, the then defense minister, Ezer Weitzman, proposed to the government to let Jews buy land in Judaea and Samaria. The idea was postponed again. This time because of Sadat's impending visit to Haifa. But after a few months, when the fears increased that the planned autonomy might bring about a Palestinian state, a resolution was made to encourage settlement. In order to put things in the right proportion, it should be remembered that lands that are in private hands (131,000 dunums, of which 31,000 were owned by Jews even before 1948) constitute but a minuscule part, compared with lands which were seized by the various governments over the years. Who remembers today the 1980 hunger strike of activists in Judaea and Samaria which lasted 45 days? The impression created then was that nothing was accomplished. Actually it was one of the most impressive success stories of the proponents of a Whole Land of Israel following the Six Day War. The strike was followed by a decision to tap government lands. These are mostly rocky areas which were owned by the Jordanian kingdom. Today the government owns (according to data gathered by Dr Meron Benvenisti) 52 percent of the 5.5 million dunums in the occupied territories. About 40 percent are government lands. The rest were seized for military and other needs. Only a small portion is set aside for settlement, but the seizure was made for other needs as well, especially to prevent Arab development on the West Bank.

The question arises, why -- under present conditions -- is there a need to acquire private lands as well? It turns out that in many areas, planned for settlement, government lands were not adjacent to each other. Thus, for example, continued development in Qarne Shomron necessitated the purchase of private Arab land. Efforts are concentrated mainly on such cases. But there were some national concerns who wished to use acquisition in order to force the government to approve more settlements. "We own land, why should we be prevented from settling there?" they argued.

One active concern in this area is the Fund for Redeeming Lands at the Qedumim school, headed by Avraham Mintz. According to him, activity is now concentrated on creating available areas for the government as well as allowing individuals to establish settlements independently. There are three such settlements so far, which are in advanced stages of development. Similar

funds are working for Amana, the Gush Emunim settlement movement, and for the council of local governments in Judaea and Samaria.

The race for land started following the 1979 government resolution. Many private investors went into business. They received the government's blessings. Some bought land in good faith. It is suspected that some participated in shady deals. According to Jordanean law, if someone shows documents from the Jordanean real estate registry, a statement by a licensed surveyor, signatures of owners of neighboring lands and a signature of the village chief, his land can be sold. If some of these signatures and documents are forged, in coordination with the village chief, this obviously constitutes fraud.

Another problem that came up was the intervention of the Jordanean government and the PLO in an effort to prevent sales. Many land owners feared for their lives. The solution was created in the form of Arab "straw men," who supposedly bought the lands for themselves and then turned them over to Jews. This method opened the door for more fraud. The problem mushroomed when private investors began to sell these plots. In May 1983 the papers were flooded with tempting ads to buy land. The Jumbo Company promised, for \$6,500 per dumum, plots which were supposed to be in a settlement with a country club, with two swimming pools, one heated and one with artificial waves, ten tennis courts, a soccer field, a volleyball court, stables and more. The Jerusalem representative of the company was willing to show a sample contract in which the buyer was expected to sign that he/she has seen and examined the land to assess its condition. Anyone who insisted on actually seeing the plot was given a strange answer: "You cannot reach the place because there is no road there. But you can go toward Bethlehem, turn left at the Elias Monastery, go 5 more km and get an idea of what the area is like..."

It turns out that many did not hesitate and made the purchase. Those who did some investigation found that the company was registered with the Jordanean registrar in Ramallah, although one of the partners was a senior Likud official, whose attorney was a Knesset member. In response to MA'ARIV the attorney said that Jumbo is a serious company, dealing legally, and that he made sure that there was a section in the contract which promised full refund should the deal not go through.

It is not only Jumbo which is registered with the Jordanean registrar. Many private investors preferred the king's wings. Some buyers woke up to the fact too late; others feel they gambled their money away. Thus it happened that some land buyers in Giv'at Ze'ev found themselves owning the local sewage plant.

It is now asked what will happen to settlements which were constructed on illegally acquired lands. The settlers have no cause for alarm. The settlements will not be dismantled. A senior legal official in the Ministry of Justice said that according to law, from the minute the property is more valuable than the land it is on, it is enough to compensate the owners who were victims of fraud.

The investigation now underway in the Unit for Serious Crimes is different than the first investigation conducted by Deputy Commander Ziegel. But the road to conviction of politicians is still very long. Not because none of them had anything to do with these deals. Not at all. Some acted out of ideological motivations without benefiting themselves. Some were partners in companies or served as advisers or attorneys and did not feel badly about making some easy profits. But most of them were careful enough to not leave any traces.

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CSO: 4423/12

ISRAEL

COMPANIES ENGAGED IN LAND DEALING LISTED

Jerusalem AL-'AWDAH in English 25 Aug 85 p 8

[Text]

Until 1979, Israelis were not allowed to buy land in the West Bank. The Camp David agreement stated that settlements could only be built on land which had been sold and after this time, the buying of Arab land became widespread. Since Jordanian law does not allow foreign companies to buy Arab land, the Israeli authorities allowed Israeli companies to establish offices in settlements and act as 'West Bank' companies, thereby circumventing the law.

The following is a previously unpublished list of the names of Israeli companies who buy Arab lands and construct settlements in the West Bank. Although these companies work throughout the West Bank, they are found particularly in the north in Emmanuel, Al-Kana and Kerni Shamron settlements.

1. El-Al for constructing projects, Kerni Shamron settlement.
2. Delta for trade and investment, Kerni Shamron.
3. Titanium for building and investing, Kerni Shamron.
4. Jumbo for trade and constructions, Kerni Shamron.
5. Uranium for building and investing, Kerni Shamron.
6. Omega for investments, Kerni Shamron.
7. Shareih Uroshlime for trade and constructions, Kerni Shamron.
8. Shareih Uroshlime for investments and realand proerty, Kerni Shmron.
9. Khafir Yakir Amik, Yakir settlement.

10. Titanium for trade and constructions, Kerni Shamron.
11. Q.M.H. for investments, Al-Kana settlement.
12. Q.M.H. corporation for investments, Al-Kana settlement.
13. Sham Dar company for building and development, Emmanuel settlement.
14. Dar.M.S. for investments, Emmanuel settlement.
15. Delta for real estate, Kerni Shamron.
16. Tal for building and investing, Kerni Shamron.
17. Karmim for investments corporation, Kadomim settlement.
18. Karmim for building and development, Kadomim.
19. Shamai land company, L.T.D, Tel Aviv.
20. Mormeniot company, Al-Kana settlement.
21. Makhsheeb Nakhl Raba Meniot, Al-Kana.
22. Inab company for investments, Kerni Shamron.
23. Deikel company for trade and building, Kerni Shamron.
24. Morshet Benyamin for investments, Kerni Shamron.
25. Morshet Benyamin for building and commerce, Kerni Shanron.
26. Elias M.D. buildings company, Kerni Shamron.
27. Edirit Hashka'ot, Al-Kana.
28. Ohlifa company, Al-Kana.
29. Edirit Ghaulat Karka', Al-Kana.
30. Hamnota M.d, Bethlehem.
31. Matiz for constructions corporation L.T.D, Tel Aviv.
32. Mormeniot Kana, private corporation, Al-Kana.

33. Afrat company for development M.D, Jeursalem.
34. Ba'ieh Yakir for investments, Kerni Shamron.
35. Oreit for property, Kerni Shamron.
36. Oreit for building and developing, Kerni Shamron.
37. Oranit for development, Kerni Shamron.
38. Klozar for building and investing, Al-Kana.
39. Gal Yozma for investment and development, Al-Kana.
40. Shat Tokhaf Baeer, Kokhan Yaer settlement.
41. Shat Tokhat Baeer for investment and development, Kokhan Yaer.
42. Shakhtar Oldanker, Maaleh Afracim settlement.
43. Shakhtar for investment and development, Maaleh Afracim.
44. Darghal for investment, Karni Afracim settlement.
45. Nizar for building, agriculture and commerce, Arael settlement.
46. Shamai Nof Shomron land private corporation, Yakir settlement.
47. Ozz company for planning, searching, and development, Kerni Shamron.
48. Bar Hashkaot/f Linmo't company, Maaleh Afracim.
49. Kanaan company for investment, Kerni Shamron.
50. Afrat works company, Afrat.
51. S.W.J.L. company for investment and development, Kerni Shamron.
52. H.R.S.W.K. company for investment and development, Kerni Shamron.
53. J.R.K.S.Y. company for development, Kerni Shamron.
54. A.B.M.D. company for developing and investment, Kerni Shamron.
55. Gold company for industry and investment, Kerni Shamron.
56. Ramat Shamoel for building and development, Emmanuel.
57. Haritaj company for development and managements, Afrat.
58. Afni Yasha company for building and investing, Kerni Shamron.
59. Sorim company for investment and projects, Shaare Tekva.
60. Sorim company for investment and development, Shaare Tekva.
61. Rimer Moda'im private corporation, Ketiyaho.
62. Hanan Zolsman for building and investing, Arael.
63. B.T. company for investing M.D., Yakeer settlement.
64. Darly company Qalqeelia, Kadomim settlement.
65. M.D. Asher company, Yakeer.
66. Yahloum Kokhaf Hashemron company for investing.
67. Rahamim company for developing outskirts of Yahuda and Samera, Bet Horon.
68. Hikal company for investment, Al-Kana.
69. Thara and Sakhra M.D. company, Kiryat Arba.
70. Giola Abot company, Al-Kana.
71. Younis company for investing and developing lands, Kiryat Arba.

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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

ANOTHER HARBOR IN ASHDOD--The Ministers' Committee on Economic Affairs decided yesterday to build a deep-water harbor north of the one at Ashdod. The harbor will be used primarily for the unloading of coal at the Rotenberg power plant at Ashqelon and for additional power plants which will be built in the future. The committee preferred this alternative over others. For example: An intermediate solution would be based on using existing harbors or establishing a pier for direct off-loading into the Rotenberg power plant (this would be similar to the one at Hadera). The cost of this project would be almost \$125 million. The expenditures would be spread out over 5 years. Nine ministers voted in favor of this proposal by Moshe Shahal and Hayim Corfu. They included Economic [Planning] Minister Gad Ya'aqobi and Deputy Prime Minister David Levi. Those voting against the project were Yitzhaq Moda'i, Ariyel Sharon, Yiga'el Hurwitz, and Aryeh Nehamkin. [Text] [Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 4 Sep 85 p 20] /8918

CSO: 4423/24

LEBANON

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SURVIVES AMIDST CHAOS

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 28 Jul-3 Aug 85 pp 18-19

[Text] Will the American University in Lebanon close its doors? What is going to happen to the university from which generations of specialists and intellectuals in all fields of knowledge have graduated over a period of more than a century, graduates who have helped develop Lebanon in different areas.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI put this question to Dr George Frayhah, director of the University's Eastern District Campus. Casting light on the historic background of the university and its development over the past 10 years, Dr Frayhah said: "The history of the mother university is only recent. During the past 120 years since its foundation the University has survived different eras starting with the Ottomans, through the French mandate period, independence and post-independence era. It has flourished in a peaceful atmosphere, so much so that it gained an immunity which later became ineffective.

"Immunity as a concept has several criteria; it is academic freedom, such as non-interference in administrative affairs, respect of laws and regulations, and the safety of the family which includes students, faculty and staff. We feel that immunity in that sense is not adequately secured."

He added: "The campus here was founded in 1976 due to the security situation and the division of Beirut into East and West. The beginning was very modest; we had only 7 faculty members and 13 courses; the administrative situation was related to the security situation and how stable it was. Initially, the "Theatre Al-Elysee" was converted into the headquarters for the administration, then, due to road blockages and the deterioration of security, we moved to Zahrat al-Ihsan school. As a result of the continued shelling of al-Ashrafiyah district, the administration moved to al-Fanar. But, after a short time there the campus moved back to Beirut. It is worth noting that the more shelling we had, the more students, faculty and staff joined us and the more the campus expanded. We had more colleges and the number of students increased to more than 160. In 1980, the engineering school in Brummana was founded. As the security situation became tense in al-Ashrafiyah we moved to al-Luwayzah, then to al-Markaziyah until we settled in the school of the "Two Sacred Hearts" in Juniyah, our current

headquarters. Our life has been and still is like a wanderer's, yet despite these difficult moves, classes have never been disrupted. On the contrary, there has been tangible progress for our institution both in the human and cultural aspects. The number of faculty jumped to 160 professors; staff ranges from 40 to 45 employees; the number of students in all colleges exceeds 1,000. It is interesting to note that as security deteriorated the university flourished and while roads were cut off, more colleges were available (except the medical school). Despite those circumstances, about 1,100 students graduated from the university in the past 10 years."

[Question] How important is the campus to you?

[Answer] Its importance lies in the fact that it has maintained three essential points. These are as follows: First, it maintained itself as an integral part of the university. Contrary to what is being said our campus did not split from the university, neither in student affairs nor in registration nor in promotion, graduation or financial affairs. The campus is bound by the decisions of the central administration and the board of trustees. It has never split from the mother university, never.

Second, the campus has maintained both its administrative and educational standards. Perhaps order is being applied today more than at any time before; there is a measure of discipline; no partisan politics and no favoritism. Once we lose that discipline, I can tell you, the campus would collapse and education would be at stake.

Third, regardless of the past 10 years, the campus has always been a shelter for every university student. Everyone who could not continue his studies in the western section came to us. The campus secured food supplies and medical equipment for the AUB hospital and facilitated their passage to the western section of the city.

When Israel stormed Lebanon the campus administration received hundreds of professors and students and offered all it could. We did not retaliate despite some hostile statements. There was an intention to close down the AUB branch and there were some troubles. Yet what prevailed was the academic spirit, the spirit of love and the atmosphere of a university campus, values which were taught to us by the university founder, Dany Bliss, whose philosophy is ours: "Let them have life and let them have it abundantly."

[Question] What are the prospects for the campus and what possibility is there for closing down the university?

[Answer] The destiny of the campus is that of the university and vice versa. I am not worried about the university as a whole. There are many rumors but there is also a lot of assistance. The university will remain as long as we want it to. We are not going to accuse the Americans or the board of trustees.

Under the cruelest and most horrible circumstances, the Americans left Lebanon only after a series of kidnappings and assaults had started. Such acts have resulted in human and material damage. I can say that neither the American nor the Lebanese administrations want the campus closed down unless we express such a desire through negative acts. If it were decided that the university would not remain, the branch, too, would not remain unless there was another arrangement. As an administrator, I am committed to the administration of the mother university. But the society which wanted the institution and which absorbed the Anglo-Saxon education is, in one way or another, the strongest actor; it can keep the campus under another cover, not necessarily the American University. When man and program meet, the land remains for legitimacy. There are many donors who offer land--and they have offered a lot of it; there are those who offer money--and they have offered millions of pounds. The question, then, has been accepted popularly and psychologically. Of course, the university is supposed to remain because it is the tradition. If, however, it closed its doors, God forbid, I don't think the society would deprive its sons and daughters of an Anglo-Saxon education.

[Question] Can we say, therefore, that society takes a part in making the decision?

[Answer] If the university is a rejected object, it definitely will not be able to survive.

[Question] Is there any support from political parties and other luminaries, as well as from the Lebanese government?

[Answer] Yes, there is also support from charity and social organizations. That is why society will not allow the abolition of Anglo-Saxon education.

[Question] It is reported that there is a deficit of \$15 million.

[Answer] I have no knowledge of the financial affairs of the university. But I think that the university loses money every year and that it is compensated for this loss.

[Question] Is the question of closing down the university related to its financial deficit?

[Answer] The university will not close its doors due to financial reasons. It has always lost money and still does.

[Question] Do you think that closing the university will become inevitable, despite the will to survive, if the "inhuman acts"--as they are called by some--continue?

[Answer] If the situation remains as it is now, it is natural that the university will fade away. No institution can survive amidst an unsafe atmosphere.

[Question] Do you think there is a negative will to eliminate foreign education and consequently the sources of foreign culture?

[Answer] No, I do not think so. On the contrary, the university has enjoyed a measure of stability and security since the days of the Turks, the French mandate, independence and post-independence. Even the Palestinians gave it some kind of immunity. The political parties preserved its academic freedom. Today, however, we are going through an unusual period of loss of immunity. The university is slipping dangerously and if this continues, it will close its doors. It is today in a state of danger.

[Question] Will the decision concerning the fate of the university be internal or external?

[Answer] If the situation remains as it is now, the university will close down by itself because there is a drain of students, faculty, and staff. There are some steadfast people, of course, but there is a limit to steadfastness.

[Question] How many are the steadfast people?

[Answer] I have no idea but the number is large.

[Question] What are your means of struggle to keep the branch and the university?

[Answer] The university exists and registration continues. It will continue its mission. It exists and we hope that there will be enough awareness for survival. So far no American decision to close the university has been taken.

[Question] What do you think of the contacts that are taking place at the official level?

[Answer] They pleased me and I wish my colleagues, the professors, good luck.

[Question] Any other comment?

[Answer] All universities here, whether they be American, Christian, or Lebanese, are symbols of this country and of its heritage. They are like the Cedars of Lebanon, like Lebanon's mosques and churches, like Gibran's words and the best poems written by Elias Abu Shabakah or al-Akhtal al-Saghir. Everything may be permissible or may have been allowed in Lebanon, except the violation of the sanctuary of education—the basis upon which Lebanon has existed before Christ, in the time of Christ, and after him.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

FATAH SPENDING DECENTRALIZED, NEW U.S. OFFICES EXPECTED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Sep 85 p 53

[Article: "Fatah Enters Finance Decentralization Period"]

[Text] New signs in the Palestinian arena indicate that the Fatah organization has entered a new monetary period which might be called the financial decentralization period.

A direct outcome of this monetary decentralization is, to a certain extent, the opening of a number of different types of Palestinian "media" offices in Washington, D.C.

Fatah sources in the American capital confided to an AL-HAWADITH correspondent that five main characters in the organization have begun, according to the new arrangement, to enjoy increasing independence in their spending policies. These characters are: Abu 'Ammar, of course; Abu al-Lutf (Faruq Qaddumi); Abu'Iyad (Salah Khalaf); Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) and Khalid al-Hasan. The new arrangement grants the five Fatah leaders liberty in determining how to spend the organization's monies and the monies they raise directly. It also relieves them from reaching a consensus in determining the spending policy.

The organization's circles say that the new monetary decentralization system will be reflected in the establishment of new offices in the United States. There is talk of opening an office in New York or Washington, to be managed by the organization's former representative in Beirut, Shafiq al-Hut. Abu 'Ammar has already approved the necessary funds for this office. In addition, it has been rumored that Khalid al-Hasan will support opening a Palestinian office in Washington, D.C., administered by the well-known writer and media expert, Raymonda al-Tawil. There is also talk of al-Hasan's trying to finance a Palestinian news agency (WAFA) office in the American capital.

It is worth mentioning that the office presided over by Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahman in Washington is considered officially an information office only, and the American authorities do not allow the organization's delegate to the United Nations, Zuhdi al-Tarazi who is considered an "observer," to leave New York City for other American cities or states.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN POLICY CHIEF DESCRIBES CURRENT MOVEMENT ISSUES

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Oct 85 pp 10-12

[Interview with Faruq Qaddumi, Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Palestine Liberation Organization, by Mazin Bakr: "Abu Al-Lutf: Peace Is Under the Ruins of the Bathhouse on the Gulf"]

[Text] Our brother Abu al-Lutf, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization's political bureau, is taking part in the meetings of the 40th session of the United Nations in New York. He was close to the Security Council proceedings concerned with the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

We held a telephone interview with our brother Abu al-Lutf in New York a few hours after the final voting on the Security Council resolution condemning the barbaric Israeli raid.

While the interview was being readied for publication, further developments occurred -- the American pirates' operation, Geoffrey Howe's retreat from the meeting with the two Palestinian members of the joint delegation, the European market countries' demand for a postponement of its meeting with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which it had been stipulated would be held on the 16th of this month, then the declaration by the committee preparing for the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations that it would not invite Yasir 'Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, to attend.

We therefore contacted our brother Abu al-Lutf a second time to complete the interview. We found that he had been expecting that.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Our brother Abu al-Lutf, let us start with the Security Council resolution which has been approved and sharply condemns the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

What is your assessment of this resolution?

Abu al-Lutf: The barbaric Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia is also to be considered a violation of the sovereignty and unity of Tunisian territory.

It became clear from the beginning of the discussion in the Security Council that the United States stood alone in its support of the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian and Tunisian people. Conversely, all the people who spoke harshly condemned the Israeli raid and the losses of lives and property that resulted from it, and asked that the most severe penalties be imposed on Israel.

In the final voting in the Security Council, 14 votes were in favor of the resolution and the United States alone abstained.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: The resolution included a reference to Tunisia's right to obtain appropriate compensation for the losses of human life and material damage inflicted on it.

What does that mean?

Abu al-Lutf: The inclusion of the paragraph on compensation in the resolution means that there was an aggression which was committed. This paragraph also includes another form of condemnation of Israel and its criminal violation of the sovereignty and unity of Tunisian territory.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: However, the resolution did not refer to the right of the PLO and the Palestinian people to receive similar compensation.

Abu al-Lutf: The basic point in the matter is the condemnation by all the members of the Security Council, except the United States, of course, of Israel, because of the aggressive raid it made on the headquarters of the PLO in Tunisia. This is what we were seeking from the beginning.

In addition to that, all the people who spoke referred to the PLO by describing it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and they asserted their appreciation of the organization's efforts in the search for a just, permanent peaceful solution in the region.

The Security Council and the Raid

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: The United States is always biased in favor of Israel's interests and consistently delays adopting any resolutions condemning it in the Security Council by exercising the right of the veto. This time, however, it was compelled to abstain. This is something that has rarely been seen in the record of American positions in the Security Council.

How do you explain that?

Abu al-Lutf: The United States of America is constantly providing protection for Israel. It defends it and prevents the Security Council from taking any disciplinary measure against it or condemning its aggressive acts against the Palestinian people.

However, it was clear to the international community this time that Israel had gone to great extremes in its aggression against Tunisia, which is very distant from it, striking more than 70 Palestinian and Tunisian martyrs and

a large number of wounded. The overwhelming majority in the Security Council stood alongside the Palestinian and Tunisian people and supported the complaint which the Tunisian minister of foreign affairs submitted.

In spite of American maneuvers aimed at procrastinating and postponing the discussion, the Security Council gave great importance to the matter and treated it as an urgent, pressing issue.

#### I Was Not Surprised

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: The balance the PLO is striking between armed struggle and its diplomatic efforts to seek a permanent, just peace in the Middle East may be one of the major reasons behind the joint American-Israeli attempt to liquidate the Palestinian leadership. America is trying to provoke the PLO to extremist activity or a political capitulation to the American and Israeli terms.

What is your comment on that?

Abu al-Lutf: Let me say, first of all, that the United States offers complete support for Israel's aggressive and expansionist policies against us. While Israel accuses us of terrorism, it itself engages in terror against our people with full support and sympathy from America.

Second, the United States does not recognize the legitimate rights of our Palestinian people, is ignorant of their national ambitions and is always trying to crush their national identity by destroying the PLO, the mechanism which expresses this identity.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Our brother Abu al-Lutf, in your capacity as one of the leaders of the PLO, what reaction did you feel to the Israeli attack?

Abu al-Lutf: I cannot say that the Israeli attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia surprised me. Indeed, to the contrary, in my capacity as a member of the organization's executive committee, I expected an Israeli action of this sort. The Israelis have always deliberately frustrated any peaceful initiatives toward movement and they have ignored a great many of the United Nations decrees issued by the General Assembly and the Security Council bearing on the Middle East and the Palestinian cause.

However, such Israeli obstinacy in continuing to occupy Arab and Palestinian territories would not have gone on had it not been for American support of Israel. Had it not been for this support, Israel would not have been able, either, to act with such an arrogant and overbearing attitude toward the Security Council. Its continuous aggressions against the Palestinian people are reactions against Palestinian military operations.

#### We Do Not Accept This

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Could you give us some idea about what went on during King Husayn's talks with President Reagan during their most recent meeting in Washington?

Abu al-Lutf: We have received some information about the meeting between King Husayn and President Reagan. According to this information, the American position regarding the PLO has not changed, since Washington still insists that the organization offer basic concessions in advance by recognizing "Israel's right to exist" and accepting Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 before America talks with the PLO. This we cannot accept.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: It is not odd that the United States is adhering to its previous positions.

Where, however, does the PLO stand?

Abu al-Lutf: There is the Fez policy which was approved unanimously by the Arab countries and must be carried out. At the same time we are not prey to any illusions on America and Israel's attempts to crush the PLO, whether we are moderate or hard-line.

The British Retreat

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: What are the circumstances that led the British government to retreat from the meeting with two members of the PLO's executive committee as part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation?

Abu al-Lutf: It is not surprising that the British government should have retreated from its position on meeting the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The position of the British government under Thatcher's premiership has not yet adopted any progressive stands. Britain has always represented an obstacle in the way of the development of the European Common Market countries' positions. Unfortunately, it alleges that the Palestinian officials had sought to issue a statement recognizing resolution 242, on the basis of which it would be possible to hold such a meeting. In addition, one can say that pressures were exerted on Britain. It is well known that the British position corresponds to a large degree with the American position in its obstinacy vis-a-vis the Palestinian cause. One should bear in mind that Britain bears a historic responsibility regarding the Palestinian people's tragedy, because it was a major cause of this tragedy, when it was the mandate power in Palestine.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: However, the official Jordanian statement issued in this regard is consistent with the declaration Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British foreign minister, made concerning the reasons for cancelling the meeting, in spite of the Jordanian warning about the seriousness of what had happened as far as complicating the situation in the Middle East was concerned.

Abu al-Lutf: There was a difference in interpretation between us and Jordan from the outset, since Jordan is in favor of 242 and we do not recognize it because it does not recognize us. We declared from the time the agreement was first signed that our room for maneuver in carrying it out was based on a group of constants in the Palestinian position which the Palestine Liberation Organization executive committee statement issued regarding the agreement has articulated. We stressed on these occasions our adherence to these



constants in every area of our political movement and we have warned all Arab brothers and Jordan also of the consequences of any backsliding.

Jordan faces daily threats from Israel, and the United States of America exerts various diverse pressures on it to push it to move forward, from their perspective, and agree to direct negotiations with Israel. We in the Liberation Organization have considered that the importance of the meeting between the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the foreign minister of Britain can be determined by the support for the Palestinian cause that this meeting might produce and new improvements in the British position that might result from it. The fact of the matter, though we agreed to the meeting and appreciated the invitation, is that we never had any illusions about its results.

We must now realize that in confronting this obstinacy it is necessary to escalate the Palestinian armed struggle, exert every effort to resolve Arab disputes and strengthen Arab solidarity.

Our positions in the Palestine Liberation Organization are well known and specific. We would like the fraternal nation of Jordan to understand these positions, because we have experiences which categorically prove -- and the events which occurred recently have confirmed this -- that Israel and the United States of America are seeking to strike out at the PLO and not meet with it in any case. We are prepared to negotiate by means of an international conference under the supervision of the United Nations. However, the practices which Israel has engaged in, thereby defying world public opinion and the Arab nation, and the unqualified approval it has received from the United States, establish an unquestionable determination to ignore the basic rights of the Palestinian people and attempt to strike at the PLO and exterminate the Palestinian people.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: What about the European Common Market countries' retreat also from meeting the joint delegation, bearing in mind that the Gulf countries are continuing their meeting with the market countries to set out economic arrangements on trade between the two parties?

Abu al-Lutf: The European Common Market has succumbed to American pressures. There is no doubt that some Arab positions have helped these countries to back down from positions they took in the past. I am not saying that all the European market countries have backed down, but Britain, West Germany and Denmark are the ones that have taken positions of retreating from the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli struggle. There is no doubt, either, that solidarity in Arab positions makes it possible for these countries to feel the force of Arab pressure on them as far as the Palestinian cause is concerned.

#### The General Assembly and 'Arafat's Appearance

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: What are the circumstances which prompted the non-aligned countries to withdraw their request from the United Nations General Assembly that an invitation be sent to our brother Abu 'Ammar to address the assembly on its 40th anniversary?

Abu al-Lutf: The nonaligned countries have not withdrawn the draft of their resolution from the General Assembly concerning an invitation to our brother Abu 'Ammar. The fact is that the General Assembly in 1974 approved the PLO's right to take part in all its activities. However, the celebration committee adopted a resolution last June on the participation of the heads of delegations of member countries at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations, and the resolution noted that observer members could take part in these celebrations on the basis of the special section on their causes. This was totally against the interests of our cause, and we actually tried to correct this mistake. A draft resolution was presented concerning this participation where the chairman of the General Assembly issued an official statement declaring that the assembly, after legal consultations, asserted that the decree bearing on participation by PLO and Sowapo members in General Assembly activities still was valid and that no decree or recommendations of the joint member country committee on the 40th anniversary celebrations would affect that. It is well known that the General Assembly does not send invitations to its members to participate but rather informs them of the date of the opening of the session or occasions it holds from time to time. The nonaligned nations' request is still pending there in the General Assembly, and it can be voted on at any moment. However, as I said, it is well known that invitations are not sent to anyone, whether they are members or something else; rather, these occasions are announced and the member countries declare their desire to take part. This is their right.

#### The Geneva Summit

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: The Soviet-American summit will meet soon in Geneva.

Do you believe that this summit will help the two great powers arrive at a mutual understanding of the Middle East issue in a manner which will pave the way for the holding of an international conference?

Abu al-Lutf: The Middle East problem will not head the discussion agenda. Of course bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington will assume first place.

As regards their relations in the international context, in general, trust between them is absent and each one is vying with the other to win further positions and international influence. For example, America cooperates with Israel to thwart the peace initiatives in our area, because its strategic alliance with the Israeli state gives it a foothold in the region.

#### Syria and Jordan

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Let us move on to talk about domestic Arab politics and Palestine-Arab relations. The Arab reconciliation committees which emerged from the Casablanca summit have begun their activities. For example, last month, a meeting was held between the prime ministers of Jordan and Syria in Riyadh, the first between them since 1978.

What is your assessment of the effects of a probable Jordanian-Syrian reconciliation on Palestinian-Jordanian and Palestinian-Syrian relations?

Abu al-Lutf: I would like to stress that we are the ones who were behind the appeal that the Arab summit meet in Casablanca, and the overwhelming majority of the Arabs' response to our appeal is proof that the Arabs stand alongside the Palestinian people and respond to the demands of its sole legitimate representative, the PLO.

At the summit, we asserted the importance of eliminating Arab disputes and the need for Arab cooperation on all levels to support the Arab and Palestinian positions in the international community and support the Palestinian struggle to regain our people's legitimate rights.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Let me be more specific. Syria imposed on Jordan the condition of abrogating the agreement signed with the PLO last 11 February as an approach toward improving Syrian-Jordanian relations.

What is your comment on this?

Abu al-Lutf: As I said, the PLO is always seeking Arab solidarity and is always presenting recommendations to belligerent Arab parties to hold meetings among themselves to end disputes. Arab fragmentation and rifts have weakened the Arab position on the international stage. There is a need to retain at least a minimum level of relations between Arab countries and coordinate among them, especially countries which border on Palestine, although what is required is comprehensive cooperation and coordination on all levels.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Syria recently recommended the holding of a six-party mini-summit in Riyadh, which the PLO would not attend, prior to the stipulated Arab summit next November. With Syria's insistence on keeping the organization out of this summit, does this reflect a change in Syria's position, which was that of boycotting the last summit?

Abu al-Lutf: They, the Syrians, are isolated from the Arab world. Therefore they responded to the efforts of the reconciliation committees the Casablanca summit originally formed in accordance with a special recommendation from the PLO. The organization always works to improve Arab relations, because disputes within the united Arab family do not serve Arab interests.

#### National Unity

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Where does the PLO stand today on the road toward the restoration of Palestinian national unity?

Abu al-Lutf: Our departure from Beirut in 1982, then from Tripoli at the hands of the Syrians in 1983, has affected our internal situation and our status in the Arab and international contexts. However, by developing the Palestinian dialogue, we were able to reach the Aden-Algiers agreement.

Then the convening of the Palestine National Council in Amman in November 1984 was the beginning of a way out of the predicament. We then devoted ourselves to consolidating our relations with Jordan so we could be close to our occupied territories and it would be in our ability to take rapid, direct steps to help our people there.

When AMAL launched its attack on the Palestinian camps, the Palestinians came together to defend them, in spite of their disputes, since the Palestinians who are outside the organization then felt that their allies of the moment had broken the promises they had made to them and it had become clear to everyone that it was necessary to protect the PLO and defend it against all conspiracies, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

We are actually doing everything in our power to bring them back to the organization and give them the chance to express themselves within its framework, not outside it. We are a democratic organization. We listen to the opposition and exchange views with it. This is our Palestinian democracy, which provides us with strength in our armed struggle against the enemy.

FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH: Brother Abu al-Lutf, what is the PLO's position vis-a-vis the hijacking of the Italian vessel Achille Lauro and the United States' hijacking of the civilian Egyptian airplane which was transporting the hijackers?

Abu al-Lutf: The PLO, by means of its chairman, our brother Abu 'Ammar, has declared that it condemns such actions and that it will try the people who hijacked that ship. However, the United States committed an act of air piracy and hijacked the Palestinian hijackers who were on an Egyptian airplane en route to a Palestinian trial.

The PLO, on the basis of consultations with brothers in Egypt and Italian officials, intended to try them in order to prove to the world that it rejects such acts and that it punishes the people who commit them.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PROBLEM OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS FOR NATIONALS REVIEWED

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Oct 85 pp 18, 19

[Article by Jamal Shadid: "Hakam Bal'awi and the Problem of Palestinian Passports: There Are Seven Hardships in Traveling"]

[Text] What do Palestinians holding the document do?

There are stories which more closely resemble fantasy about Palestinians who travel from the airport of one Arab capital to the airport of another. Some of them stay as unwanted guests in 20 Arab and foreign airports.

One of them committed suicide.

Another worked as a baggage handler in a foreign country until his situation was set straight.

The person holding the document bears a cross of woes. His hand is on his heart whenever he enters an airport and he swears a thousand times to hold onto his rifle.

Some years ago there was harsh treatment in European capitals, where every Palestinian was the object of suspicion. Now, Palestinians in the airports of Europe say "I am a member of the PLO" and sometimes their entry is facilitated.

However, it is in the Arab countries that the hardships and "plagues" become aggravated. Some of them are funny, funny to the point where one cries or erupts in rage.

Palestine is a member of the Arab League, and it must liberate the movements of ordinary Palestinians, if its countries are incapable of liberating the territory of the Palestinians (while being unable to liberate their camps of them!). The issue that arises is that of the issuance of passports to Palestinians, in cooperation between the PLO and the Arab League. However, some Arab countries consider the Palestinians "their quota" from Palestine.

Our brother Hakam Bal'awi, PLO representative at the Arab League, has participated in many meetings to solve this problem, of which Mahmud Darwish has



said "The Athens airport distributes us among airports -- Lod Airport, when will we fly from you and come back to you, come back to you?"

[Question] At their recent meeting, the representatives of the Arab countries discussed the subject of the work, residence and movement of Palestinians in Arab countries. What have the results been?

[Answer] This important subject is discussed at all league council meetings, periodic or extraordinary, at the ministers' level or at the level of the delegates. All these meetings assert that Palestinians should be treated in accordance with the laws and statutes that apply to the citizens of the countries on whose territories they reside. Affirmation of the resolutions issued in this regard has been made on more than one occasion.

[Question] However, we see that the actual situation differs from the resolutions.

[Answer] These resolutions have been adopted at more than one meeting. When they have not been carried out, so far, in some Arab countries, the Arab League council has adopted a resolution to send a delegation which would begin its tour in Tunisia, then Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar and North Yemen, and from there to the other Arab countries, directly to hold discussions with the officials concerned with the conditions of the Palestinians residing there and ways to guarantee that the Arab League's resolutions are carried out.

#### Two Delegations, One Arab and One Palestinian

[Question] Could you give us an idea about the composition of the delegation?

[Answer] The delegation in actuality consists of two delegations, one Palestinian, from the PLO, including our brothers Jamal al-Surani, Tawfiq al-Safadi and Ahmad Muhammad Salim, and a delegation from the Arab League headed by the assistant secretary general, Mr Muhammad al-Farra, and including Dr Akram Nash'at, the secretary general of the council of Arab foreign ministers, as a member.

[Question] Could we say, then, that the delegation's task is primarily to seek information?

[Answer] What is needed is not just to learn about these conditions, which are clearly and thoroughly known; rather, these visits are in essence to confirm the extent to which the resolutions bearing on the treatment of Palestinians residing in Arab countries are applied. The delegation will submit a detailed report on its tour to the league council, and our hope is that all Arab countries will cooperate with the delegation.

[Question] However, the league has a memorandum from Syria stating that it refuses to receive the delegation.

[Answer] This is true. Syria has refused to receive the delegation. It has said that the Palestinians residing on its territory have no problems. The

truth is that the Palestinians residing in Syria suffer from complex political problems and are treated harshly. We are all familiar, for example, with the harassment by Syrian authorities of the inhabitants of the al-Yarmuk camp near Damascus. Until 1961 the Palestinians did not suffer from any problems in Syria, but after the secession, and then after 1976, the situation changed. This situation arises from the current Syrian policy of opposition to the Liberation Organization. The Palestinians in Syria of course are not in favor of this; no Arab country has the right to curtail the civil rights of Palestinians residing on its territory if a dispute arises between that country and the PLO. Otherwise, what would be the difference between having the Palestinians under Israeli occupation and having them as guests in the Arab countries?

[Question] How will Syria's refusal to receive the delegation be dealt with within the league?

[Answer] The question will be discussed in a league council meeting. No country has the right to object to a resolution the Arab League adopts unanimously.

#### The Casablanca Protocol

[Question] What does this mean -- that the Syrian delegate to the league agreed to the formation of such a delegation?

[Answer] The Syrian delegate was present and did not object to the resolution forming the delegation, since it was a resolution affirming a previous resolution. The history of this sort of resolution goes back to the Casablanca protocol of 1965 concerning the treatment of Palestinians and also to the Arab League charter, its appendix bearing on Palestine and the league resolutions bearing on the Palestine cause, specifically that bearing on the preservation of Palestinian identity. The council of foreign ministers of the member countries agreed unanimously at the Casablanca meeting on 10 September 1965 to the provisions concerning the conditions of the Palestinians. The council invited the member countries to take the measures necessary to carry all these resolutions out.

[Question] Could you refresh our memory on sections of the Casablanca protocol?

[Answer] Most gladly. Among its most important sections are:

The Palestinians now residing on the territories of Arab countries have the equal rights to work and be employed as the citizens of these countries, while retaining their Palestinian nationality.

The Palestinians residing on the territories of these countries have the right, whenever their interests so require, to leave them and return to them.

The resolutions have also stipulated that they are to be given suitable documents for their travel and that these are to be renewed without delay,

provided that the people holding these documents in territories of the League of Arab States be dealt with as subjects of the league countries with respect to visas and residence.

Travel documents bearing on Palestinian refugees issued by any Arab country will be dealt with in the same manner as passports bearing on the citizens of that country.

Palestinians holding Palestinian refugee travel documents will be dealt with as subjects of the countries issuing these documents, with regard to freedom of residence, work and movement. Secondly, coordination will take place with the PLO to extend measures bearing on the execution of these sections.

In the event any Palestinian commits any crime, misdemeanor or violation in any Arab country, the laws of the country in which he resides will be applied to him.

These resolutions were approved in the Casablanca protocol and later were approved at all sessions. There are no new resolutions in this regard, but rather resolutions which affirm these previous ones.

#### Lebanese Travel Documents

[Question] Our people in Lebanon, in particular, come up with many difficulties in obtaining or renewing Lebanese travel documents. Has the PLO made bilateral contacts with the Lebanese government in this regard, in light of the resolutions of the League of Arab States, and if so, what are the results?

[Answer] This is true, the Liberation Organization is constantly submitting studies, comments and observations at all Arab League meetings on violations by Lebanese authorities and other Arab countries of the Casablanca protocol. At the next league council meeting, we will bring the question up with the representatives of the Lebanese government. The league council has adopted a series of resolutions demanding that there be coordination between the PLO and the Lebanese government, the latest of which was at the two council sessions held in Tunisia in June of this year, which the emergency summit conference at Casablanca reaffirmed last 7 August.

[Question] Do you believe that these resolutions will see the light of day?

[Answer] They must. The PLO has monitored the execution of these resolutions and will spare no effort to this end.

[Question] Could we say that a solution to what our people in Lebanon and our people residing abroad are facing is near at hand?

[Answer] Yes, there are good possibilities in this regard. A Liberation Organization delegation will tour the countries concerned in the effort to solve these problems in a temporary or permanent fashion, and the organization will follow up on this problem until measures are taken which will in effect stop these hardships from being repeated.

## Hardships in the Gulf

[Question] There has been much talk recently about the termination of Palestinians' work contracts in Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the deportation of some of them, in addition to intensification of the difficulty of their obtaining entry visas to these countries. Have issues of this sort been discussed in the halls of the Arab League?

[Answer] These subjects have not yet been discussed because there are Palestinian delegations which will soon tour these countries to discuss such subjects directly with the officials in them. I believe that these countries will respond and act to solve these problems.

## Relief!

[Question] For some time papers have been disseminating news about the League of Arab States' upcoming issuance of special passports for Palestinians via the Liberation Organization. To what extent is this news correct, and what stage has it reached?

[Answer] This subject has been discussed in the Arab League and a number of resolutions have been adopted with regard to it which the Arab interior ministers reaffirmed in their last meeting. We have presented a detailed study on this subject which will be discussed with all Arab countries during the Palestinian delegation's tour with the Arab League delegation to member countries to arrive at final recommendations to be presented to the league council so that suitable resolutions can be adopted in their regard.

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QATAR

ADVISORY COUNCIL: AIMS, ACHIEVEMENTS

Doha DAILY GULF TIMES in English 28 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by K. N. Sharma]

[Text]

**Q**ATAR'S Advisory Council, which begins its 14th session today after a formal address by the Emir, HH Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, symbolises the country's commitment to government by consent.

It is a product of the Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972, promulgated by HH the Emir soon after his accession, which organises the different organs of the State.

Technically the Council's role is to advise the Head of the State in the exercise of his legislative functions. But in practice the Council is more of a Parliament in the Western sense, particularly that of an upper chamber in a bicameral legislature.

The Qatari institution is rooted in the tribal tradition of "Shura" (consultation) which presupposes the pre-eminence of the ruler, but at the same time admits his need to seek the advice, indeed the consent, of the tribe which he rules.

The importance of the Council was underlined by HH Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani in his inaugural address in May, 1972. His Highness said: "The Advisory Council has been established according to the provisions of the Constitution of our dear country to assist in dealing with affairs of the state and to participate, through its counsel, in achieving comprehensive development in all fields."

At the time of its inauguration the Council comprised 20 members. In 1975 the number was increased to 30 in view of the success of the experiment.

At present HH the Emir appoints the members in the light of social standing, sound judgement and competence to "represent all the people of Qatar." But the principle of appointment is only experimental. With the passage of time, the principle of direct election to the Council, as envisaged in the Provisional Constitution, could become a reality. HH the Emir knows almost all family groups in Qatar personally and appoints prominent leaders from each who can serve the nation competently.

The Advisory Council has its own rules to regulate its activities. It is assisted by five major standing committees — legal and legislative affairs, financial and economic affairs, public services and utilities, domestic and foreign affairs, and cultural and information. Interim committees may be formed according to needs.

At first, when the Advisory Council was formed, Article 51 of the Provisional Constitution defined its role as follows:

1. The Government shall refer to the Advisory Council — for opinion — draft laws proposed by the Council of Ministers before their submission to the Head of State for ratification and promulgation;

2. The Government shall refer to the Advisory Council — for consultation — all decree-laws issued in the absence of the Council at the first meeting following the issue of those decree-laws. In such a case the Council either approves a decree-law as it stands, or recommends that the Council of Ministers issues a new law amending the decree-law under consideration. But it is not in the competence of the Advisory Council to amend decree-laws;

3. The Government shall refer the draft budget of the major public projects of the State to the Advisory Council, for opinion, before its ratification and enactment;

4. The Government refers to the Advisory Council any matters related to the political, economic, cultural, social or administrative general policy of the State;

5. The Advisory Council submits to the Cabinet due recommendations regarding all the matters included in the aforementioned clauses;

6. The Advisory Council may request from the Government statements necessary for making its opinion about any of the matters included in clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 above mentioned. Statements are requested from the Prime Minister if the matter relates to the general policy of the Government, or from the Minister concerned if the matter relates to the affairs falling within the competence of his ministry;



7. The Advisory Council is entitled a) to follow up all the matters previously referred to it, b) to enquire about the manner of carrying into effect the rules approved and agreed upon by the Government, and c) to suggest manners of carrying those rules into effect.

Impressed by the creative role of the Advisory Council in shaping the future of Qatar, HH the Emir promulgated another decree in 1975 enlarging the competence and the powers of the council.

The amended Article 51 defines the council's role thus:

1. That it shall debate the general policy of the State from any political, economic or administrative aspect as may be referred to it by the Government according to the requirements of the public interest.

2. It shall debate the social and cultural affairs of the State as may be referred to it by the Government or on the Council's own initiative through requests of general discussion or individual proposals submitted by the Council's members.

The social and cultural affairs of the State comprehend all matters not related to the general policy of the State from the political, the economic and the administrative aspects defined in the above mentioned clause, which the Council is not entitled to debate unless they are referred to it by the Government. Any other matter can be looked upon as related to the social and cultural affairs of the State which the Council is entitled to debate on its own initiative. These aspects are so wide-ranged that they approximately comprise most of the State's affairs.

3. The Advisory Council shall debate draft laws proposed by the Cabinet and referred — compulsorily — to the Advisory Council before being submitted to the Head of State for ratification and promulgation.

4. It shall discuss the draft budget of the major public projects of the State referred to it — compulsorily — by the Government, for opinion and advice, before ratification.

To enable the Advisory Council to perform its duties, the new text of the amended Article No 51 stipulated that:

a) the Council is entitled to request statements related to any matters falling within its competence from the Council of Ministers regarding matters related to the general policy of the State, and from the minister concerned regarding matters falling within the competence of his ministry;

b) the Advisory Council expresses its opinions regarding the matters it debates in the form of recommendations or wishes;

c) the Advisory Council shall not intervene in the work of the executive and judicial authorities, which implies that the Constitution defines the Advisory Council as a body that participates — compulsorily — in the work of the legislative authority which is practised by HH the Emir, in pursuance with the modern constitutional systems where a state is based on three authorities, namely the legislative, the executive and the judicial authorities;

d) an Advisory Council member is not to blame for any viewpoints he expresses regarding a matter under consideration, whether at the Council itself or at any of its committees; that this immunity continues even after the term of membership; and that this immunity applies only to the members of the Advisory Council, but not to senior officials or experts who participate in the performance of the Council's or the Council committees' work. The immunity is removed once the member's opinions or statements contain abuse or defamation of a person whosoever.

The Council has a number of achievements to its credit in various legislative, economic, cultural, social, political and financial spheres. It was instrumental in the setting-up of many new bodies and institutions in Qatar. These include the establishment of new municipalities in different towns of Qatar, an Audit Department, charitable associations, Qatar University, Qatar Monetary Agency, Industrial Development Technical Centre, cooperative societies, commercial agencies and the regulation of various business, aviation and maritime matters.

The council has also through private member's proposals made an immense contribution to the development of Qatar. This includes extending aid to farmers and livestock breeders and increasing social aid to the disabled and the aged, and Qatari youth on marriage.

SYRIA

REAL ESTATE BANKS RAISE LOAN CEILINGS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 31 Jul 85 p 5

[Text] The Real Estate bank in Syria is one of the most important economic institutions that have contributed positively in the resolution of the housing crisis. Mr Faruq 'Ayyash, the chairman and director general of the bank, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that in order to cover the needs of borrowers, the bank introduced new important changes effective the fourth quarter of last year. The changes include raising the loan ceiling for construction work from 80,000 to 125,000 Syrian pounds and for finishing work from 45,000 to 80,000 Syrian pounds.

The bank's capital has reached 1 billion Syrian pounds this year, the volume of its activity was 825 million Syrian pounds last year, and all Syrian provinces have benefited from the bank's activity, Mr 'Ayyash said.

'Ayyash added that the bank's support for the cooperative sector, to which more than half the loans went, aims to encourage the cooperative housing societies which secure prefabricated houses for their members at cost price. This, he said, is a great contribution from the bank in resolving the housing shortage, or in helping to resolve it. "Also our support for the General Establishment for Housing has, no doubt, contributed in alleviating the intensity of the housing shortage to a large extent," Mr 'Ayyash said.

He added that the bank's support for individuals through private loans has helped in resolving the housing crisis for tens of thousands of Syrian families without discrimination against one province or another.

Besides the contribution to resolving the problem, cities have greatly expanded through the construction of residential suburbs which have helped alleviate the overcrowding of the main city centers.

The number of housing units financed by the bank through the granting of loans had reached 125,867 units by the end of 1984. "I believe this is a high figure given the population figure in Syria and given the bank's capabilities. The results also show that the bank has helped provide the citizens with the requirements for economy housing, thus protecting them from exploitation by construction tradesmen," he said.

"In addition, the bank's participation in financing installations for tourists, such as hotels and restaurants, has had a great impact on promoting tourism in the country."

'Ayyash pointed out that the bank's participation in financing the construction of modern hospitals has secured for Syria the best medical experts who practice in those hospitals. It has also dissuaded many citizens from traveling abroad to obtain medical treatment.

Explaining the nature of the bank's resources, the chairman said that his bank depends on its own resources as well as on deposits. The bank also borrows from restructured loans from Syria's Central Bank when necessity arises.

Since the bank depends on deposits, it has encouraged citizens to save. It is important to note here that the Real Estate bank increases the sums of the borrowing plans year after year and is able to lend money to qualified borrowers.

'Ayyash said that because of the bank's care to keep pace with the development of construction activity in Syria and to grant loans on affordable terms which would meet the borrower's needs and ensure prompt construction, it introduced important changes during the last quarter of 1984. The most important of these changes are: raising the ceiling for land loans to 125,000 Syrian pounds from 80,000 pounds; raising the ceiling for loans granted to finish a house from 45,000 to 80,000 Syrian pounds; and raising the ceiling for loans granted to individuals from 80,000 to 100,000 Syrian pounds.

Concluding his interview, Mr 'Ayyash said that the Real Estate Bank's ambitions are embodied in the complete achievement of the goals and objectives for which it has been established. The bank seeks to accomplish the best results due to both the confidence bestowed upon it by the citizens and the support it receives from the supervising authorities.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING STRATEGY REVIEWED

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Ahmad Muhsin: "Text of the Planning [Ministry] Report to the Council of Ministers on Economic Conditions"]

[Text] The Planning Ministry memorandum which the council of ministers discussed at its meeting last Monday called for the adoption of nine steps to preserve the economic achievements the government has carried out and continue the development process in the future.

The memorandum dealt with the condition oil, financial and monetary policy must assume as well as ways to stimulate the role of the private sector, develop legislation bearing on economic activities, give attention to domestic human resources and deal with population and social conditions.

AL-BAYAN herewith publishes the full text of the statement, in view of its importance.

The post-1980 period has witnessed important economic developments on the local and international levels. During this period there has been much talk about the recession and its direct and indirect effects on various economic activities. This has been accompanied by many discussions on various levels concerning the best ways for dealing with economic conditions in a manner which will result in the reinvigoration of various economic activities. In general, the process of passing judgment on the overall views and discussions which the economic stage in the country has witnessed in past years, from the standpoint of accuracy of diagnosis or from the standpoint of comprehensiveness, can be summed up from the body of reports the government agencies concerned have issued. However, the important thing in these discussions is that there is increasing interest from various entities on the course of development in the country.

First: Stages of Economic Growth

The country's economy has passed through a number of growth stages in a relatively short period of time. Each stage has been marked by a group of characteristics by which it has been distinct from the others, although

there has been some interaction among these stages, each one has influenced the others, and these stages with their characteristics as a whole have been influenced by a group of issues, some internal and others external, because of the nature of the country's economy. Through the stages of growth, the development of the country's economy has been influenced by a number of things, most important of which are the tendencies of the country's political leadership, government measures and codification of laws, the organization of government administration, the creation of new specialized organizations, the economic behavior of the private sector, the population situation, the influential role of the general budget, the issue of coordination among decrees at the federal and local level and so forth. It is worth pointing out that most of the economic and social decisions which were adopted during past years and the most important of them were all linked directly and indirectly to progress in the activity of producing and exporting crude oil. More accurately, economic and social development in the emirates and the achievements this economy has witnessed may basically be attributed to the efforts made with respect to the exploitation of crude oil revenues in the course of the country's economic construction.

1. The economy of the emirates up to the end of the fifties was characterized by the limited nature of its economic and human resources, since economic activity was basically focussed on the activities of agriculture, trade, fishing and pearling. At the beginning of the sixties, a new stage in the economic and social growth of the emirates began, since crude oil was discovered, produced and exported and its revenues were used to expand spending more extensively than before and in a number of areas, especially in service activities.

2. While the sixties represented an important turning point in the economic history of the emirates, the seventies are to be considered another more profound turning point, since the situation was not just confined to the economic areas but also included political and economic ones, since the establishment of the federation in 1971 is to be considered one of the most important distinguishing features of this period. Also, the period of impulsive growth began, especially after the correction of crude oil prices in 1973 and the other subsequent price modifications, relying on massive investments which involved the various sectors and diverse emirates. These investments and the nation's current government spending led to a state of economic prosperity which the country had not previously witnessed, and this prosperity reached its peak in 1979.

3. In the final quarter of the seventies a new stage began which was characterized by a slowdown in the growth rates of a number of economic variables and activities. Consequently, the volume of economic activity declined. This stage began in the second half of 1977 and its dimensions assumed clear concrete form in 1978, when numerous elements converged, including foreign factors resulting from fluctuations in world crude oil demand and domestic factors, of which the most important were the outstripping of local absorptive capacity and some forms of economic behavior, to bring the country's economy to a state of economic stagnation. This stage lasted until mid-1979.

4. In the second half of 1979 economic activity became prosperous again as a result of the numerous measures and policies the government had taken in



various areas, especially those of public finance, banking activity and housing activity, as well as the improvement in international oil markets in terms of the size of demand and prices. This revival lasted until the end of 1981.

5. As a result of numerous factors, most important of which were fluctuations in the world oil markets, political and security circumstances the region was experiencing, the effects of trends in government spending, especially investment spending, and the stabilization of the growth rates of a number of economic variables, new economic conditions were created. These conditions were characterized by fluctuations in the growth of most activities and economic variables. The rates of some of these tended to stabilize and others dropped. In general, the features of this important stage of economic growth in the country started to become apparent in 1982 and continued during the following years.

#### Second: Observations on the Nature of Economic Growth

1. The years 1975-1980 witnessed radical transformations in various areas, since average per capita income in the emirates became one of the highest in the world and the rate of growth of the country's economy, represented by the development of gross domestic product, came to about 23.0 percent a year in current prices and about 16.0 percent a year in fixed prices. The economic sectors attained high, distinctive growth rates. Projects were carried out in most sectors and their costs came to 135 billion dirhams. Services, especially health and education services, were also promoted, government and family sector consumption developed at high rates while the country's economy developed a great capacity for savings and the government's financial status improved since the emirates became a distinctive country in this area as a result of the attainment of final, positive general budget and balance of payments surpluses. In addition, the government expanded support for the private sector and various areas of private sector activity and expanded the grant of productive and social aid to numerous segments of the population. Federal government agencies and the agencies of emirate governments also developed and expanded and created a number of specialized economic institutions in the public and private sectors. The period witnessed significant development in the codification of laws and statutes.

2. In another area, the great achievements realized in the country during the period 1975-1980 were accompanied by a number of conditions, some of which were most sensitive. One of the most important of these was the population situation, since the period witnessed a great increase in the size of the population; the rate of population growth came to about 13.2 percent a year and since this increase came about as a result of the increase in the number of people coming in to work in the country so that the requirements of economic and social development could be met, and consequently the population composition started to be characterized by a rise in the ratio of the people coming in to the total population and a rise in the ratio of males, the country's economy began to rely to a great extent on the outer world in terms of imports and exports, since the ratio of the volume of foreign trade to gross domestic product came to about 106.4 percent in 1980. In addition, a state of imbalance accompanied the growth of the sectors, since the crude

oil sector started contributing about two thirds of the volume of this product. A state of imbalance in volume of economic activity also appeared among emirates as a result of the difference in the innate resources of each emirate, although an important percentage of federal budget expenditures were allocated to non-oil emirates.

### Third: The Nature of Development in 1980-84

1. During the past 4 years, the emirates have witnessed new economic and social conditions as an inevitable result of economic decisions taken in the past and also as a result of the development system followed in dealing with economic conditions, in addition to the effect of other local and foreign factors.

2. The year 1980 is considered an important turning point in the emirates' economic history, since most economic changes reached the peak of their development during that year. After that, after 1981 specifically, the growth rates of a number of economic variables declined and there was a stabilization in the rates of others at specific limits. Consequently, the volume of economic activity, which was characterized during the period of the seventies by a constant increase, tended to stabilize in the eighties.

3. Although one of the main reasons for the stabilization of the volume of economic growth at specific levels can be attributed to the connection between this activity and the magnitude of crude oil revenues, whose volume declined perceptibly after 1981, the volume of economic activity would have assumed new tendencies and courses even if the effect of oil conditions on overall economic and social development had been isolated, since new features had started to appear in the country's economy as a result of development efforts exerted in the past.

4. The period 1980-84 witnessed conditions of the utmost importance. Among the most important of these was the emergence of a deficit in the general budget, contraction in the volume of trade and a drop in the volume of gross domestic product as a result of the drop in the contribution of crude oil. However, on the other hand, many positive conditions appeared during this period, including an increase in the role of the productive sectors in overall economic activity, since the sectors of agriculture, industry and electricity and water realized high annual growth rates during the period 1980-84 totalling 13.0, 24.2 and 11.7 percent respectively. In addition, the local production of a number of goods started to meet an important share of demand and the government started exporting many goods produced locally; their value came to about 9.9 billion dirhams in 1984, as compared with 2,969,000,000 dirhams in 1980 and around 11 million dirhams in 1975.

5. The important development during this period was the population condition's tendency to stabilize, since the rates of growth of the population dropped toward internationally recognized limits for the first time, as the rate of growth of the population during the period 1980-84 came to about 4.2 percent a year as compared with a growth of 13.2 percent a year in the 1975-80 period.

#### Fourth: Economic Performance in 1984

1. The completion of the economic, administrative and organizational agencies of the government and the expansion in the process of passing laws helped to a great extent regulate the decisionmaking process and the development of methods for dealing with conditions and shortages emerging for the first time in the economic arena. The data available for 1984 shows that there has been obvious improvement in the country's overall economic performance since the country's balance of trade surplus rose from 28.3 billion dirhams in 1983 to 33.2 billion dirhams in 1984, a rate of increase totalling 17.3 percent. This obvious improvement may be ascribed to the drop in the volume of commodity imports from 31.0 billion dirhams in 1983 to 26.8 billion dirhams in 1984. This drop in imports can be attributed to a group of causes, most important of which was the drop in the value of foreign currency relative to the dirham, the increase in local production of a number of commodities which have replaced some imported commodities and the stabilization of consumption and investment volume at specific levels. In another area, the country's exports realized an increase in volume from 59.3 billion dirhams in 1983 to 60.1 billion dirhams in 1984.

2. One of the important indices offering proof of the improvement in economic performance is that gross domestic product realized an increase in volume for the first time in 3 years. Although the increase was limited, it is apparent, monitoring developments in the structure of gross domestic product, that an increase has been obvious in the productive sectors -- agriculture, crude oil, industry and electricity and water -- while the service sectors have marked a relative decline in their contribution to domestic product. These sectors had been expected to grow at negative rates. This may be attributed to the decline in the profit margin in the trade sector and the decline in rents, since the number of housing units increased perceptibly during recent years.

3. The volume of investment, which is considered the basic motive force for a number of activities, held at a level of 30.0 billion dirhams a year during the past 5 years. However, the changes were in the structure and the directions of investment, since the years 1983 and 1984 witnessed a great increase in crude oil sector investments and also in investments in agriculture, building and construction, while the sectors where investments clearly declined were those of real estate and government services.

4. The volume of consumption declined from 46.1 billion dirhams in 1983 to 43.4 billion dirhams in 1984. The drop encompassed the two areas of government and private consumption. In general the change was limited, although consumption, like other economic variables, reached maximum growth levels and started to tend to stabilize. Regarding government consumption, areas of expansion became limited after public services had been apportioned to all the areas of the country; in addition there were the guidance measures which limited the expansion in expenditures, especially nonessential expenditures. As regards private consumption, the volume of the workforce and wages, average prices and composition of the population had an obvious effect on the development of their growth rates.

5. The country's population rose from 1,195,000 in 1983 to 1,231,000 in 1984, a rate of increase of 3.1 percent. This rate, although high by international standards, is much lower than the population growth rates of the period of the seventies. While the stabilization of population conditions, in one respect, was the result of economic conditions, the regulatory measures taken in past years and the efforts to develop domestic labor had an obvious effect on these conditions.

#### Fifth: Scope of Economic Activity

1. The circumstances which brought the country's economy to a state of contraction in economic activity and a slowdown in the growth rates of some activities and economic variables can be attributed first of all to the drop in crude oil revenues, secondly to the failure of newly-emerging economic conditions to be adequately responsive, especially in the case of the private sector, thirdly to the loss of some revenues as a result of inadequacies in coordinating activities and accumulated effects from the past, and fourthly to trends in government spending.

2. It is necessary to point out here that new economic conditions have been created in the country which differ from the conditions that prevailed during the period of the seventies. Therefore, the situation requires that economic activities connected to the volume and nature of investment activity which dominated the previous period, especially in the private sector, adjust, through government efforts, to the new economic conditions, in terms of orientation and dependence.

3. The economic and social conditions the country is now experiencing are to be considered a distinctive, decisive stage and the process of taking decisions to deal with current conditions will without a doubt determine the course of development in the future. Therefore reliance on a logical analysis of the dimensions of existing economic and social conditions and a description of the magnitude of interaction, interconnection and mutual effects among the various economic and social variables is a process of the utmost importance for the purpose of guaranteeing the soundness of the decisions to be taken and for avoiding the negative effects of any decision to the greatest possible extent, proceeding from the premise that current and future circumstances will not allow any portion of revenues to be wasted, especially since the revenues available have started to face pressures which did not exist in previous periods. To preserve the previous achievements and continue the development processes, the situation requires that resources in the country (especially the financial ones) be exploited in an optimum way. This will be done by:

1. Conserving oil and gas reserves for the longest possible period, on grounds that that will be the best investment for the future and that emphasis should be placed on oil and gas drilling programs in promising areas in all emirates. Since crude oil is not a self-regenerating resource, the process of determining the quantities produced must be connected to the requirements of development and attainment of the goal of diversifying income sources.



2. Government spending in the emirates has become the main motive force for economic activity as a whole. Since this spending is now connected to crude oil revenues, the situation requires thinking of finding effective new revenues to finance this spending, to the end of sheltering the movement and development of economic activity from crude oil revenue fluctuations as far as possible.

3. Supporting Central Bank efforts aimed at carrying out and developing monetary and credit policies.

4. Supporting the private sector and providing the appropriate circumstances for exploiting its savings in diverse investment areas, especially productive ones.

5. Working to make legislation in various economic and social areas all-inclusive.

6. Carrying on efforts to develop domestic human resources and deal with population conditions.

7. Giving greater attention to regional development.

8. Increasing coordination activities between federal government and emirate government agencies.

9. Working to develop administrative agencies in the country.

10. The goals of development in the emirates as cited in the document on general development goals and as detailed in the book on the first 5-year plan draft may be summarized as follows:

Development of living standards.

Gradual reduction of reliance on crude oil revenues by developing the productive structure and diversifying income sources.

Developing domestic human resources and dealing with population conditions.

There is no doubt that attainment of the above goals and treatment of the basic conditions in the society can take place only by preparing 5-year and long-term development plans, since in the event these plans are soundly drawn up they will guarantee that the major conditions are dealt with in a radical manner, as well as realizing the aspirations of the society. One should bear in mind that temporary solutions and rapid measures taken to remedy newly-created issues are necessary and essential, but will continue to fall short of solving various conditions over the medium and long term. It is worth pointing out that the government has made significant strides in planning activity, and to all that one might add that the processes of coordinating within the activities of the Cooperation Council require work within economic and social bases and policies with a relatively long time span.



UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REVIEWED

Dubayy Al-BAYAN in Arabic 3 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Zaghin Shahin: "126 Water Tanks in Dubayy and the Northern Emirates and Pipes Totalling 1,066,000 Meters in Length"]

[Text] The number of water tanks belonging to the Ministry of Water and Electricity in Dubayy, al-Shariqah, 'Ajman, Umm al-Qaywayn, Ra's al-Khaymah and al-Fujayrah come to 126, with capacities ranging from 5,000 to 200,000 gallons, with the exception of the new 'Ajman tank, whose capacity comes to 2.5 million gallons.

Total water pipelines come to 1,066,800 meters in length, ranging from 3 to 24 inches in diameter.

This was cited in the report the General Water Department of the Electricity and Water Ministry has prepared.

The report pointed out that the number of tanks under the ministry's supervision in the Emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah came to 34, with capacities ranging from 5,000 to 200,000 gallons, since nine tanks have been assessed at a capacity of 5,000 gallons. These are al-Katbah, Shamal Two, al-Faraya, Wadi Safni, Sayh al-Ghab A, Masafi, Idhan, Safi and Wadi al-Qur One tanks. The capacity of the Sayh al-Ghab B tank comes to 7,500 gallons.

As far as the Rahba, al-Mahabib, Wadi Kub, Fashaqah, Shawkah, al-Mani'i, Kibdah and Kadra tanks go, their capacity totals 10,000 gallons.

The capacity of 11 tanks in the emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah now totals 20,000 gallons. These are Shamal One, al-Huraysh, al-Qayshah, al-Zahra', Wadi Sahwat, Wa'b, al-Rifaq, al-Hala, Wadi al-Qur Two, Maksurah and Masafi tanks. With respect to the Sha'm, al-Ghayl, al-Jir and Idhan tanks, their capacity now totals 30,000 gallons.

The capacity of the Khawr Khuwayr al-Jir totals 200,000 gallons; that is the highest capacity tank in the emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah.

With respect to the emirate of al-Fujayrah, the total has come to 39 tanks, of which 38 are elevated and one is on ground level. The capacity of 10 of

these tanks totals 5,000 gallons; these are Safad, al-Balidah, Saram, Wadi Mayy, Wadi Sidr, Janub, Daba, Daba, Qadfa', al-Fujayrah, al-Fujayrah and Kadna tanks.

As regards the al-Hayl, Wadi Sahn, al-Jurayf, Riyamah, North Wadi Sidr, al-Huwayrah, Qadfa', Ahfirah, Zakat, Dadna, Rul Dadna, al-Siji, al-Hala and Wadi al-'Abadilah tanks, their capacity now totals 10,000 gallons.

The capacity of nine tanks totals 20,000 gallons: these are al-'Iffah, al-Hinah, Maduk, Farfad, Murbid, Awhilah, Wam, Saram, al-Bi'nah and al-Badiyah tanks.

The capacity of the al-Qub tank comes to 30,000 gallons.

The capacity of the Kadna tank totals 100,000 gallons. It is a ground-level tank and is matched by the capacity of the al-Fujayrah tank, which can also accommodate 100,000 gallons and is elevated.

The capacity of the al-Fujayrah and Daba al-Fujayrah tanks totals 200,000 gallons.

The tanks in the emirate of al-Fujayrah come to 24, all elevated. The capacity of two of them totals 5,000 gallons; these are al-Dhayd and Wadi al-Hilw One.

The capacity of 10 tanks totals 10,000 gallons. These are al-Zubayr, al-Bahayis, al-Sudayrah, al-Sanad, Filli B, al-Dhayd, Wadi al-Hilw Two, Barir, Filli A and al-Madam.

The capacity level of the Umm al-Safat, North Malihah, Hamdah, al-Thaqibah, Tawi 'Abdallah Ibn Hulays, al-Ghayl, South Malihah and al-Zayara tanks comes to 20,000 gallons.

The capacity of the Kalba Turayf and Daba al-Husn tanks comes to 100,000 gallons. The capacity of the Khawr Fakkan and al-Dhayd tanks totals 200,000 gallons.

With respect to the emirate of 'Ajman, the report states that it has 15 tanks, of which three are on ground level and 12 are elevated. The capacity of five of them totals 5,000 gallons; these are 'Ajman, al-Manamah, Masfut Two and 'Ajman, a ground-level tank.

The capacity of the al-Hilw and 'Ajman tanks totals 10,000 gallons. The Mu-zayra' and al-Nasim tanks now total 20,000 gallons. The capacity of the Masfut tank totals 40,000 gallons. With respect to the al-Manamah elevated and ground-level tanks, the capacity in those two totals 100,000 gallons, and the level of the two 'Ajman tanks 200,000 gallons. The capacity level in the new 'Ajman tank now totals 2.5 million.

As regards the emirate of Umm al-Qaywayn, the number of tanks there now totals 10, three of which are 5,000-gallon tanks, those of Falaj, al-Mu'alla and Umm al-Qaywayn. The capacity level of the al-Muhdhib and Umm al-Qaywayn

tanks now comes to 10,000 gallons. The level in four tanks now totals 20,000 gallons; these are al-Silmi, al-Sina'iyah, al-Bayaqa and al-Rashidiyah.

With respect to the Umm al-Qaywayn tank, the capacity level in that now totals 200,000 gallons.

With respect to the emirate of Dubayy, the number of tanks under the ministry's supervision now totals four, three of which have a capacity of 10,000 gallons. These are the al-Khawanij, al-'Uwayr (Shahin) and al-'Uwayr (al-Sha') tanks. The fourth, with a capacity of 20,000 gallons, is the al-'Uwayr (Jum'ah al-Humaydan) tank.

The report pointed out that there are a number of small tanks in the emirates of al-Fujayrah and Ra's al-Khaymah which the ministry has installed on a temporary basis. Their total capacity has come to about 200,000 gallons.

The report also cites the lengths and diameters of water pipelines. Their total overall length has come to 1,166,800 meters.

The report also referred to the number of underground water reservoirs, which total 15, and their estimated productive capacity. In the case of al-Manamah, this totals 140,000 gallons a day, al-Dhayd, 686,000, Daba, 1.2 million, al-Fujayrah, 2,065,000, Kadnah, 83,000 gallons a day, Sur Kalba', 1,593,000, Kalba Turayf, 496,000, Sha'm and Zamuriyin, 886,000, Riyamah, 42,000, Wadi al-Bayh, 3,225,000, Shamuf, 1,046,000, Tawi Rashid, 1,838,000, Sayh al-Fahlayn, 2,460,800 and the al-Sirrah reservoir, 100,000 gallons a day.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

CEMENT AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE--A French company signed an agreement of \$82 million with the government of South Yemen to build a cement factory in the Abyan region, south of Aden. The factory's production when it begins operating in the summer of 1986 will amount to 350,000 tons annually. The French company will train Yemeni workers to manage and operate the factory. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Sep 85 p 53] 13035

13035/12929  
CSO: 4404/14

AFGHANISTAN

GROUNDWORK SAID PREPARED FOR EMPLOYMENT OF 8,000

Kabul ANIS in Dori 24 Aug 85 pp 1-2

[Text] With the triumph of the glorious Sawr revolution, world imperialism, headed by world-devouring American imperialism, imposed an undeclared war on our people from every side. Economically, they temporarily brought the country's economy to the verge of stagnation by unilaterally canceling all the contracts, such as the Afghan Golbahar Textile Plant contract.

The chief of the Afghan Golbahar Textile Plant, in answer to questions concerning the activities of this plant, stated: The Afghan Golbahar Textile Plant occupies a 1,500-acre site which includes various installations, development space, residential homes for workers, parks, a library, mosques, sports fields, a club, and a cinema. In 1332 [21 Mar 1953-20 Mar 1954] within the framework of the Afghan Textile Corporation its foundations was laid, and in 1339 [21 Mar 1960-20 Mar 1961] its construction work was completed, and it went into initial production with a daily capacity of 20,000 meters of fabrics. There is a total of 2,765 production and auxiliary machines of various kinds operating at the plant.

The energy for the plant's machinery is supplied by hydroelectric power, through Naghalu and Sarubi power line, producing 186,000 meters of plain cloth in 22 hours and 22,000 meters of dyed product. The variety of cloth include striped, patterned, checkered, plain, and printed cotton, Jim, Gamsokut, Ruipak, Dastpak, Kampal, and gingham.

This plant is one of the country's largest textile plants in terms of number of machines and production capacity. There are 7,500 workers and staff working two shifts.

After the triumph of the revolution, specifically its new and evolutionary stage, the Golbahar-Sarubi-Naghalu power line was cut off by counter-revolutionary elements--the fawning lackeys of imperialism who do nothing but wreck and destroy--and plant activities were partially suspended. However, as the result of the efforts, assistance, and steadfastness of the plant's workers and staff, the unit's activities were increased in the shortest time possible with thermal and diesel electric energy. We hope that next year, with the completion of a project for two diesel electrical generators with a 3.5 megawatt capacity supplied by the friendly and brotherly nation of the



Soviet Union, the unit will have a full quota of electrical energy. The plant will then be operating at full capacity, producing 56 million meters of plain cloth and 85 million meters of dyed and printed cloth, providing work for 8,000 persons.

The chief of the Afghan Textile Plant added:

Presently, at the Afghan Golbahar Textile Plant, 2,928 workers and staff are employed either on contract or wage basis for the two daily shifts. The plant produces various kinds of plain and printed cotton cloths. These fabrics, along with the textile production of Polkhomri and Jabal-assaraj, are dyed in the dyeing and printing branch of this plant and then sold to various stores throughout the country.

The production plan for the first quarter of 1364 [21 Mar-21 Jun 1985] calls for 14.2 million meters of plain and 28 million meters of patterned fabrics. In spite of the problems of electrical shortages in the production branches, 96 percent of the quota were met.

It is worth noting that a diesel fuel storage tank, with a capacity of 240,000 liters, was bombed and burned in 1359 [21 Mar 1980-20 Mar 1981] by an enemy missile and then rebuilt using available materials by workers in the technical workshop under the guidance of technical workshop leader Engineer Khalil Allah, resulting in a 4-million afghani savings for our revolutionary government.

9310/13046  
CSO: 4665/4

AFGHANISTAN

HEALTH CLINIC SERVICES EXPANDING

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 3 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] The Central Urban Polyclinic, which was formerly known as Government Employee's Insurance, became known as the Central Urban Polyclinic for Government Workers and Staff after the Sawr revolution.

A total of 65 specialists and nurses are employed at the polyclinic in 30 fields of services, performing medical services for patients. Likewise, there are 20 administrative employees working at the polyclinic. All services provided to eligible persons at the polyclinic are free.

It must be added that in 1363 [21 Mar 1984-20 Mar 1985] 234,699 patients visited the polyclinic, 13 percent of whom were children, and 87 percent were adults--workers and employees of the government and industrial installations.

In 1363, at the suggestion of the polyclinic and with the approval of the Minister of Public Health, the cost of medical treatment was subsidized in the interest of the workers.

According to the projected plan, two health clinics at two industrial and worker installations were built and put into operation. Another health clinic, beyond the requirements of the plan, was built and put into operation in honor of the 20th anniversary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan at the Afsutar Institute. All personnel, medical equipment, and drugs required by the health clinics are procured by the Central Union Polyclinic. In the year 1363, close to 26,000 industrial workers and employees were given medical services at the polyclinic.

9310/13046  
CSO: 4665/4

AFGHANISTAN

NETWORK OF SILOS EXPANDING NATIONWIDE

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 3 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] In the procurement of needed raw materials for the people, especially flour and baked products, silos at the capitol and in the provinces play an active role. While realizing the usefulness of silos, the revolutionary government makes extensive efforts to increase the productive capacity of existing silos, in addition to constructing new silos in the rest of the provinces.

In answer to the question as to which one of the country's provinces now have silos, the head of the silos stated:

Currently, in addition to Kabul, silos are being used for production in other provinces, such as Balkh, Polkhomri, Qandaha, and Herat. The 24-hour production capacity of the Balkh silo's flour mill is 60 tons. Its bakery has a 24-hour production capacity of 25 tons of baked products, of which only 13 tons are now being utilized. Likewise, the capacity of its grain elevator is 20,000 tons, and when elevator number two is completed--which is scheduled to be finished within the first six months of 1365 [21 Mar-22 Sep 1986]--its storage capacity will increase to 40,000 tons.

The Polkhomri flour mill was completed in 1362 [21 Mar 1983-20 Mar 1984], and it has a 24-hour production capacity of 60 tons. The Polkhomri grain silo elevator [wheat storage] has a capacity of 20,000 tons, and this will also increase to 40,000 tons by the end of 1365 [20 Mar 1987].

The source added:

The Qandahar flour mill has a 24-hour production capacity of 120 tons. Its grain elevator has a capacity of 20,000 tons. Likewise, a grain elevator has been constructed in Herat which has a capacity of 20,000 tons. This plant does not have a flour mill or bakery as yet.

The product produced for the silos at the flour mills is flour, and at the bakeries it is various kinds of bread and cookies.

Concerning the number of workers and employees at the silos, the head of silos said:

At the Kabul silo 1,418 employees are working, including 237 managers and supervisors, 1080 workers, 101 of whom are temporary wage-workers.

BANGLADESH

OFFICIALS, OTHERS CONDEMN RAID ON PLO

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 3 Oct 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

President and CMLA Lt. Gen H M Ershad yesterday strongly condemned Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis, a Foreign Office press release said, reports BSS.

In a message to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat he said "I have learnt with shock and dismay the bombing attacks carried out by the Israeli enemy on the PLO headquarters in Tunis."

The message said, "I strongly condemn this gross violation of the territorial integrity of a brotherly Muslim country by the enemies of Islam and mankind".

"This despicable act, perpetrated on the peace loving people of Tunisia and PLO which have been waging a struggle for achievement of its legitimate rights, militates against all international norms of civilised conduct and amounts to a gross violation of the UN charter" it added.

In a separate message sent to Head of Political Department of PLO Faruq Kadumi Foreign Minister Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury condemned the Israeli attack and described it as a "heinous act".

Mr Chowdhury expressed "deep shock" at the news of bombing raids on the PLO headquarters in Tunis by Israel yesterday killing 156 persons.

The Foreign Minister said that this heinous act deserves condemnation by all who firmly supported the just and inalienable rights of the Palestine people for self determination and fully committed to the restoration of occupied lands to its rightful owners.

Mr Chowdhury said this act of international terrorism would strengthen "our resolve" to fight against all forms of aggression and gross violation of human rights.

The Foreign Office in a separate statement said, The Foreign Office said, Bangladesh condemns in the strongest possible terms this violation of the sovereignty of Tunisia.

The Government and the people of Bangladesh, it added, have been shocked and outraged by the barbaric Israeli air raid on Tunis Tuesday in which a large number of innocent men, women and children have been murdered and maimed.

Various political parties also condemned the Israeli air raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis on Tuesday.

Bangladesh Nezam-e-Islami Party in a statement expressed its grave concern over the Israeli attack and described it as an "act of terrorism and threat to the global peace and security".

Bangladesh Labour Party condemned the incident and called upon the world conscience to resist the Zionist forces.

ARAB ENVOYS

The Arab ambassadors in Dhaka at a meeting yesterday condemned Israel for bombing Tunis yesterday, describing it as "a preplanned, premeditated piracy against Tunisia, Palestine and the entire civilised humanity".

Briefing newsmen after the meeting at the Algerian embassy, the Dean of the Arab diplomatic corps, Algerian Ambassador Mohammad Laibi Demaghlatus, said, without support from its mentors Israel could not have

carried out such acts of aggression against Tunisia—which is not only a third country but also the headquarters of the Arab League.

He described the Israeli attack as "unprecedented" in international relations and "a flagrant violation of the international law".

Mr Demaghlatus said that international condemnation of Israel for such acts of "state terrorism," gangsterism and piracy was not enough.

Saudi Ambassador Abdulatif A. Al-Maimanee described the Israeli aggression as humiliating to the entire human civilisation.

Mr Maimanee said Israel which was created by terrorising Palestinians was continuing its policy of terrorism and proved that the state "is basically based on terrorism".

He said that the Islamic and Arab countries needed to unite to resist these acts of aggression and terrorism to establish just peace in the region.

He said while the Arabs were the builders of civilisation, Israel was showing total disregard to civilised practices and international law saying that the laws were created before Israel.

The meeting was attended by Iraqi Ambassador Zuhair Mohammed Alumar UAE Ambassador Ahma Mohamed Ibrahim Al Tamimi Kuwaiti Ambassador Ahmed Murshed Mohammad Al-Sulaiman, PLO Acting Representative Faiz H. Hamze, Qatar mission head Alisultan Zamal and Libyan People's Bureau Secretary Musbah Ali A-Maimoon.

BANGLADESH

PRC AMBASSADOR SPEAKS AT FRIENDSHIP MEETING

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 26 Sep 85 pp 1, 10

[Text] Ambassador of China Mr Xiao Xian Qian on Wednesday said that the relations between his country and Bangladesh were like that of the flowing waters of river Yaloo Zhang (Brahmabutra) which has its source in Tibet and goes down to the sea through Buriganga; reports BSS.

The outgoing Chinese Ambassador was speaking as chief guest at a function of the Bangladesh-China Friendship Association arranged Wednesday afternoon to bid farewell to the former and madam Xiao at a local hotel.

It was presided over by Friendship Association chairman Mirza Golan Hafiz and was addressed by former Bangladesh Ambassador to Peking Mr. Abdul Momen.

Tracing the friendship of the two peoples since the last two thousand years Mr Xiao said even the Himalayas could not separate 'us'. Both the sea and the land "silk routes" followed by the pioneers of friendship of those ancient times not only brought the two neighbouring peoples closer and nearer but also sowed the seed of real bond of ever-lasting friendship; Mr Xiao said. Buddhism along with its culture and philosophy was introduced to China from here at those times; he recalled.

Paying tribute to President H. M. Ershad the Ambassador said under his leadership the existing relations between the two countries were being further consolidated.

The Ambassador also recalled the recent visit of President Ershad to China when the Bangladesh leader was very warmly received by the Chinese leaders in Peking.

He termed the proposed bridge across Buriganga as a landmark of friendship between the two peoples since the Chinese were really interested in Bangladesh's economic development.

The construction of two thousand metre long proposed bridge will start next year the Ambassador disclosed.

Mr. Xiao told the gathering that possibilities of joint ventures in the industrial sector between the two countries now under study would further enhance the spirit of South-South cooperation.



China always seeks this sort of cooperation among the under-developed countries of the south and the third world nations he said.

Friendship Association Chairman Mirza Golam Hafiz paid tributes to the outgoing Chinese Ambassador saying that in the course of his stay here meaningful relations between the two countries were established.

The function was attended among others, by high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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CSO: 4600/1051

BANGLADESH

REPORT ON ERSHAD SPEECH TO CIVIL SERVICE TRAINEES

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 22 Sep 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

SAVAR, Sept 21 (BSS): President Hussain Muhammad Ershad today advised the government officers to build themselves for fulfilling the requirements of the dynamic administrative system introduced in the country recently.

The President was inaugurating the fourth foundation training course of civil officers at the Public Administration Training Course (PATC) here.

He said the administration had been reorganised and reformed so that it could be helpful to development and build a close relation with the people. Administration was decentralised by effecting upazila system for taking it closer to the people, he said.

President Ershad said the system was a revolutionary step which had removed the gap between the government and the people. The nation had already started getting the benefits of the system, he said adding: 'now the upazila system is being considered as a development and people oriented model of administration in the developing countries of the Third World.'

The President pointed out that the success of the new system was largely dependent on the government officials and said they would have to change their outlook, and mentality and give up any negative attitude nurtured for a long time.

He said patriotism, hard work and self-sacrifice were essential for building the nation and hoped that the trainee officers who were the leaders of future administration would get inspiration from the course to build a happy and prosperous new Bangladesh.

President Ershad said efficient administration was a prerequisite for making independence meaningful to the people. He expressed his optimism that the officers would make every effort to achieve this objective.

He underlined the importance of training in administrative fields under the changed circumstances in the world and said keeping this in view, the government had set up a national council for training. In this context, he referred to the establishment of several training centres including the PATC for government officials. He stressed the need for maintaining the qualitative standard of training.

President Ershad also asked the railway authority to take measures on priority basis for rehabilitation of the railway tracks for smooth and safe running of trains.

The President said despite resources constraint, determined efforts by railway employees could help making the system as an ideal means of communication for the people.

Speaking briefly, Communi-

cation Minister Maudud Ahmed referred to the personal initiative of the President for the overall development of the railway system and said every endeavour were being taken to identify the problems seizing the system and solve those.

President Ershad referred to the increase of salary and other benefits of the government employees and said the government had also formulated rules for their appointments and promotions. Besides, he said, steps had been taken to maintain the mental strength of the government officers.

He hoped that in turn they would make relentless efforts for achieving overall development of the country and play their due role to build a corruption free, responsible and clean administrative system which could earn the confidence of the people.

Earlier, the President of the board of governors of the PATC and Food Minister Major General Mohabbat Jan Chowdhury in his welcome speech explained the functions and activities of the PATC. He said during the last seven months 830 first class officers were given training in the centre.

The acting Rector of the PATC, Dr Mohammad Haroonur-Rashid, also spoke on the occasion.

/9274

CSO: 4600/1048

BANGLADESH

DHAKA, BEIJING EXCHANGE MESSAGES ON TIES ANNIVERSARY

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 4 Oct 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] President and CMLA Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad has expressed the hope that "sincere friendship and excellent co-operation" characterising Bangladesh-China relations would flourish further in the years to come, a Foreign Office press release said, reports BSS.

In separate messages greeting Chinese President Li Xiannian and Premier Zhao Ziang to mark the 10th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, he hoped that Sino-Bangladesh relations would help realise the common aspirations of the two peoples to attain a better life and live in a happier and peaceful world.

The two countries established diplomatic relations in October 1975.

In his message sent to President Li he said the historical, spiritual and cultural ties between the peoples of Bangladesh and China could be traced to the ancient times which enriched their lives in many ways.

It added, "In this background of mutually beneficial past contacts between our two lands, we have achieved during the past decade significant results in the growth of our bilateral relations in different sectors for the welfare of our two friendly peoples."

Greeting Premier Zhao he described the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and China as "an important happy occasion for us to celebrate."

President Ershad said the past ten years witnessed a remarkable progress in the promotion of mutual understanding, friendship and co-operation between the two peoples.

"Our common faith in and commitment to the principles of the U.N. Charter, our respect for each other's independence and our adherence to the principle of sovereign equality of nations constitute the strong foundation for us to build in the future decades mutually beneficial relationship of fruitful and friendly co-operation," he said.

The President said that identification of poverty, disease and illiteracy as the common scourges "of our society and our firm determination to fight them have brought us still closer".

"We have a long day to go in the achievement of our common aims and objectives", he said adding, "we in Bangladesh are confident that we shall reach our desired goal with mutual cooperation, help and understanding."

Li, Zhao

Xinhua reports from Beijing: Chinese President Li Xiannian and Premier Zhao Ziyang sent a congratulatory message on Thursday to Bangladesh President H M Ershad on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Bangladesh.

The Chinese leaders wrote "The traditional friendship between our two peoples dates back to ancient times. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1975 has turned a new page in the annals of Sino-Bangladesh friendship. Over the past ten years, under the guidance of the five principles of peaceful coexistence the friendly relations and cooperation between our two countries have developed rapidly in the political, economic, trade, cultural and other fields.

"We are deeply satisfied with the sound development of Sino-Bangladesh relations. Your Excellency's successful visit to China in July this year made new contributions to the further development of the friendly relations between our two countries. Sino-Bangladesh friendship is not only in the interest of our two peoples, but also conducive to peace and stability in Asia.

"We sincerely wish that under the care of the leaders of our two countries and with the common efforts of the two governments and peoples, the existing Sino-Bangladesh friendly relations will develop further."

Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian also sent a congratulatory telegram on Thursday to Bangladesh Foreign Minister Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury.

/9274

CSO: 4600/1057

BANGLADESH

JUTE PURCHASING AGENCIES TO GET FRESH CREDITS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 22 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

The government has directed Bangladesh Bank to immediately place fresh funds with jute purchasing agencies to revamp the market.

The directive was issued at a meeting yesterday at the CMLA Secretariat where representatives of the bank and jute purchasing agencies were present.

Representatives of Jute Corporation BJMC, private mills and shippers were learnt to have informed the meeting that jute price was falling as they could not fully operate in the market.

They said most of the funds advanced by banks for three months' buying had been exhausted. Some of them had not been in the market since last week for lack of funds.

The meeting was informed that jute purchasing agencies had so far brought over 20 lakh bales of jute from an estimated production of 70 lakh bales this year.

Bangladesh Bank representative at the meeting was learnt to have informed that jute purchasing agencies were advanced credit for operation during the first quarter ending this month. Fresh credits were to be extended from next month.

Considering the low price in the market the meeting decided that purchasing agencies should be advanced credits immediately.

Meanwhile, a number of jute mills in the private sector alleged that Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB) had advised all banks including the central bank not to advance credit to them.

Terming them as 'delinquent borrowers' BSB has advised all the banks not to provide

credit facilities including working capital to the above jute mills till such time they pay the bank's dues and furnish you with the BSB's clearance certificate.

It could not be confirmed if Bangladesh Bank would oblige BSB in refusing credit facilities to these private jute mills.

Most of the 32 private jute mills constituting about 40 per cent of the industry owed to BSB or BSRS and the amount claimed by the two financing institutions from individual mills remained disputed since the former owners took over the mills two and a half years ago.



BANGLADESH

TEAM TO STUDY POSSIBLE BHUTAN TRANSIT ROUTE

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 23 Sep 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Matiur Rahman]

[Text]

A three-member technical team from Bangladesh is leaving Dhaka soon for Thimpu to carry out studies for a possible road-cum-river transit route with Bhutan through India.

The team comprising engineers from Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority BIWT during its week-long stay in the land locked Himalayan kingdom will carry out the studies in close cooperation with the Bhutanese officials for a short and possible road-cum-river transit route.

Both the Bangladesh and Bhutanese sides will take up the two routes one through Kakata and Mathabanga in India to Mugholhat in Bangladesh and the other through Dhubri in India to Chilmari in Bangladesh through the Brahmaputra river—both from Bhutan's most important commercial town of Phuntsholing for the transit route.

To have a practical idea, the Bhutanese Trade Minister travelled by road to Dhaka during his visit to Bangladesh in recent past and went back to Thimpu by the river route through Dhubri in India.

The transit route is urgently needed by both Bangladesh and Bhutan for promoting their bilateral trade. Dhaka and Thimpu signed the bilateral

trade agreement as far back as 1980 and the protocol in this regard was initialled during the state visit of the King of Bhutan to Bangladesh in February last year.

Though the agreement was signed five years ago but no significant trade could take place between the South Asian countries because of transit facilities. India being the common neighbour of the two countries signed transit agreements separately with both Bangladesh and Bhutan agreeing to transit facilities for the bilateral trade.

Bangladesh is now importing 2500 metric tons of dolomite from Bhutan for the country's only steel mills at Chittagong port. Half of the consignment of dolomite has already reached at Chittagong from Bhutan through the Dinhat-Mugholhat Indian railway transit.

The Bangladesh business circle is optimistic of a promising trade with Bhutan as a number of commodities like jute and jute goods, newsprint, dry fish, pharmaceutical products has good market in the kingdom. Bangladesh jute carpet is popular and in good demand in Bhutan as was evident from the sale of jute carpets like hot-cake after an exhibition of Bangladesh products in Thimpu

recently.

Similarly, Bangladesh is in badly need of railway boulders and sleepers which can be easily imported from Bhutan when the transport cost will be minimum because of the proximity of the geographical position of the two countries. Dolomite and other raw materials have also been selected by the Bangladesh side for import from Thimpu.

Bangladesh government is learnt to have approached Bhutan for import of railway sleepers and boulders for heavy rehabilitation work of country's age-old railway network.

Bhutan is known for its quality fruits like orange and apple besides canned fruits, jelly and jam. India's International Airline Air-India gets its main supply of these fruits and fruit-products from Bhutan. Neighbouring Nepal and India also import fresh fruits from Bhutan.

Even in Dhaka some of the quality fruits from Bhutan travel through some Indian routes and sell at a higher price because of middle-man's commission in the dealing.

A businessmen's delegation from Bangladesh is likely to visit Bhutan in near future to explore further the market.

/9274

CSO: 4600/1050

INDIA

U.S. STEPS AGAINST PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT UNLIKELY

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 8 Oct 85 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text]

In his latest interview to *Newsweek*, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has made two new pertinent points on the twin subjects of Pakistan's nuclear bomb and the U.S. supply of sophisticated arms to that country. To take the latter point first, since there never has been a warplane that flies in only one direction, the threat to this country inherent in the Pakistani acquisition of the F-16, the most advanced and versatile fighter aircraft in use, is manifest even though both Washington and Islamabad have been trying hard to pretend that the warplane is intended to strengthen Pakistan's security in relation to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. This pretence has now been torn to shreds by the Prime Minister's disclosure that the secret U.S. documents captured by the Iranians from the U.S. embassy in Teheran clearly show that the F-16s delivered to Pakistan "are to be used against India, and not in Afghanistan." The published reports of the interview do not go into further details. But it is no secret that Pakistan's real purpose in acquiring the F-16s has been laid bare by none other than the then Pakistani foreign minister, Mr. Agha Shahi, in one of the documents seized and published by the Iranians which relates apparently to his negotiations with American officials. Why a copy of the minutes of these discussions was sent to the U.S. embassy in Teheran is not clear. But the document's message is loud and clear.

Against this backdrop, the recent report in London's *Financial Times* that the Pakistanis are so designing their nuclear bomb as to be able to carry it in the F-16s in their possession becomes both plausible and ominous. It also makes the whole issue of Pakistan's bomb—christened the Islamic Bomb by its originator, the late Mr. Bhutto—much more alive than was the case even some weeks ago. Mr. Jack Anderson, the well-known U.S. investigative journalist, has said repeatedly that he has learnt from U.S. intelligence documents that Pakistan is already in a position to either detonate a nuclear bomb or to start stockpiling such bombs without testing because detonation might mean an end to the U.S. economic aid and military sales to Pakistan at a

time when the doubling of the existing aid package over the next five years is under discussion. Since before his visit to Washington in June, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has been appealing to the U.S. to use its leverage with Pakistan to dissuade the Zia regime from going nuclear. But these appeals have failed to produce the desired result. On the contrary, the U.S. has asked India to find a regional solution to the problem by either signing the NPT so that Pakistan can sign it too or by agreeing to Pakistan's proposal for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. The first proposal cuts at the very root of India's nuclear policy; the second is equally flawed because foolproof verification is impossible, as the Prime Minister has so often pointed out. It is in this context that he has now told the U.S. that if it is really concerned about Pakistan's bomb, the least it can do is to withdraw the waiver given to that country from the Symington amendment that prohibits U.S. military or even economic aid to any nation embarked, overtly or covertly, on the nuclear path. Whether Washington would pay this plea greater heed than to his earlier appeals is, however, a different matter. On the face of it, that looks unlikely.

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CSO: 5150/0013

INDIA

GANDHI TELLS POSSIBILITIES OF PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ATTACK

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 9 Oct 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, October 8.

**T**HE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said today that India had firm evidence that Pakistan's nuclear bomb was financed not solely by that country and warned again of the danger of its inadvertent use.

Mr. Gandhi raised several questions related to Pakistan's nuclear bomb programme and wondered what it would do to the region and to the balance of power theory in the world.

Addressing the National Defence College here, Mr. Gandhi said India had demonstrated to the world that it had the will not to proliferate even after having proved its capability to manufacture the bomb 11 years ago.

Mr. Gandhi reaffirmed that India was not developing a nuclear device but regretted that Pakistan was going ahead in this regard. "Pakistan must desist from making such a weapon," he said.

"What we seek with Pakistan is not detente but entente," the Prime Minister said and pointed out that the only inhibiting factor was to what extent Pakistan was willing to go.

A nuclear, Mr. Gandhi said, was a very dangerous tool in the hands of countries where violent changes occurred and there was no established system of command and control.

**POLITICAL STABILITY**

The question was whether Pakistan had the technical capability for the requisite command and control and adequately stable political system to prevent the danger of its inadvertent use. In such a situation, he said, the chance of inadvertent use of an atomic weapon increased tremendously.

Mr. Gandhi also wondered whether the Pakistani bomb would be made available to the countries which were co-financing the project.

Mr. Gandhi said it could be debated whether Pakistan was on the verge of making the nuclear bomb, near it or had already developed one. One wondered whether the technology borrowed from other countries for the purpose required to be tested at all.

It could also be debated whether the technology and components were defective and that these were sought to be rectified by smuggling in some devices.

The Prime Minister said security lay in building upon affection, goodwill and neighbourliness which already existed between the people of the two countries.

However, since hostilities did exist, the armed forces should be strong enough to meet surprise attacks or counter unwarranted intrusions.

Since true security could come only through dialogue and interaction, India

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Threat From The Periphery,  
by K. C. Khanna, Page 8

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was not very enthusiastic about the proposals of a no-war pact and mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. These were not adequate to diffuse tensions. What was needed was people-to-people contact and friendliest of inter-governmental relations.

He said India was committed to resolving issues through friendly negotiations. "We do not want to spread Indian hegemony," Mr. Gandhi asserted. India wanted even small countries like Bhutan and Maldives to have their own personality and character, strengthen their independence and achieve their development as per their own wishes.

**BORDER PROBLEM**

About China, Mr. Gandhi said India was trying to normalise relations with that country despite the unprovoked attack. He admitted that the border issue was central to resolving the problems between the two countries. "We hope to find a solution but this is not easy or speedy task."

He said the approach of solving problems through peaceful negotiations was valid in dealings with all neighbouring countries. This had also come to the fore in the context of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. He was confident that the Sri Lankan ethnic problem would be solved.

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CSO: 5150/0014

INDIA

PAPERS REPORT U.S. REGIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Armacost, Fortier Delhi Visit

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 18 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, September 17.

THE United States has urged India to consider "regional initiatives" to avert nuclear competition in the sub-continent.

Two senior American officials, who had held discussions with the foreign secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, yesterday, called on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi today. They discussed this issue in response to India expressing its deep concern over Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

India had asked the U.S. to monitor Pakistan's nuclear programme to ensure that it did not acquire the weapons capability.

The U.S. approach, as reflected in its suggestion for regional initiatives, however, differs from the Indian perception since it seeks to equate India

and Pakistan despite the fact that India abstained from the nuclear weapons option after demonstrating its capability more than a decade ago.

The U.S. suggestion also gives the impression that the Reagan administration has begun to take note of Pakistan's weapon programme, so well documented by foreign journals and TV networks, only after India's response became strident and the talk of India keeping its nuclear option open gathered momentum.

The suggestion also implies that there is a competition between India and Pakistan in the nuclear field, an argument which the former does not accept.

The so-called regional initiative may presumably involve mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and not so foolproof measures. It can also create a false sense of complacency even as Pakistan intensifies its clandestine op-

erations.

Under the circumstances, India can hardly consider the U.S. response to be satisfactory. Since the two U.S. officials left for Islamabad for talks, it expects the U.S. to take up the issue with Pakistani leaders in an effective manner.

The two officials, Mr. Michael Armacost, under secretary of state for political affairs, and Mr. Donald Fortier, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs, also met Mr. Arun Singh, parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minister, before leaving.

According to the U.S. embassy here, the two officials "urged the Indian side to consider regional initiatives to avert nuclear competition in the subcontinent during a discussion on "south Asian nuclear developments."

Government Spokesman's Remarks

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 19 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

India has rejected Washington's unsolicited advice to reach agreement with Pakistan against nuclear weapons, and has stressed that the US should use its considerable clout to prevent Islamabad from acquiring nuclear capability.

The suggestion made by two senior aides of President Ronald Reagan that India should take the initiative for a regional accord to prevent a nuclear race has provoked strong reaction in the

Capital.

It is felt that the US is making a highly objectionable insinuation against India even as it disowns its own responsibility of monitoring the Pakistani nuclear programme which is patently geared towards making a nuclear bomb.

There is no way, diplomatic sources say, that the US can get away from this responsibility to preventing the Zia regime from acquiring nuclear capability.



The official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry stressed the real need in the regional nuclear scenario was to ensure that Pakistan does not acquire nuclear weapon capability.

"India is committed not to produce nuclear weapons; if it can be ensured that Pakistan too becomes committed to this — and the US can assist in this — then where is the need of a regional agreement", the spokesman said.

There is also a growing suspicion in the Capital that the US wants to use

this opportunity to twist India's arm to change its steadfast policy of not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as it now stands.

Washington has used every possible occasion to press India to sign the agreement. India has, however, said the NPT is not fair to non-nuclear weapon states. While it seeks to prevent a horizontal proliferation of weapons, it is blind to the nuclear weapon states enhancing their weapon stocks.

### Comment on Jack Anderson Article

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 18 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by Girilal Jain]

[Text]

THE well-known columnist Jack Anderson, who was the first person to tell us of the Nixon-Kissinger decision to "tilt" towards Pakistan at the time of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, has now disclosed that the Reagan administration may be beginning to "tilt" towards India.

If this in fact happens, it will be a development of the greatest importance for Asia. Naturally we have to wait for developments to unfold themselves before we can assess the magnitude of the supposed tilt and its importance, for good or ill, for us. Meanwhile let us examine its possibility. The prospect does not appear all that hopeful.

Judging by the available PTI summary, Jack Anderson and his collaborator Joseph Spear have given mainly a negative reason for the possible shift in America's South Asia policy in India's favour — disillusionment with General Zia-ul-Haq — and they have cited three reasons for this disenchantment.

First, the "U.S. conservatives' ardour for General Zia was based on the belief that he was a reliable anti-Soviet ally. It cooled when they realised that he was an Islamic fundamentalist determined to take the country down this road and stirred serious opposition among his countrymen". Secondly, the American policy-makers were unhappy over his cavalier disregard of their concern over his determination to build an "Islamic nuclear bomb." Finally, "Zia's decision to clap Bhutto's daughter under house arrest, demonstrating his fear of popular opposition after more than a decade

of dictatorship, may prove to have been the last straw."

It is difficult to believe that the first factor — General Zia's Islamic fundamentalism — can be, or is, a matter of serious concern for the Reagan administration which itself has been keen on bringing religion into the public realm. Witness its desire to make prayer compulsory in schools and its opposition to abortion. Moreover, Gen. Zia's fundamentalism is not of such a virulent type as would provoke strong reaction in the United States. The opposition to it in Pakistan also has been rather muted. Moreover, while Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, America's current obsession is with Shia radicalism emanating from Khomeini's Iran.

### Benazir's House Arrest

The third factor — Benazir Bhutto's house arrest — too cannot be a matter of such fundamental interest to the Reagan administration as to provoke it to revise drastically its South Asia policy. It is possible that it had taken a more hopeful view of General Zia's phoney elections and formation of a so-called government headed by Mr. Mohammed Khan Juncjo in Islamabad last March. In that case Benazir's house arrest could have come as somewhat of a shock to it. But in the context of the deep and extensive U.S. involvement with the Afghan mujahideen in their anti-Kabul crusade, its principal interest in Pakistan must be in stability and not in a transition to democracy which could be quite unsettling and difficult to manage.

This leaves General Zia's "Islamic bomb" as the only possible provocation for a shift in America's South Asia policy. But two points deserve attention in this regard. First, the "Islamic bomb" is not a new development; it antedates the Reagan administration's decision in 1980 to extend military-cum-economic assistance to Pakistan; it had then even waived the Symington amendment which rules out U.S. aid to any country which is trying to develop nuclear weapons; the considerations that persuaded it to do so have not changed. Secondly, the Americans have been blaming New Delhi as much for Pakistan's nuclear effort as Islamabad and urging India to sign the non-proliferation treaty so that Pakistan could also be persuaded to follow suit, or alternatively to agree to a mutual inspection arrangement with the latter.

Thus we do not find the Anderson — Spear case particularly strong and convincing. In our view, the specific evidence they have cited is also rather weak. While the U.S. refusal to provide E2 Hawkeye radar system to Pakistan is doubtless a gesture of goodwill towards India, it is not an anti-Pakistan move as such. Indeed, to put the matter more appropriately, a decision to provide Hawkeyes to Pakistan would have been tantamount to a declaration that the Reagan administration was anti-India to the point of being willing to tilt the power balance in the air decisively against it and in Pakistan's favour. So by refraining from such a decision, Washington has only shown that it cares for India's

Interests and susceptibilities at least to that extent. This fits in with the administration's new interest in improved relations with this country.

### Interesting Coincidence

It is, of course, a sheer coincidence that the Anderson-Spear column should have been followed by a report in *The New York Times* that Mr. Armacost, under secretary of state, and Mr. Fortier, deputy assistant to President Reagan for national security affairs, were being sent to New Delhi (they have since held discussions in the Indian capital) and Islamabad to express anxiety about the development of a nuclear weapon by Pakistan and possible retaliation by India in a manner similar to the Israeli strike against an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. But it is an interesting coincidence which illuminates the American approach to the issue of non-proliferation in South Asia. For the report quotes U.S. officials making two points.

First, though India has always resisted being equated with Pakistan, one option to be considered is agreement between the two countries permitting mutual inspection as urged by Pakistan. Secondly, the mood in the administration is to "get involved" and "weigh in" to avert a confrontation between India and Pakistan. In 1963 too the U.S. and Britain "got involved" and "weighed in" to "resolve" the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Jammu and Kashmir in the wake of Chinese aggression against India. Pakistan was then threatening to make common cause with China; now it is threatening to make the bomb. The threat was indirect then; it is indirect now.

It is hardly necessary to recall that the government of India has said more than once that it has no plans to engage in an Israeli-type pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's key nuclear installations at Kahuta near

Peshawar. It is equally unnecessary to recall that, unlike Iraq's, Pakistan's nuclear facilities are located in hardened underground sites which India cannot bomb out of existence even if it was so inclined. Moreover, unlike Iraq vis-a-vis Israel, Pakistan vis-a-vis India is not a sitting duck. It can retaliate and attempt to bomb either oil or nuclear installations. These are within the range of its F-16s.

Clearly there is a purpose in American attempts to conjure the unlikely scenario of India attempting an Israeli-style pre-emptive strike on Pakistani nuclear installations. Indeed, this purpose is self-evident. It is to compel India to sign the NPT or a mutual inspection agreement with Pakistan. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's numerous statements could have aroused the hope in Washington that it is possible to push India in that direction.

### The Two Refrains

On the eve of his visit to the United States last June, Mr. Gandhi was quoted as having said in Paris that India might be willing to sign the NPT. A day later he denied having made such a statement. For us in India, that was the end of the matter. But perhaps that was not so for the Americans. They could have concluded that opposition to the NPT was not an issue of principle with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi as it was with his predecessor, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and that he could be brought round with the help of a proper mix of threat (the Pakistani bomb) and inducement (offer of sophisticated weapons to India and denial of Hawkeyes to Pakistan). Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has made a number of other statements on the issue of the Pakistani bomb. Two refrains run through these statements. First, that Islamabad's determined bid to acquire nuclear weapons has become

the biggest obstacle in the path of improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. Secondly, that the United States has not done all it could to stop General Zia in his tracks. This stance is quite different from Mrs. Indira Gandhi's. She was more concerned with Pakistan's alleged aid to Sikh extremists and America's military supplies to Pakistan.

The implications of the Prime Minister's statements are obvious. If Islamabad's nuclear efforts are the biggest obstacle in the way of improved Indo-Pakistani ties and if it is desirable that these relations improve, it must be in India's own interest to do all it can to persuade Pakistan to give these up. And we know Pakistan's price. Either we sign the NPT or conclude a mutual inspection agreement with it.

Similarly, if it is our case that U.S. has not done all it could in the matter, we must, again in our own interest, persuade it to use fully its influence in Islamabad. Again we know the price. It is the same as in the first case.

From the American point of view, it is not an unreasonable proposition; we must be willing to give up our nuclear option if we want them to persuade Pakistan to give up its. In view of all this, can it be a matter of great surprise if the Americans have come to feel that a supposed "tilt" towards India can win them a lot, including the Indian signature on the NPT?

We need to be careful. Good Indo-U.S. relations, to be durable, must rest on mutuality of interests. Such a mutuality of interests, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be spelt out. But it can be asserted that a sensible definition cannot involve a tilt on the part of either country. Mature leaders do not think and speak in terms of tilts. They think and speak in terms of mutuality of interests and mutual adjustments.

INDIA

# EDITORIAL DEMANDS END TO MURUROA NUCLEAR TESTS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 25 Sep 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Mururoa Tests Must Stop"]

[Text]

Thanks to exposures by the press, especially *Le Monde*, the French government has been compelled to admit its guilt in sinking the environmental group Greenpeace's protest ship, the *Rainbow Warrior*, in Auckland last July. But it has done so in a characteristically awkward and half-hearted manner, and three days after the resignation of the defence minister, Mr. Charles Hernu, and the dismissal of the secret service (DGSE) chief, Mr. Pierre Lacoste. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Laurent Fabius, has now told the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. David Lange, that he is "truly sorry" about the effect the Greenpeace affair has had on relations between the two countries. He has also confirmed that it was DGSE agents acting "on orders" who sank the ship. However, an official spokesman has refused to say if the message to Washington constitutes an apology of the kind Mr. Lange has been demanding from France for committing a "sordid act of state-backed international terrorism." Mr. Fabius has also chosen to condone the criminal acts of DGSE agents who blew up the ship which was on a mission of protest against French nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific ocean. He has stated that "the simple executors (of the DGSE plan) obviously must be exonerated because it would be unacceptable to expose military men who only obeyed orders."

This is the conventional approach. Another government in a similar embarrassment would have taken a similar position. But it cannot dispose of other problems. In the first place, France had no business carrying out dangerous nuclear tests in the Pacific. And sending DGSE agents to a sovereign state to sink a ship and kill a journalist on board is tantamount to international brigandage. Mr. Lange has rightly termed Mr. Fabius' statement as "a remarkable interpretation of international law" and insisted on a formal apology as well as full compensation from France. Meanwhile, Australia has also demanded a full apology. And at home the right-wing opposition to Mr. Mitterrand is mounting. Evidently, the French President is now caught in a cleft-stick with the parliamentary elections only six months away. Regardless of whether Mr. Mitterrand or Mr. Fabius was involved in making decisions

pertaining to the shameful affair, their Socialist party is bound to have to pay a heavy political price for it. There is only one morally acceptable way out now for Mr. Mitterrand. He should stop all nuclear tests in France's Polynesian colonies. These tests have caused untold ecological devastation and their fallout has apparently produced incurable tumours and other fatal health effects among islanders living nearby. As the Polynesian independence movement has demanded, France should conduct such tests at home: it has no business poisoning people in the third world.

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CSO: 5150/0009

INDIA

GENERAL SINHA'S VIEWS ON VARIOUS NATIONAL ISSUES

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 24 Sep 84 p 5

[Interview with Lt Gen [Ret.] S.K. Sinha by Surinder Kishore; date and place not specified]

[Text] About 2 years ago Lt Gen S.K. Sinha resigned in protest from his position when Lt Gen A.S. Vaid was promoted to the rank of commander-in-chief of Indian Army.

There was a lot of reeling in Bihar at this "injustice" done to the first Bihari to reach that high position. In 1983, when Mr Sinha returned to Patna from New Delhi, he was met by hundreds of Biharis at the airport.

He was being pressured into entering the political arena to fight the injustice being done to Bihar. He himself was also interested in politics, but refrained from joining any party.

In 1984, Mr Sinha ran for the Parliament from Patna constituency against two established candidates. He ran on an independent ticket and lost the election. He blamed dishonest practices by his opponents for his defeat.

He was not disheartened by his defeat in the election. He has recently joined a coalition of opposition parties, called "Save Democracy Front" to demand reformation in election rules. Mr Sinha presided over the meeting held by this group on 31 August 1985. A part of his interview with our correspondent, Surendar Kishore, is given below.

[Question] Two years ago when you first entered the political arena from the armed forces, it was a new world for you. How much have you adapted to politics during the last 2 years?

[Answer] In some ways I am still new to politics even though there is little difference in the army and politics. I had to solve routine problems of 300,000 soldiers on a daily basis. Their problems are not very different from civilians.



The only difference is my belief and desire to keep politics and the armed forces separate. At the time of my resignation, I expressed the desire that politics should never enter the armed forces.

When I was denied my right to the position of commander-in-chief, several lawyers working in the Supreme Court volunteered to fight my case free of charge. I declined their offers politely because I did not want the image of discipline in our armed forces to be tarnished.

[Question] Now you are in politics. Does not the simple fact that a military officer of your rank is in politics mix the two?

[Answer] When I entered politics the HINDUSTAN TIMES of New Delhi editorialized that a high ranking army officer should not enter politics. People who are opposed to my entering politics do not say anything about Congress (I) members who are retired army officers. Major General Spairo, Colonel Ran Singh and Brigadier Shailo are among them. Generals De Gaulle (France), Heidenburg (Germany) and Eisenhower (USA) all had held military ranks before entering politics. Nobody, however, objected to their entry into politics because of their military backgrounds.

[Question] Is it not possible for a portion of the armed forces to sympathize with military officers with a long service record even after they have entered politics?

[Answer] I have made sure that I have no connections with the army after entering politics. I was invited scores of times by military men for various events and I declined attending all of them. I do not even visit Danapur Cantonment, the nearest military base from here. It just is not appropriate for me to associate with soldiers when I am in politics and running for the Parliament. It would adversely affect my career.

[Question] You were a commander in the army and now you are a commander in politics. What is the major difference between these two roles?

[Answer] There is no major difference except for the style of leadership. I would like to add that the field of politics is corrupt. I want clean politics and this will happen only when honest people enter politics.

[Question] What is the most irritating aspect of politics?

[Answer] I would like to say sycophancy and political dynasties. Indira Gandhi practiced these and Rajiv Gandhi is following in her footsteps. Central Minister Boota Singh recently said in a speech that the drought in Rajasthan ended when Rajiv Gandhi visited there and his visit to Punjab would end floods there. There should be a limit to sycophancy.

[Question] How do we eradicate these evils?

[Answer] In order to get rid of the dynastic rule established by the Congress, we must have a strong opposition. People's ambiguity will result in autocracy by one group.

[Question] How can people have another choice since the opposition is not ready?

[Answer] This is the question of the hour. I had thought that I could stay neutral and help the opposition parties. This did not work, however. I believe that the landslide victory of Congress (I) in the last elections was not because of its popularity but because of pilfering in the election process and the lack of unity in the opposition.

[Question] Some people believe that you will have to take the initiative in uniting the opposition parties. Then you can achieve what you failed achieving 6 months ago.

[Answer] I wrote letters to leaders of the three prominent opposition parties and made suggestions regarding sharing some seats in the elections. I even offered my services to lead the joint front made up of these parties. But we could not work together. I am glad that, finally, opposition parties have joined forces to demand election reforms. If they continue to work together, they will be able to achieve a lot. It would be even better if these regional parties united to make a federal party.

[Question] Is the Save Democracy Front the first step to unite the country's opposition parties?

[Answer] It is a great development that Bihar's Communist Party and Janata Party are working together to demand election reforms. This is the first time since 1967 that they have joined forces.

[Question] The Communist Party of India has stated that it does not sympathize with the Bihar Communist Party's demand for recalling the Parliament.

[Answer] I do not want to say much on this issue to avoid misunderstanding. All I want to say is that as long as Congress (I) is in power, Bihar will not prosper. Congress (I) is responsible for Bihar's backwardness.

[Question] The recent change in the attitude of Bihar's opposition leaders indicates that they are ready to work with each other.

[Answer] It would be premature to say that. Personally, I respect all opposition leaders. They are all good people. They could not unite because of some personal problems. There are some personality conflicts. However, all of them cooperate with me and I believe that my being neutral helps. I would be delighted if I could help in uniting them all.

[Question] Now that you have joined the coalition and this coalition is ready to agitate, you may end up in jail. Are you ready for it? After being a high-ranking army officer, how would you feel being in jail?

[Answer] I served 40 years in the armed forces when you are required to be ready to die any minute. Going to jail is nothing compared to it. I am ready to make any sacrifice for the people of Bihar.

At the same time I hope that the Indian government stops this tradition of sending political demonstrators to jail. Shooting and jailing people is not appropriate in a democracy. In other democratic countries people demonstrating against the government are not sent to jail.

[Question] Do you believe that this coalition will succeed in bringing about the necessary election reforms?

[Answer] People are not aware of the corruption in the last general elections. Even the report issued by the Election Commission indicates biased elections in Bihar. The government ignores the Election Commission's suggestions. Activities of our united front will educate the public about dishonesty practiced in elections. It will increase awareness among our voters and they will demand honest elections. It is my duty to achieve this goal. Maybe we do not succeed, but I will feel satisfied that we did try.

[Question] What is your opinion about the elections in Punjab and Assam?

[Answer] All I can say is that the only solution to the problems in Assam and Punjab is throwing the Congress Party out of there. If Congress wins, there will always be reasons for protestors to protest. The Congress Party has the tendency to forget its promises after winning elections. It would be better if the opposition there took over the government and worked in a responsible position.

[Question] The Indian government is trying to rehabilitate the Sikhs who had deserted the armed forces. What is your opinion about it?

[Answer] They are not deserters; they are traitors. It is wrong to admit them into the army. The concept of discipline would be adversely affected. They should be court martialed. Later, the government could decrease their sentences.

I want to add that I have done a lot for the Sikh and they trust me. Some Sikh soldiers even believe that had I been promoted to the rank of commander-in-chief, I would not have let the Operation Blue Star take place. Their belief, however, is wrong. As the commander-in-chief, I would have also obeyed the orders from above. Despite all this, I believe that a deserter should not be allowed to serve again.

[Question] A year ago, it was said that you had met the U.S. ambassador and he had promised you financial help. Did you meet any other foreign diplomat during the past year?

[Answer] I did not meet anyone after I met the U.S. ambassador. I have already clarified the issue of my meeting with the U.S. ambassador. I would

like to add that the accusations against the American ambassador were inappropriate. Only a low ranking diplomat can be expected to engage in such actions.

[Question] But the rank of the contacting person depends on who is to be contacted.

[Answer] That is not true. Diplomats do not get involved in such actions. Have you ever heard of any diplomat being accused of such actions? Only a low ranking employee of an embassy is usually involved in such covert work. I have also served as the director of military intelligence. Such talk is not carried out in front of anyone. The ambassador visited me in my Patna home. Several people saw him come and go.

[Question] What do you do in addition to being involved in politics?

[Answer] I would like to be involved in social and educational areas. Bihar is very backward in the area of education. The caste system is also prevalent. I believe that the caste system can be stopped by inter-caste marriages. People marrying out of their castes should be given preference for government jobs. My son has married a Brahman girl and my daughter has married a Vaishya boy (General Sinha is a Kayastha). I believe it is my moral duty to support inter-caste marriage.

Educational environment in Bihar universities is not very good. People with money send their children out of Bihar for education. Since my resignation from the army I have lectured at several foreign universities, but Patna University, my alma mater, has never invited me to lecture there!

7997/12951

CSO: 4624/2

INDIA

ANOTHER 'BHOPAL' IN DELHI FEARED

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 25 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Shushil Varma: "The Danger of Delhi Becoming Another Bhopal"]

[Text] Our government tends to raise a hue and cry whenever a terrible accident happens, but never takes any precautionary measures. Bhopal is a good example of this practice. God knows how many journalists (especially Rajkumar Keswani) and welfare groups had tried to warn the government about the problem before the 4 December 1984 calamity. The state government, however, turned a deaf ear to all these warnings. We have the same situation in Delhi now. There are 114 factories that leak poisonous gases. Among these, there are 28 licensed and 32 unlicensed small factories situated in densely populated Delhi suburbs such as Rajouri Garden, Ramesh Nagar, Subhash Nagar, Moti Nagar, Shahdara, Sudarshan Park, Nangloi, Punjabi Bagh, Tilak Bazaar, Sadar Bazaar, Balli Maraan and Bara Hindu Rao.

The fear of a "Union Carbide" of Bhopal, however, is from DCM Chemical in the private sector and Hindustan Insecticide Limited in the public sector. Both manufacture poisonous gases in huge quantities. About 250,000 people live around these factories in Prem Nagar, Baljit Nagar, Swatantat Bharat Mills Colony, Karam Pura, Moti Nagar and Tri Nagar.

About 80 tons of chlorine gas is manufactured daily in the DCM Chemicals plant situated on Nazafgarh Road. The potency of this gas can be estimated by the fact that inhalation of a fifteenth of a miligram of this gas can kill a human. This gas was used for killing people in World War II. It is estimated that this factory has about 400 tons of this gas while their records show only 280 tons in stock. It has been learned that this gas is stored in two 100-ton tanks and 200 point nine cylinders. This gas is used for making bleaching powder, and large amounts of chlorine are also supplied to other companies. In this very mill, sulphur dioxide is also produced while making sulfuric acid. Some of it is stored there.

According to some employees of this factory and people living in the neighborhood, these gases are let go via the exhaust vents during the night. People have had bouts of coughing attacks while asleep. Small accidents happen almost daily, but a major accident occurred on 30 January at 6:30 pm.



Fifteen people were seriously injured when some chlorine gas leaked out. It was learned that, due to a turbine malfunction, the compressor failed to pull out gas. This gas escaped through a "seal." On 17 December, 40 children attending the Swatantat Bharat Public School fainted near the Nazafgarj Nullah (a revine) because some chlorine gas was dumped in the revine the night before. Persons living in the shanties next to the revine have experienced a strong stench coming from it, causing choking in some people.

Recently during the night of 10 September between 11:37 and 11:55 pm (twice during this short period), a large amount of sulfur dioxide gas escaped from the chimneys of this mill, affecting hundreds of people living in Prem Nagar, Baljit Nagar, Nehru Nagar and Punjabi Basti. They had coughing bouts, burning eyes and a choking feeling. Some even lost consciousness and vomited blood. Hukamchand Aggarwal of Baljit Nagar told us that he was sleeping outside on a cot and suddenly felt choked and began to gag. He looked around and saw whitish smoke all over the place. He ran inside and soaked his face in cold water, but still lost consciousness. Another resident named Bhim Singh Jain said, "When the smoke began to spread, people ran into their houses. I wrapped cloth around my face and closed all the doors and windows of my house." Renu, wife of Punjabi Basti resident Kishan Lal, is still scared of this incident.

Dharam Singh Kaushik, general secretary of the employee welfare congress and an employee of DCM Chemicals, informed us that "two plant pumps containing sulphur and sulphuric acid developed problems at 9:45 pm the night of 10 September. Sulphur began to accumulate in the burner until a worker stopped this pump about 20 minutes later. Vijaypal, a mechanic, later fixed all but pump number 35 (only pumps numbered 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 contained sulphuric acid. the remaining had sulphur). In order to run the factory efficiently it is essential that at least three pumps be working. On that day, however, foreman Pande had only two pumps operating. The gas accumulated in the burner spread all over the plant and began to escape via chimneys. The plant was closed for 2.5 hours. An attempt to start the plant again was aborted when gas began to leak again. On 11 September, after all pumps were repaired, the plant began to operate again. The security at the mill is very weak. There is a public road only 50 yards from the place where sulphuric acid cylinders are kept. The 5-foot-high wall between the plant and the road does not provide much resistance. Neither is it hard to enter the mill. Anyone can enter it when a group of laborers go in.

Whenever officers of the Government Efficiency Board visit the mill, they inform the management in advance. On these occasions, the mill is kept very clean and the work in the murderous plants is slowed down.

Last February, famous British scientist Dr D. H. Slater visited the mill on invitation from Nita Bali, a labor relations worker. Dr Slater declared the mill unsafe. Lalit Makan and Jayanti Patnayak raised the question of safety in this mill in parliament on 25 March. They cited this report. At that time, Labor Minister T. Anjaya also agreed that safety measures in this mill were inadequate.

Hindustan Insecticide, a public undertaking manufacturing DDT gas, is just as unsafe as this mill. This gas is so poisonous that several Western countries have banned its use. The poisonous chlorine gas is used to make it and the pungent chlordane is produced during the process.

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INDIA

# AKALIS ADVISED TO WORK IN HARMONY WITH HINDUS

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 27 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Prabhash Joshi: "Victory of Akalis"]

[Text] Punjabi voters should thank the democracy? They came out fearlessly and voted the Akalis in and defeated the religious fanatic and terrorists. They made the challenges of Mr Barnala and Balwant Singh go to waste. They will vote in at least 65 to 70, if not 70 to 80, seats for Akalis. They are electing Akalis for the Parliament also.

This victory will give the Akalis the much needed self-confidence. They are now the real regional party of Punjab since they have won the majority votes there. They believed that they could gain power by the democratic method. They should be especially commended as they did it on their own, without any help from another group. True, Congress did not challenge them on a full scale. Had the Congress Party tried, Akalis would still have won. It was a "now or never" situation for the Akalis. The Congress party did well by accepting defeat without a showdown. Such sportmanship was necessary for Punjab and the country.

This victory will heal the wounded pride of Sikhs in general and the Akalis in particular. More than the Akalis, this victory belongs to democracy. This development has brought the whole country out of the suicidal dark alley of terrorism. Punjabis had two choices, democracy or terrorism, and they made the right choice. The people's choice was more effective in curbing terrorism and religious fanaticism than the efforts of the armed forces and police. They have sent the Akalis to rule in Chandigarh. Now the ball is in the Akali Party's court. They must prove worthy of the confidence Punjab's voters have put in them. In some ways, the Akalis have it easier than the Congress Party would have, had they won the election. They have difficult tasks ahead of them. Their greatest problem and fear is the internal strife. In the past, whenever Akalis came to power, they lost it along with people's faith by fighting among themselves. Now they have to prove that they are not united in adversity alone, but can stay as one to rule and serve the people. In the euphoria of their victory they have picked Mr Barnala as the chief minister. Soon, however, the political ambitions of Badal, Balwant Singh, Sukhjinder Singh and Amrinder Singh will cause problems. They should especially look out for Badal. If factionalism and internal strife emerged, then the religious groups

would control the government. In the past, both Sikhs and Hindus got tired of the Akali tendency to fall prey to internal strife and decided to support the Congress Party. Now they have shown their support once more and if the Akalis fall prey to factionalism again, they will not trust them again. On this special occasion, and with deep feelings, people have given power to the Akalis. This time the Akalis must show their unity. Power corrupts; they must fight this temptation.

The second challenge is dealing with the religious fanatics and terrorists. Punjabis have voted the Akalis in to stop terrorism and bring harmony among various religions. The Akalis are better equipped to deal with this issue than Congress Party would have been. They have popular support and are able to stop people from using Sikh temples for terrorist activities under the guise of religion. Terrorists will be singled out and dealt with more properly. Not all Sikhs support terrorism, however, the Akalis have to be careful. By giving a blanket amnesty to all terrorists, they could not expect hardcore terrorists to become nonviolent holy men. Activities to denounce Akali rule would take on momentum in Pakistan. It is easy to denounce Congress as a Hindu rule; it is extremely difficult to label an Akali government as anti-Sikh.

Jagjit Singh Chauhan, Ganga Singh Dhillon and, right here in our country, Baba Joginder Singh will not be able to incite separatists about a Sikh country, scaring them about the dangers to their religion. They will, however, use their religious clout and priests of various temples to help them. Young radical Sikhs wearing red turbans and those who hope to establish Khalistan (a separate country for Sikhs) will find new ways to tarnish the Akali image. The whole country, including Punjab, is expecting the Akalis to control the terrorists. When the Akalis start this effort, there will be a hue and cry. The Akalis will be called traitors and puppets of the Delhi government. This situation will put the Akali government in a situation much more difficult than it would put a Congress government. Akalis will have a hard time running a government when they are called traitors to both the religion and the country. On the other hand, if they fail to curb the terrorists, they will not be able to blame Congress for their problems. Akalis have to follow the example of the left wing government of Bengal that curbed the Naxalites and established peace there. The leftist front is still in power there for many years. If the Akalis succeeded in curbing the Sikh terrorists in time, no one will be able to challenge their authority in Punjab.

The fact that the Hindu vote, in addition to the Sikh vote, played an important role in their landslide victory poses another challenge to the new Akali government. Without the Hindu vote they would not have been able to capture that many seats. Now they cannot let their party be a Sikh party. The recent terrorist activities have forced the Akalis to take their politics out of Sikh temples. It must prove itself to be a party of Hindus as well as Sikhs. The Hindus must get the same treatment under the Akalis as Sikhs desire under a Hindu rule! The dichotomy of crusading for equal rights for the Sikh minority in India and ignoring the rights of the Hindu minority in Punjab just will not work. Sikhs will get the same treatment as a minority in India as the Akalis give the minorities in Punjab. A Hindu is much closer to a Punjabi Sikh than

he is to a Tamil Hindu. There are many Sikhs outside of Punjab who are not Punjabis. Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab are blood brothers. Akalis have to control zealots and religious fanatics within their ranks. They may not have to face another Bhindrewala because of Rajiv Gandhi's support. The fanatic Akalis also have some political clout. After getting power the Akalis will learn what Rajiv Gandhi has already learned. Religion should prosper in Punjab, but not rule it. Peace can come to Punjab only when Hindus and Sikhs live like brothers. They belong to the same race, culture and civilization. An Akali government will succeed only when it is a Punjabi government.

During the last 4 years, not only Congress and the country, but also the Akalis have learned definite lessons. Now that people have given them power, they must implement what they have learned. Punjab will give them opportunity to practice flexibility. The second lesson is that government is to serve people and not for fighting among themselves or using it for religion. The government must serve the cause of peace and prosperity in Punjab. Prosperity in the present times requires industrialization and technology, not agriculture and religion. Industrialization and promotion of science cannot be achieved by religious zealotry. Religion means the welfare of all human beings and not just of Sikhs. The Akalis have to find a solution to all the problems in a modern world using modern methods. The whole country, including Delhi, welcomes them with garlands and spread-out red carpet. The Akalis government should avoid the thorny path and use good political savvy to achieve their goals.

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INDIA

BRIEFS

COMPUTERS FROM USSR--MOSCOW, September 25 (UNI)--India is going to buy four more EC-1045 electronic computers from the Soviet Union this year and is negotiating for some more sophisticated ones. The Indian minister for electronics, Dr. Sanjivi Rao and the Soviet deputy radio industry minister, Mr N.V. Gorshkov, signed a protocol last night at the conclusion of the third meeting of the Indo-Soviet working group deliberations on electronics. Dr Sanjivi Rao left for Sofia today. The four EC-1045 are being acquired for the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, it was learnt. Besides these, India will also purchase EC-1061 from the USSR. As regards "elbrusz" and other modern computers, the two sides will hold negotiations next year, when Mr Gorshkov will attend the fourth meeting of the working group in Delhi scheduled for the first quarter of 1986. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 26 Sep 85 p 6] /12828

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IRAN

## SEPARATION OF POLICE, KOMITEH DUTIES ELABORATED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Aug 85 p 2

[Text] The plan to separate the duties of the Islamic revolution Komiteh and the Islamic Republic police department was approved recently in a joint committee with the participation of the authorities of the related organizations in the Ministry of Interior. The antinarcotics campaign, protection and investigations of public places, and the antiprostitution campaign have been given to the Islamic revolution Komiteh.

In a press, radio, and television interview yesterday morning announcing this decision, Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek, the Islamic revolution Komiteh deputy, and Colonel Samimi, the Islamic Republic police chief, explained the details of the plan and the duties of the Islamic revolution Komiteh and the Islamic Republic police department.

First, Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek thanked the Muslim people for their "ever-presence-at-all-the-scenes" which has frustrated the counterrevolution and expelled the Great Satan from all the scenes. He praised the efforts of the Komiteh Pasdar brothers and police personnel for establishing security on Quds day and during the fourth presidential election. In regard to the separation plan, he referred to the history of the Islamic revolution Komiteh formation and said: "The activities of the Komiteh brothers sometimes caused interference with other organizations, especially the police department. Therefore, it became necessary to suggest a new project in order to prevent this interference. Since 1360 [21 March 1981-20 March 1982] was declared law year, all the executive branches of the government had to present the projects and job descriptions of their organizations in order to coordinate them with the sanctioned laws of the Majlis and prevent any interference." He added: "With regard to the joint session of the Komiteh and police and the problems of the Majlis in allocating credit and budgets for both organizations, distinguishing the duties of the disciplinary apparatus were essential. On the basis of these needs, in various meetings in the Ministry of Interior it was decided that the duties of the disciplinary organizations be specified. With the distinction of the duties of both organizations, each will be aware of its mission according to the law and consequently the people will be saved from confusion. They will be able to refer to the proper authority in order to receive answers. The other result is that the government and budget committee will not have any problems in

budget allocations. On the other hand, this project will help distinguish the duties of each disciplinary organization, and it will be easier for authorities to contact the proper organ and receive answers." In relying on the legal source for the separation plan of the disciplinary forces, he remarked: "In all the sessions with the Interior Minister, the chief and police department deputies and related authorities agreed with the suggested plan."

#### Police Chief Speech

Colonel Samimi, the Islamic Republic Police Chief, also in regard to the separation of the duties of the police and the Islamic revolution Komiteh said: "In order to prevent the affairs of the nation from stagnating and the newly established Islamic Republic from facing any danger after the revolution's victory, some organs were formed in the country and with the need for continuing the revolution according to the nation's imam's order, some of these organs, like the Islamic revolution Komiteh, were retained." He added: "Since the missions and duties of the police and the Islamic revolution Komiteh had similar aspects and both organs were executing one duty, they were interfering in each other's work. Therefore, two or three years ago, the separation plan was discussed, and especially during the approval of the plan, the proper authorities insisted that the duties of each of the disciplinary forces be distinguished so in time of need, they could perform their separate duties."

In regard to the duties of the revolution Komiteh, the chief of police said: "Pasdar brothers have used tremendous efforts in the antinarcotics campaign and have achieved success and gained experience in this area. The problems of drug addiction and narcotics smuggling have caused many educational and economic losses, led to the withdrawal of foreign currency, money, gold, and precious objects from the country, and caused the Islamic society to face political and social losses. Therefore, it was essential to form an organization to conduct a stubborn campaign. It was agreed that the revolution Komiteh organization be in charge of this task." The police chief added: "This certainly does not mean that other organizations and the people will not participate in this affair. The need for the people's cooperation, especially for providing information, like their help at the war front of the imposed war, is effective and destiny making." He continued: "Since the responsibility for the antinarcotics campaign and addiction is given to the Islamic revolution Komiteh, the police department of the Islamic Republic of Iran will use personnel from the antinarcotics criminal investigation department for robbery and crime prevention." He also stated: "A group of experienced personnel from the antinarcotics bureau has been assigned to the Komiteh for a brief time to cooperate with the Komiteh brothers in antinarcotics and share their experience."

After the speech of the police chief, Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek said: "In this project, the police department is recognized as the disciplinary and services forces and the Komiteh as the disciplinary and security forces. With this separation and the change of duties, all experience and files will be transferred to those responsible." He added: "The Komiteh charter will be

discussed during the second deliberation of the special committee of the Majlis and the subjects of this project will be composed in a manner in order to be applicable to the charter and duties of the Majlis."

#### Police Department Responsibilities

Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek then referred to the police department responsibilities and said: "At present, the police department is in charge of the identification bureau, international police, the criminal investigation department, the municipality executive branch and other organizations, the passport office, and the foreign nationals office according to the devolved responsibilities. The duties of the police department also include providing protection for official ceremonies, protection of embassies, banks, official foreign guests, conferences and international seminars, establishment of physical protection of public places, the prevention, discovery, and investigation of public offenses, except for antinarcotics, counterrevolution, and public places."

#### Komiteh Responsibilities

In emphasizing the joint cooperation of the Komiteh and police in regard to the devolved responsibilities in this project, he said: "Protection of sensitive areas and installations, investigation of all offenses related to information, security, and the counterrevolution, affairs related to narcotic addiction, the fight against all kinds of unlawful acts, riot control, demonstrating without a permit, strikes and disorders with a counter-revolutionary aspect are among the Komiteh's responsibilities." He referred to the cities without Komiteh and stated that the police would be in charge of these responsibilities until the formation of the Komiteh and said: "We also have joint missions with the gendarmerie which the separation plan will specify later."

In regard to the execution of the separation plan, Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek said: "Joint teams from the police department and the Komiteh have traveled to the cities in order to explain these projects. The execution of this project has started in Tehran, and it is in the process of implementation in the other provinces."

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IRAN

INFORMATION MINISTER DETAILS ACTIVITIES DURING PAST YEAR

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] Political Service-Yesterday on the occasion of government week, the information minister while presenting his views in a press, radio and television interview in the presence of domestic and foreign correspondents, elaborated on the specifics of the information system in the country and the operation and activities of this ministry during the past year. According to the information minister, the employees of this ministry, with the cooperation of the people, succeeded in discovering over 1300 firearms, 1513 Molotov cocktails, 1011 explosive percussion caps, over 430 kilograms of TNT and 7 ammunition warehouses of counterrevolutionary minigroups. Moreover, they have arrested over 590 high ranking members of minigroup organizations. These activities have prevented 136 terrorist acts and tens of inhuman projects by the lackeys of world oppression against the defenseless people and officials of the Islamic Republic.

According to our reporter, in this interview, Hojatt ol-Eslam Mohammad Rey Shahri referred to government week and first explained the specifics of the intelligence system of the Islamic Republic and said: "Iran's intelligence system has several important, unique and exclusive specifications which you cannot find in any other part of the world. Among them is the sovereignty of Islamic order and religious rules over all the intelligence organizations. The second feature of this uniqueness is the humane intelligence activities and eye-catching cooperation of the people with the Information Ministry. Definitely this cooperation arises from the religious beliefs of the people for protecting the gains of their revolution. In regard to this subject he added: "The people's cooperation with the Information Ministry and with intelligence organizations is noticeably high and according to received reports, this cooperation indicates a 160 percent increase in comparison to last year." The information minister called the third specifics of the intelligence system its formation as a ministry and said: "You cannot find any place whose intelligence system works under a ministry and whose proper authority is selected by the representatives of the people for a limited time in the manner customary in the Islamic Republic. In the free tribune of the Majlis, the representatives are able to directly discuss the current issues of the Information Ministry and question the responsible officials of that Ministry. Non-interference in the people's affairs is another important peculiarity of this ministry, in another sense it is the most important difference of



intelligence activities in our country in comparison to other countries. The Information Ministry does not interfere in the slightest in the affairs related to the rights of the people." He added: "Certainly, these unique peculiarities create an abundance of difficulties for the Information Ministry and we hope that with the newly compiled bill, which will be presented to the Islamic Majlis, we will be able to solve these problems. But despite all this, we have to point out to our country's beloved people that despite the existing problems and difficulties the Information Ministry has been able to be the most successful intelligence organization in the world. As stated before, this success is indebted to factors like divine help, considerable cooperation of the people with the proper intelligence authorities and the complete faith and belief of the officials and responsible authorities of the Information Ministry in their duties."

Hojjat ol-Eslam Ray Shahri then explained the Information Ministry's activities last year and referred to the establishment of the said organization and stated: "Planning different plots in order to inflict a blow on the order of the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently been the main goal of the enemies of the revolution. These plots were especially intensified during the past year. All the minigroups have used their utmost efforts to take advantage of different occasions and execute their master's orders. But due to the sacrifices of the unknown soldiers of the absent Iman, thank God, most of their inauspicious plans have been revealed and neutralized. In some cases, the people did not even notice the plots and occurrences." The information minister said: "The statistics regarding arms and explosives which were captured this year indicate what inasuspicious plans Saddam's domestic collaborators had in mind." He added: "During the time, from all the minigroups, whether monarchists, hypocrites, Fada'ian, Communist party, Democrats, etc., 16 pieces of RPG-7's, which were mainly supposed to be used for propaganda purposes, 398 US's and G3, 271 colts, 440 grenades, 104 bombs, 259 kilograms of TNT, 179 pounds of explosives, 4 machine guns, 54 mines, 1513 Molotov cocktails and flares, 1011 explosive percussion caps, 20 missiles and mortar shells, and 7 ammunition warehouses were seized. The majority of captured warehouses belonged to Fada'ian guerillas and also a large amount of financial resources have been discovered from minigroups. In addition to millions of tomans of money, 62 motor vehicles, 434 packages of cyanide, 56 copying machines, 45 typewriters, 3 xerox machines, 6 offset printing presses, 257 forged driving licenses, 67 birth certificates, a great many forged seals and corp's cards and Komiteh's insignia have been discovered." As regards the discovered bombs, the information minister said: "These bombs have tremendous destructive power and were delivered by the information and security organization of Iran and were to be used in populated areas and God forbid, if the plans of the filthy agents of the enemy were implemented, it would have resulted in enormous financial and human losses." He added: "A bomb with 200 pounds of TNT was planted in a Peykan car and 90 pounds of TNT in magnetic disks with enormous destructive powers were planted in a Zhian car. Fortunately, both were discovered before the explosion and neutralized."

Then concerning the arrest of counterrevolutionary agents, Hojjatt ol-Eslam Rey Shahri said: "In this regard, 39 members of a terrorist team and 352 harassment and molestation nucleus members who were setting cars and shops on fire have been arrested. The interesting point is that among those arrested, 107 are responsible authorities of the high level cadres of the minigroups and 389 are members of the minigroups."

In continuation of his speech, the information minister, while paying homage to the memory of the anniversary of the late Rajai and Dr Ba-Honar, referred to the goals of the combatants of the minigroups in terrorizing ordinary people and the hezbollah nation in the streets and said: "After a few successful cowardly acts of terrorism due to their penetration, these groups have done whatever they were able to do. Since they have not succeeded in assassinating important personalities they have been attacking the defenseless hezbollah people. Thank God, with the awareness of the security agents and cooperation of the people, they were defeated in this goal too. In this connection, with the arrest of several lackey agents, 136 terror plots were discovered and neutralized. Also, in another case, the counterrevolutionary minigroups intended to martyr several authorities including the commander of the ground forces by poisoning their food. But this plot was also discovered and neutralized."

The information minister said: "On the whole, all the neutralized plots during this year have been due to the awareness of the security agents and cooperation of the people. In this course, in addition to the assassination plot of 136 persons, the plan of 41 attacks on sensitive and vital centers, 38 cases of bomb discovery, 100 cases of setting cars on fire, 9 cases of hijacking, 298 cases of obstruction and harassment activities, and 126 cases of armed robbery have been discovered and neutralized." He added: "One of the special activities which was due to occur during the election was an RPG attack on the presidential office. According to the investigation, on Mordad 16-17 (August 7-8) a team of three was assigned to execute this crime under the leadership of a man called Abbas Hushmand alias Behruzli and two others named Bolurchi and Huseyni. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the komiteh on Vozara Street and two shops were among the targets of minigroups too. These men have confessed in their investigation that they had been instructed that even if they pulled one stone off the presidential headquarters it would have been enough to meet their goal. It was also planned that a similar attack occur in Eshahan by a person named Asghar Suleymanzadeh who has had a record of sabotage since 1981 and has performed 30 terrorist acts."

The information minister said: "I warn all the security disciplinary forces that in order to regain their lost prestige and show their weight again, these counterrevolutionary minigroups might start to attempt some new efforts again. Therefore, everyone must be alert and watch for the slightest plot." He added: "In order to keep up their luxurious life abroad, the latest method of the counterrevolutionary leaders is to get in touch with the high authorities by telephone and disguise themselves as an important person ask for certain

information and then sell this information to the Iraqi regime. Therefore, all officials must be very careful in their telephone conversations with strangers."

In conclusion, while appreciating the sincere cooperation of the responsible authorities of the revolutionary corps of the Islamic Republic with the Ministry of Information and Security, the information minister announced that people can call 210, the telephone number of the special information headquarters of the Information Ministry in Tehran or write to PO Box 13185/111 for relaying any information.

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NEPAL

BRIEFS

AMBASSADORS TO AUSTRIA, YUGOSLAVIA--Royal Nepalese Ambassador General Singha Pratap Shah presented his credentials to Mr Rudolf Kirchlarger, president of the Republic of Austria, at a special ceremony held at the presidential palace in Vienna on Tuesday. Mr Shah is Nepal's resident ambassador in the Federal Republic of Germany. Likewise, Royal Nepalese Ambassador Krishna Bahadur Manandhar presented his credentials to Mr Radovan Ulajkovic, president of the presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 14 October. Mr Manadhar [spelling as published] is Nepal's resident ambassador in Egypt. [Text] [Katmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 17 Oct 85 p 1 BK]

SAARC APPROVES TRANSPORTATION LINKS--The technical committee meeting on transport under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], which concluded in Katmandu yesterday, has approved the proposal to construct highways linking all the seven members of the SAARC grouping. The meeting also passed another resolution to link all the seven countries by railways. At the meeting, Nepal emphasized the need to exchange [words indistinct] by all the member countries on urban passenger-related transportation and to develop various modes of transport. [Text] [Katmandu External Service in English 1445 GMT 7 Nov 85 BK]

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CSO: 4600/73

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

BK310719 Madras THE HINDU in English 18 Oct 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Zia's Days of Reckoning"]

[Text] Probably taking the cue from the turn of events in Latin America where several generals are now facing the long arm of justice for their atrocious violations of human rights, their venality and corruption and their gross abuse of power while in office, Gen Ziaul Haq of Pakistan has been insistent on passing a sweeping Indemnity Bill as a pre-condition for the lifting of martial law in the country. But he must have been under a haze of illusion if he believed that the members of the National Assembly, including many of the pro-regime sympathisers, would take the provisions of such a measure lying down. Ever since the Constitution Eighth Amendment Act was introduced in Pakistan's hardly freely elected National Assembly last month, serious efforts were under way by the members, particularly the Independents, to stifle somehow the proposed piece of legislation that would have the effect of legitimising some 300 edicts issued in the past eight years, including the bogus referendum of December last. Although the "civilian" government had tried to mollify the fears of the legislators by declaring that once the mechanics for the return of civilian rule was complete, certain controversial aspects of the new Constitution could be revised separately, it was very clear from the outset that few would swallow this bait.

And even as Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo, and a section of the pro-establishment parliamentarians had been calling for the acceptance of the validation of martial law as the minimum condition for the return to civilian rule, there were others who questioned the justification (or rationality) of ratifying every martial law enactment as a part of the Constitution. Faced with a no-win situation and forced to come to grips with reality, Mr Junejo, after consultations with the opposing members, reintroduced a fresh set of partially watered down proposals. The new plan abandoned the idea of a super-body called the National Security Council--whose membership was of course heavily weighted in favour of the Armed Forces--that would act in times of a "national emergency." Also, Gen Zia agreed to give up the proposal to arm the president with powers to dissolve the Parliament at his discretion. And now word comes from Islamabad that a comprehensive agreement has been reached between the critics of the Indemnity Bill and the



government, with the Independent members agreeing to "pardon" Gen Zia for the 1977 coup in return for specific guarantees under a civilian form of government.

The government is taking a lot of credit for the so-called consensus posture it had adopted. But the fact of the matter is that at one time the regime realised that it might not, after all, have the two-thirds majority to bulldoze the bill through the National Assembly. The process of arriving at the current compromise is more reflective of the part played by the Independents whose sustained campaign against the original provisions of the Act opened up an overall political debate of the subject in the country. The present arrangements might appear quite impressive on paper--a brake on the powers of the president, the supremacy of Parliament, no role for the Armed Forces in constitutional matters, a flexible attitude towards the revival of political parties and so on--but the real question is whether Gen Zia is sincere in his new moves and how the brass hat interests, going beyond Pakistan's current dictator, will respond. If Mr Junejo has been credited with trying to impress upon the martial law administrator the urgent need to wind up his long and illegal show, and is supposedly in favour of the country's return to the civilian fold by January 1, 1986, Gen Zia's problems and political inclinations are transparent. Pakistan's military dictator has gone into a class by himself in the South Asian region for going back on commitments, and often blatantly on his personal word (witness the numerous promises since 1977 to hold elections to return the country to civilian rule). The latest instance of bad faith is represented by the arrest of Miss Benazir Bhutto after she had been given to understand that she would be free to move about anywhere in the country. The future of Gen Zia now appears technically safe, but the proposed changes have hardly instituted or restored either the substance or the spirit of a minimum-level civilian constitutional and political framework. And much remains to be learnt about the content of the Political Parties Act that is to be passed in the near future. The 11-party Movement for Restoration of Democracy and the Jaamat Islami, the one-time ally of the government, are hardly pleased over the recent turn of events, and there is certainly the possibility of the traditional parties starting a campaign against the present legislature once the country returns genuinely to the democratic fold. That the Zia regime is intent on making a clever but not very intelligent use of time to crack down on dissent is evident from the continuing arrests of opposition activists, especially those belonging to the Pakistan People's Party. With the dictatorship losing what little credibility it has had at home and overseas, Gen Zia will have to face the people eventually--after all, he has himself announced more than once that he is ready to do so, even if nobody really has taken this at face value.

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PAKISTAN

RESTRICTIONS ON MRD TERMED 'UNFAIR'

GF030423 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 25 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Curbs on MRD"]

[Text] The authorities have acted rather precipitately to prevent a large number of MRD [Movement for Restoration of Democracy] leaders from converging in Karachi to attend a meeting of the Movement scheduled to October 25 and 26. In order to forestall the assemblage, the Sind Government has banned the entry of the MRD top brass into that metropolitan city for a period of three months. Those banned from entering the province include Abdul Wali Khan of NDP [National Democratic Party], Maulana Fazlur Rahman of JUI [Jamiatul-ulema-i-islam], Aftab Sherpao of PPP [Pakistan People's Party], Ghulam Ahmad Bilour and Abdul Khaliq Khan of NDP. Wali Khan, who refused to receive the order served on him by the local authorities in Peshawar was informed on Wednesday that he would receive the Sind Government's orders to this effect some time on Thursday.

The leaders prevented from proceeding to Karachi will probably sit back and sulk since any attempt to participate in the meeting despite the prohibitory orders could entail their arrest and detention, the duration of which is difficult to presage. But what baffles the people is that while they are being told that martial law is to be lifted before the current year is out and that the revival of political parties and political activity is on the cards, efforts of political leaders to get together should be scuttled. The right of these leaders to meet and formulate their future programme should not be denied. The curbs now imposed on them are not only unfair but also unnecessary and should be withdrawn.

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PAKISTAN

CONFISCATION OF PASSPORTS DENOUNCED

GF040412 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Freedom of Travel"]

[Text] Some prominent lawyers have approached the courts for the restoration of their confiscated passports. Confiscation of passports not only infringes their basic constitutional right of freedom of travel but is patently against the spirit of the times inasmuch as the government is avowedly endeavouring to revive democracy in the country. Certainly, the government has always conceded the right of every Pakistani citizen to hold a passport. In the circumstances, it is impossible to understand why the need should arise to prevent people from travelling by imposing irritable and time consuming pre-conditions.

Under no circumstances whatsoever should political dissidence be made a basis for withholding or confiscating a citizen's passport. If this is going to be the yardstick for such action, claims of championship of democracy will not be taken seriously. Additionally, once a passport has been issued, there should be no restriction on travelling to any country in the world. The placing of such curbs amounts to a reflection on the patriotism of our citizens. Pakistan is perhaps the only country where visits to specified destinations are prohibited. Passports issued elsewhere do not omit any country. It is high time we started matching words with deeds if we are to return to democracy.

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PAKISTAN

WHEAT SAID VICTIM OF UNSCRUPULOUS OFFICIALS, TRADERS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 3 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Nurul Hasan Hashmi: "Our Hypocrisy]

[Text] According to the Bible, God disliked Adam's desire for wheat so much that He threw him on Earth and said "You and your progeny will get bread by hard labor." Ever since that, children of Adam have been tilling the land and producing wheat by the sweat of their brows. But wheat that is produced by the hard labor of men is being so mercilessly destroyed by another section of men that not to disclose their dishonesty, hypocrisy and shamelessness would be another sort of dishonesty. The governments of some well-to-do countries in the world get their surplus harvest of wheat thrown into the sea (instead of sending it to the starving nations of the world in order to keep the price of wheat high in the world market. Under these circumstances, is it not a heinous crime and the height of barbarity for the government officials of a developing country (whose economy depends on wheat, cotton and rice) to adulterate a staple food like wheat in order to put 40 million rupees in their own pockets? This large-scale food adulteration has led to gastric diseases which have caused people to die a miserable death or become invalids for life. One murder can, and does, result in a death penalty, but we have not heard of a food adulterator who was hanged or imprisoned for life. In other countries, such people are hanged or shot to death, but in Pakistan the adulteration of every item of food is carried on as a profitable business. If one murder can lead to a death penalty, why can we not hang those who cause thousands of consumers to become victims of dysentery?

Only the poorer among the culprits are caught and punished with fines. They pay the fines with pleasure and go on with their nefarious activities. Thus the vicious circle continues.

It happened when Pakistan was newly created. Wheat was brought from Punjab to a smaller province that needed it. The distribution of wheat to the flour mills was under consideration, when the secretary of the Food Department said to the chief minister: "If we give the flour mills an equal amount of dirt to be mixed in the flour the government could save a lot of money for other projects. The chief minister flew into a rage when he heard these words and told the secretary that he thought he was out of his mind. He turned the secretary out of his office and called the food minister and gave

him his final instructions. This one instance is sufficient to show that adulteration is carried on even at the highest official levels. It is strange to remember our high national ethics when Pakistan was created, and our patriotism during the wars of '65 and '71, and then look at the moral depths to which we have sunk now. Let us take the latest wheat scandal. We have set new records of dishonesty in every sphere of life. For 3 years, some individuals supplied adulterated wheat to the flour mills, which has proved to be a great health hazard for the consumers. These wheat suppliers are said to have made 40 million rupees by this fraud. One of them has acquired posh houses in Islamabad, besides a flour mill and a factory. Of the dozen or so persons who perpetrated this crime, five have fled the country. How they managed to escape is another story. How did these people, who were officials of the food department, manage to commit this crime unchecked? This will be discovered at some future date. It is not a small sum of money, 40 million rupees. Large sums of money must have been given as "hush money" to those who could disclose the secret. The law court will find a way of discovering how this pie was divided. Adulteration at the flour mills is an old story. There has always been an abundant supply of dirt, bran, bread crumbs and left-overs from the bun-factories at these mills to be mixed in the wheat flour. If the government officials had been honest, nobody could have dared to commit such a crime. But as long as the mill-owners present heavy purses to the government officials every month, the nation's health will continue to be destroyed by this unholy alliance between the Seths and the dishonest government officials.

It is said that each of the chief actors in the latest wheat scandal received a purse of 10,000 rupees every month. Most countries in the world have eradicated adulteration of food. Even in the Third World many countries have uprooted it. In Asia, only in India and Pakistan has this crime not been eradicated. Criminals are always inventing new methods of adulterating wheat. Adulteration of food is flourishing in these countries because it is not considered a great crime here. Punishment is too mild to frighten the criminals. This crime will not stop as long as the adulterators are not awarded the death penalty. It is a mystery why our government has never thought of uprooting the heinous crimes so common in the country. Besides adulteration, which is undermining the nation's health, there is kidnapping of children, forced labor camps and corruption. These three crimes can be easily uprooted only if our government sets to work seriously. The public, who want to be rid of corrupt officials, will give whole-hearted cooperation. The common people do not dare to report the corrupt government officials to the police or the law courts, because they are afraid of their power. They do not want to be disgraced in public. They will learn self-confidence only if they believe the government is with them.

The way wheat is being desecrated in Pakistan has no parallel in the world. Wheat which has been imported at the expense of a lot of foreign exchange is left to rot under the open sky, until the sun and rain make it unfit for human consumption and it has to be thrown to the hens. Have the people guilty of this criminal neglect been brought to justice? Who was punished, and how? The public has not been informed about that. We have often heard of food-grains rotting at the Karachi harbor, but we have never come across the news



that the officer in charge of the food-grains was fired from his job or had been punished in some other way. We have been told that thousands of tons of food-grain is devoured by rats, birds and insects while it is in the fields or barns, because there are very few concrete godowns for storing it. How are food-grains protected in America, Canada, Australia and the USSR? Why do our responsible officials not visit these countries and find out? The shameful tricks we have played with our wheat is a woeful tale. In the past, when there was plenty of wheat in our land and a dearth of it in India, our brave smugglers bought old trucks, repaired them and started to use them for smuggling our wheat across the border. A camel force was trained to prevent smuggling of wheat from one of our smaller provinces. After some time, it was discovered that the camels were being used to smuggle the wheat out of the province. By the time the camel force was disbanded the criminals had made hundreds of thousands of rupees. All such hypocrites should be apprehended without delay and given exemplary punishment.

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PAKISTAN

COMPROMISE URGED TO RESOLVE KALABAGH DAM DISPUTE

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 2 Oct 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Distribution of River Water and Kalabagh Dam: These Matters Should be Resolved Through Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] The rewriting of the Constitutional Eighth Amendment Bill with regard to the ending of martial law and the restoration of democracy can be appropriately described as a vital step forward. However, due to the announcement made by the members of the Azad group to oppose it, it can be said, with regard to this important issue, that this version is still on trial. The prime minister has extended his invitation to the Azad group for a fresh dialogue. But, so far, it is difficult to make any final statement with regard to the finding or adoption of any solution similar to the mutual understanding and consensus that have been rightly emphasized. Anyhow, the nature and form of whatever happens will soon come into the limelight. However, the reality unveiled by the 3 weeks of discussion, argument and exchange of view on this issue is that, if, for any reason, there is further delay in resolving the issues of national importance on a basis acceptable to all, it can lead to the creation of many types of problems.

The need for this plea is felt because of those entanglements and associated emotional statements being made with regard to the distribution of river water among the provinces, especially the implementation of the plan for the canal connecting the Jehlum Spring and the Kalabagh Dam. If the delay continues in sitting down together and resolving these issues, doing full justice to all the provinces and in the maximum national interest, there is a danger that, once again, the same type of emotional environment will be created that occurred when the connecting canal to the Jehlum Spring was closed because of low water in the rivers, was in turn result of the lengthy drought during the first half of the current year. Not only did the chief ministers of the Punjab and Sindh participate in this discussion, but, besides the elected members of the Assembly, even those politicians who on the platform of the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] gave the impression of being united and in agreement, enthusiastically took part in the interpretation of regional interests. However, these individuals also made such emotional remarks in the discussion as that they would not allow anyone to steal the water allocated to their province.

These regional arguments, demands and bitter exchanges over the division of river waters are still going on because, for some reason, the very same temporary arrangement that was made on an ad hoc basis, during the previous administration's era, is still being pursued. For some reason, there is delay and hesitation in accepting the 1983 report by the commission headed by the chief justice of Pakistan, Mr Mohammad Haleem, as the permanent solution of this problem. Last month, when closure of the canal connecting the Spring became a public issue again, the federal minister of water resources, Mr Zafrullah Khan Jamali, made it clear that this canal was being routinely closed only for yearly repair and that it is now functioning. He also said that the federal government regarded the four provinces of the country as brothers and, keeping in view the interests of all of them, base its decisions and actions on the collective national interest. Prior to this, he also gave the impression that this issue would be resolved just before the spring harvest on the basis of Justice Mohammad Haleem's commission report. It appears, however, that the possibility is increasing, of the repetition at the time of the spring harvest, which, on the occasion of the autumn crops, became a source of extreme concern for those who think on the basis of the country and the nation. Now that a new element has been or is being added in this discussion as to whether the site of the proposed Kalabagh Dam is suitable or not, there appears to be a well-grounded danger that, if there is delay and hesitation in resolving this issue with prudence and wisdom, the magnanimous and far-reaching national interests will slip into the background. The self-styled flag-bearers and champions seeking their province's interests will once again make the air and environment tense with their emotional slogans. The strange and sad thing is that all matters related to the Kalabagh Dam are being studied by a cabinet committee which has also made arrangements to seek advice from all provincial governments. However, the provincial ministers of irrigation for the North West Frontier Province and the Punjab appear to be the front runners in making emotional remarks of opposition.

This series of discussion, opinion and consultation on the Kalabagh Dam, reflecting emotional disagreements and disputes and referring to alleged provincial and regional interests, has begun at the time when the chairman of WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority], Lt Gen Dr Ghulam Safdar Butt, disclosed that a 30-year study and analysis of all aspects of this plan has already entered its final and categorical stage. Also, the task of soliciting tenders on the various technical and construction contracts for this dam is about to commence. The honorable chairman announced that the estimate of expenditure on this dam will be \$3 billion. However, the estimate of the benefit the four provinces will enjoy from its water-storage and hydroelectricity units will be approximately \$1 billion yearly. Right at this stage, however, the question of the suitability of the site chosen for the Kalabagh Dam has been raised. The site of Basha has been suggested instead. Although that, too, is under consideration by the WAPDA, still, at least another 10 years will be required to analyze and study its suitability, etc. In other words, if any obstruction arises in the construction of the Kalabagh Dam, its water-storage (7.6 million acre-feet), as customary, will be lost to the sea. If the path of the production of 2,400 to 3,600 megawatts of electricity is uneven, more extensive load-shedding than in previous years will, for an

indefinite period of time, become a source of much more concern, inconvenience and loss.

What this situation demands is that the issues of distribution of river waters and construction of the Kalabagh Dam not be put in arrears. Instead, the federal government and the relevant and authorized officials from all the provinces should sit together for a positive thinking and planning session to resolve these issues in the best interest of the nation. There is a great possibility that the dangers that are being indicated with regard to the Kalabagh Dam are mere threats, and they might have no connection with reality. Furthermore, by sitting down together, some solution might be worked out that is practicable and acceptable to all. On the contrary, if this vital issues is kept pending for fear of diverse voices and this ad hoc system is continued which satisfies none of the provinces, the differences and disputes will become permanent. The opportunity of benefitting from the resources available for the progress of the country will never arise, and the real deprivation will have to be shared by the nation and the country. Whatever the nature of the problems and however vast the circle of differences over them, it just does not reflect a positive outlook to continue the chain of delay and hesitation in resolving them through mutual understanding based on principle and justice. Neither will the impact and implications prove to be beneficial and felicitous for the nation and the country.

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PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

SOFT LOAN FROM JAPAN--Pakistan and Japan signed an agreement in Tokyo yesterday, under which Japan will provide a soft loan of 23.3 billion yen. The loan will be utilized for the development of Pakistan railways, including purchase of diesel locomotives and other commodities. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in English 1005 GMT 30 Oct 85 BK]

PRC CULTURAL DELEGATION--A delegation of Chinese artistes, led by (Yia Yau Gong) and visiting Pakistan, called on the federal minister for culture and sports, Lieutenant General Jamal Said Mian, retired, in Islamabad yesterday and exchanged views with him on matters pertaining to cultural cooperation between the two countries. The federal minister said that a 5-member Pakistani cultural delegation will visit China soon. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0600 GMT 1 Nov 85 BK]

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